Archive for December, 2011

DISEASES ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO BE CAUSED BY PARTICIPATION IN ATMOSPHERIC TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

December 31, 2011

Leukaemia (other than chronic Iymphocytic leukaemia)

Cancer of the Thyroid

Cancer of the Breast

Cancer of the Pharynx

Cancer of the Oesophagus

Cancer of the Stomach

Cancer of the small intestine

Cancer of the Pancreas

Multiple Myeloma

Lymphomas (except Hodgkinís disease)

Cancer of the Bile Ducts

Cancer of the Gall Bladder

Cancer of the liver (except if cirrhosis or hepatitis indicated)

Cancer of the urinary tract, which also translates to the bladder and kidneys

Cancer of the salivary glands

Incorporated into public law 100-321, 20.5.88.

“This law gives US atomic exservicemen due recognition for the unusual service they rendered, and is an expression of gratitude of the American people toward their atomic veterans The law enables Veteran Affairs benefits to flow to US atomic veterans who are afflicted. The US government m relation to nuclear veterans considers the nature of service plus the development of any of the above diseases sufficient cause to quality for Veteran Benefits regardless of recorded dose rates received. All US nuclear test service personnel are officially Veterans.”

Fukushima blog http://thebrinydeep.wordpress.com/

December 31, 2011

thanks to David Ritchie for pointing this one out.

http://thebrinydeep.wordpress.com/

Fukushima decontamination law to go into full force Sunday – Mainichi Daily News

December 31, 2011

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111231p2g00m0dm051000c.html

TOKYO (Kyodo) — A nuclear decontamination law will go into full effect Sunday, setting the stage for full-fledged efforts to clean up buildings, soil and waste contaminated with radioactive materials in areas affected by the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Fukushima Prefecture.

The central government will be responsible for the cleanup efforts in a no-go zone around the crippled plant and other evacuation areas in the seaside prefecture also heavily hit by the March 11 earthquake and tsunami.

Under the law, which was partially enacted in August, decontamination plans will be formulated by 102 municipalities in eight prefectures where radiation doses are expected to exceed 1 millisievert a year on top of natural background radiation and that from medical treatment.

The cleanup cost in the areas will be shouldered by the central government. The eight prefectures are Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama and Chiba.

The Environment Ministry is set to launch a 60-odd member office in the city of Fukushima on Sunday to push decontamination work within Fukushima Prefecture, with plans to start in late January the cleanup of infrastructure such as roads and water supply inside the no-go zone and elsewhere.

Full-fledged cleanup work is likely to start at the end of March, ministry officials said.

The ministry hopes to halve annual radiation doses for ordinary people and reduce those for children by 60 percent by the end of August 2013.

Under the law, the state will dispose of ashes from incinerated waste and sludge if they are found to contain more than 8,000 becquerels of radioactive cesium per kilogram.

It will still be necessary to find either space in the affected areas to temporarily keep contaminated soil and waste or landfills for disposal. The central government has recently asked municipalities in the Futaba district in Fukushima Prefecture to host a temporary storage facility for a massive amount of contaminated soil to be removed within the prefecture.

In the prefectures except Fukushima, contaminated waste is to be buried in landfills with plastic liners, but whether local communities will give a nod to the disposal remains to be seen.

(Mainichi Japan) December 31, 2011

Tom Uren – the politician who asked the hard Maralinga questions in Federal Parliament

December 31, 2011

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Uren

Thomas Uren, AO (born 28 May 1921) was a Deputy Leader of the Australian Labor Party. He helped establish the heritage and conservation movement in Australia and, in particular, worked to preserve the heritage of inner Sydney.

In 1941, Uren joined the Australian Army and served in the 2/40th Infantry Battalion. He was deployed to Timor and was a prisoner of the Japanese from 1942 to 1945, during which time he worked on the Burma-Siam railway and served with Edward “Weary” Dunlop. He was later transferred to Japan where he witnessed the distant crimson sky resulting from the explosion of the US atom bomb on Nagasaki.[3][4][5] He was discharged in December, 1945 with the rank of Bombardier.[6]

After the war Uren spent a short time trying to revive his boxing career which included a trip to England and he worked for his passage on voyages through the Panama Canal. On return he spent some time as a Woolworths manager at Lithgow. He was inspired to join the Australian Labor Party after attending Ben Chifley’s funeral.

Uren won Labor pre-selection in 1957 for the House of Representatives seat of Reid in western Sydney, which he won at the 1958 election. He was to represent the electorate until his retirement before the 1990 election, thirty two years later.[4]

Uren was a strong supporter of the left wing of the Labor Party, led at first by Eddie Ward and later by Jim Cairns, and was sometimes accused of being a secret communist, an accusation he denied. He campaigned against the Vietnam War, conscription and nuclear testing.

In 1969 Uren was appointed by Gough Whitlam to the Opposition front bench with responsibility for housing and urban affairs, which became his passion for the rest of his career. He was Minister for Urban and Regional Development in the Whitlam government from 1972 to 1975. He established the Australian Heritage Commission and consequent compilation of the Register of the National Estate. In Sydney, he promoted the restoration and re-use of derelict inner city areas such as the Glebe Estate and Woolloomooloo, the reclamation of Duck Creek and the creation of the Chipping Norton Lakes Scheme.[8] He was a key player in the creation of the Towra Point Nature Reserve.[citation needed] Despite his rhetoric as a firebrand, he proved a highly competent minister and was one of the few ministers to emerge from the fall of the Whitlam government with his reputation enhanced.[citation needed]

In 1976 Uren was elected Deputy Leader of the Labor Party under Whitlam as Opposition Leader, but after the 1977 election, when Bill Hayden was elected Leader, he was replaced by Lionel Bowen. He succeeded Jim Cairns as leader of the ALP Left, and bitterly opposed Bob Hawke’s rise to the Labor leadership.[citation needed] As a result, when the Hawke government won the 1983 election, Uren, despite being a former deputy leader of the party, was omitted from the Cabinet – he was given the junior portfolio of Minister for Territories and Local Government, and from 1984 to 1987 Local Government and Administrative Services. He became Father of the House of Representatives in 1984.

Uren stood down from the ministry after the 1987 election and retired from Parliament in 1990. He was the last veteran of World War II in the House of Representatives. In retirement he continues to campaign for various causes, including the protection of Sydney Harbour and its foreshores.[8] He opposes Australia’s participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[5]

see also https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2011/12/25/response-number-3-to-mr-patte-some-hansard-references/


amd

https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2011/12/31/nuclear-injustice-in-australia-continues-unabated-leanne-patricia-byron-jones-tells-her-story/

http://www.australianbiography.gov.au/subjects/uren/

Japanese GSDF Commander thought “Japan was done for” as he faced Fukushima crisis.

December 31, 2011

Mainichi Daily News.

(Is this technology worth it?)

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111231p2a00m0na013000c.html

Toshinobu Miyajima, commanding general of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) Central Readiness Force when it was desperately trying to bring the crippled Fukushima nuclear plant under control, thought at one point that Japan was done for, he recalled in a recent interview with the Mainichi.

However, Miyajima pointed out that the highly risky mission demonstrated to the world that Japan was truly serious about containing the crisis, which led the United States and other countries to extend major assistance to disaster areas. Excerpts of the interview follow:

Question: When were you ordered to serve as the commander of the response to the disaster at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant?

Answer: I was told to do so by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) on March 14. On March 20, then Prime Minister Naoto Kan ordered me to take command of SDF units, police and fire departments in an integrated fashion to respond to the nuclear crisis. We transported supplies and secured water sources, sprayed water to cool down the crippled nuclear reactors, helped residents in areas around the plant evacuate, decontaminated districts tainted with radiation and flew helicopter sorties to measure radiation levels, among other things.

Q: Had the SDF conducted nuclear accident response drills before the Fukushima disaster?

A: Not at all. We utilized our knowledge of radiation we had accumulated as part of our preparations for terrorist attacks.

Q: Were you afraid of being exposed to radiation?

A: Since it was a totally unexpected mission, SDF members were extremely worried about it. The deputy commanding general who led forces in the disaster areas visited them first, confirmed the situation and reported to me with a smile: “There’s no problem.” This reassured members of the force, and allowed them to calmly carry out their mission. I received a report that a radiation alarm was constantly beeping while water was being sprayed from fire engines (onto the reactors). However, all those involved in the work were dressed in protective gear and managed their radiation doses, so I wasn’t worried much.

Q: How did you feel when your force was ordered to drop water from helicopters onto the exposed reactors?

A: I was wondering whether we would actually be required to carry it out. In addition to high radiation levels, I was worried that if we dropped 5 metric tons of water from the sky, it could create a shock and trigger another explosion at the plant. I knew it’d be dangerous, but I thought unless we carried out the risky mission, there could be a catastrophe. I was watching the water drops on a screen, and when I heard on the radio, “We hit the target,” I was relieved.

Q: Did you assume the worst-case scenario?

A: I arranged models on a map in the commander’s office without being noticed by my subordinates, and repeatedly simulated expansions of the evacuation zone to 100 to 200 kilometers from the power plant. At one point, I thought Japan was finished. We never use the phrase, “beyond the scope of assumptions.” We can’t respond to a catastrophe unless we place even the worst possible situations within the scope of our assumptions.

Q: Weren’t you under enormous pressure?

A: Since I joined the SDF 35 years ago, I’ve constantly thought about how commanders should act. I think it’s extremely important for commanders to endure loneliness and demonstrate to their subordinates that they’re calm even if they’re desperate.

Q: How did you build up cooperation between the SDF and relevant organizations?

A: Plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) has been accused of hiding relevant information, but I think the utility released all available information to us. It was the first time that the SDF took integrated command of both its own troops and relevant (civilian) organizations, but thanks to that police, firefighters and TEPCO, among other organizations, worked closely with each other in combating the crisis. However, the SDF didn’t play a leading role in bringing the nuclear crisis under control. Rather, our role was to buy time until the full-scale reactor cooling system began operations, giving the government and TEPCO leeway to decide how to respond to the crisis.

Q: What do you think are some future challenges for the SDF regarding responses to nuclear crises?

A: We can’t conduct exercises for dealing with nuclear crises unless the government clarifies how far the SDF should be involved in responding to them. Nuclear accident response drills had been held in various parts of Japan but they were just a formality, because of the long-held myth that nuclear energy was safe. However, we should learn from the ongoing crisis and work out effective measures.

(Mainichi Japan) December 31, 2011

A reader writes: Is Fukushima really dead yet?

December 31, 2011

“Is Fukushima really dead yet? It is still a living source of deadly Radiation.

I recently came across these atmpospheric simulations, produced an American independent organization, that indicate TEPCO vastly under-reported radionuclide emissions from the Fukushima Plant.

http://www.datapoke.org/blog/8/study-modeling-fukushima-npp-radioactive-contamination-dispersion-utilizing-chino-m-et-al-source-terms/

http://www.datapoke.org/partmom/a=40

I’ve suspected for some time that the publicly released emissions data had been manipulated – If the models are correct I suppose this re enforces my hunch. Is there anyone here that can help us explain the implications of this model?” by unspokenhermit end quote.

Any takers?

Ric Johnstone Memorial Page.

December 31, 2011

From Alan and Marion Batchelor who passed one the following:

From Gordon Beckwith

Dear Alan,

I discovered this on the “Web” today, It appears to have been posted a few days ago.

http://www.heavenaddress.com/funeral-notice/Daryl-Richard-Johnstone/402377/obituary.aspx

Daryl Richard Johnstone
Born in Carlton, VIC, Australia on 30 November 1933
Passed away in Australia on 25 December 2011
Late of Erina, NSW
Aged 78 Years

– Service Details
Funeral service will be held at Palmdale Lawn Cemetery & Memorial Park, Palmdale Road, Palmdale, NSW, Australia on Tuesday, 3 January 2012 commencing at 4:00 pm.
Kind Regards,

Gordon [Beckwith]

Comments to my blog earlier blog entry in memory of Ric:
K. Sanders
Submitted on 2011/12/29 at 12:07 am

Thanks to Ric’s good friends Carmen and Dani who cared for him in his last days. Ric’s death has been a difficult time for these unsung heroes. X

Max Govan
mgovan8@bigpond.com (permission for publication of email address sought and given to enable contact between Max and anyone with desire to contact the SA Australian Nuclear Veterans Association)
101.103.20.118
Submitted on 2011/12/28 at 11:51 am

It saddens me to hear of Ric’s death, I had many conversations with him after he requested I become the SA rep. of the ANVA.
I found him to be a great bloke and true to his beliefs.
Max Govan

Beverley Beaver (Reg Beaver’s Widow)
December 27, 2011 at 9:26 am
I am very sad to hear of ric’s passing,he was always there to help and support the nuclear veterans widows. Bye Ric.

See also : https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2011/12/26/the-passing-of-ric-johnstone-president-of-the-australian-nuclear-veterans-association-christmas-day-2011/

Lapp was right (1970s) The plumbing broke. Even without tsunami, even with power, coolant would not flow.

December 31, 2011

Read this one first: https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2011/03/27/ralp-lapp-unsafe-core-cooling-systems-in-reactors-1971/

The reason why the people of Fukushima had to put up with the nuclear plants is that they are too dangerous to put near Tokyo. Fukushima Prefecture is not powered by the Fuk nukes. The juice went to Tokyo.

Industry has stated that the tsunami was an unforeseeible event, (wrong) and that it took out the backout power and the main grid. Hence the meltdowns. But the question has always been – what if the quake itself caused failure in the cooling plumbing – like a car bursting a radiator hose, no amount of power to the water pump will cool the thing.

So here’s the story of what actually happened from “The Atlantic Wire”.

http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/07/meltdown-what-really-happened-fukushima/39541/

Meltdown: What Really Happened at Fukushima?
Jake Adelstein and David McNeill Jul 2, 2011

It’s been one of the mysteries of Japan’s ongoing nuclear disaster: How much of the damage did the March 11 earthquake inflict on Fukushima Daiichi’s reactors in the 40 minutes before the devastating tsunami arrived? The stakes are high: If the quake alone structurally compromised the plant and the safety of its nuclear fuel, then every other similar reactor in Japan is at risk.

Throughout the months of lies and misinformation, one story has stuck: “The earthquake knocked out the plant’s electric power, halting cooling to its reactors,” as the government spokesman Yukio Edano said at a March 15 press conference in Tokyo. The story, which has been repeated again and again, boils down to this: “after the earthquake, the tsunami – a unique, unforeseeable [the Japanese word is soteigai] event – then washed out the plant’s back-up generators, shutting down all cooling and starting the chain of events that would cause the world’s first triple meltdown to occur.”

But what if recirculation pipes and cooling pipes, burst, snapped, leaked, and broke completely after the earthquake — long before the tidal wave reached the facilities, long before the electricity went out? This would surprise few people familiar with the 40-year-old Unit 1, the grandfather of the nuclear reactors still operating in Japan.

The authors have spoken to several workers at the plant who recite the same story: Serious damage to piping and at least one of the reactors before the tsunami hit. All have requested anonymity because they are still working at the plant or are connected with TEPCO. One worker, a maintenance engineer in his late twenties who was at the Fukushima complex on March 11, recalls hissing and leaking pipes. “I personally saw pipes that came apart and I assume that there were many more that had been broken throughout the plant. There’s no doubt that the earthquake did a lot of damage inside the plant,” he said. “There were definitely leaking pipes, but we don’t know which pipes – that has to be investigated. I also saw that part of the wall of the turbine building for Unit 1 had come away. That crack might have affected the reactor.”

The reactor walls of the reactor are quite fragile, he notes. “If the walls are too rigid, they can crack under the slightest pressure from inside so they have to be breakable because if the pressure is kept inside and there is a buildup of pressure, it can damage the equipment inside the walls so it needs to be allowed to escape. It’s designed to give during a crisis, if not it could be worse – that might be shocking to others, but to us it’s common sense.”

A second worker, a technician in his late 30s, who was also on site at the time of the earthquake, narrated what happened. “It felt like the earthquake hit in two waves, the first impact was so intense you could see the building shaking, the pipes buckling, and within minutes, I saw pipes bursting. Some fell off the wall. Others snapped. I was pretty sure that some of the oxygen tanks stored on site had exploded but I didn’t see for myself. Someone yelled that we all needed to evacuate and I was good with that. But I was severely alarmed because as I was leaving I was told and I could see that several pipes had cracked open, including what I believe were cold water supply pipes. That would mean that coolant couldn’t get to the reactor core. If you can’t sufficiently get the coolant to the core, it melts down. You don’t have to have to be a nuclear scientist to figure that out.”

As he was heading to his car, he could see the walls of the reactor one building itself had already started to collapse. “There were holes in them. In the first few minutes, no one was thinking about a tsunami. We were thinking about survival.”

A third worker was coming into work late when the earthquake hit. “I was in a building nearby when the earthquake shook. After the second shockwave hit, I heard a loud explosion that was almost deafening. I looked out the window and I could see white smoke coming from reactor one. I thought to myself, ‘this is the end.’”

When the worker got to the office five to 15 minutes later the supervisor ordered them all to evacuate, explaining, “there’s been an explosion of some gas tanks in reactor one, probably the oxygen tanks. In addition to this there has been some structural damage, pipes have burst, meltdown is possible. Please take shelter immediately.” (It should be noted that there have been several explosions at Daiichi even after the March 11 earthquake, one of which TEPCO stated, “was probably due to a gas tank left behind in the debris”.)

However, while the employees prepared to leave, the tsunami warning came. Many of them fled to the top floor of a building near the site and waited to be rescued.

The reason for official reluctance to admit that the earthquake did direct structural damage to reactor one is obvious. Katsunobu Onda, author of TEPCO: The Dark Empire (東京電力・暗黒の帝国), who sounded the alarm about the firm in his 2007 book explains it this way: If TEPCO and the gover“nment of Japan admit an earthquake can do direct damage to the reactor, this raises suspicions about the safety of every reactor they run. They are using a number of antiquated reactors that have the same systematic problems, the same wear and tear on the piping.”

In a previous story, Kei Sugaoka, a Japanese engineer who worked at the Unit 1 site, says that he wasn’t surprised that a meltdown took place after the earthquake. He sent the Japanese government a letter, dated June 28, 2000, warning them of the problems there. It took the Japanese government more than two years to act on that warning. Mr. Sugaoka has also said he saw yakuza tattoos on many of the cleanup crew staff. When interviewed on May 23 he stated, “The plant had problems galore and the approach taken with them was piecemeal. Most of the critical work: construction work, inspection work, and welding were entrusted to sub-contracted employees with little technical background or knowledge of nuclear radiation. I can’t remember there ever being a disaster drill. The TEPCO employees never got their hands dirty.”

Onda notes, “I’ve spent decades researching TEPCO and its nuclear power plants and what I’ve found, and what government reports confirm is that the nuclear reactors are only as strong as their weakest links, and those links are the pipes.”

During his research, Onda spoke with several engineers who worked at the TEPCO plants. One told him that often piping would not match up the way it should according to the blueprints. In that case, the only solution was to use heavy machinery to pull the pipes close enough together to weld them shut. Inspection of piping was often cursory and the backs of the pipes, which were hard to reach, were often ignored. Since the inspections themselves were generally cursory and done by visual checks, it was easy to ignore them. Repair jobs were rushed; no one wanted to be exposed to nuclear radiation longer than necessary.

Onda adds, “When I first visited the Fukushima power plant it was a web of pipes. Pipes on the wall, on the ceiling, on the ground. You’d have to walk over them, duck under them—sometimes you’d bump your head on them. It was like a maze of pipes inside.”

Onda believes it’s not very difficult to explain what happened at Unit 1 and perhaps the other reactors as well. “The pipes, which regulate the heat of the reactor and carry coolant, are the veins and arteries of a nuclear power plant; the core is the heart. If the pipes burst, vital components don’t reach the heart and thus you have a heart attack, in nuclear terms: meltdown. In simpler terms, you can’t cool a reactor core if the pipes carrying the coolant and regulating the heat rupture—it doesn’t get to the core.”

Tooru Hasuike, a TEPCO employee from 1977 until 2009 andformer general safety manager of the Fukushima plant, also notes: “The emergency plans for a nuclear disaster at the Fukushima plant had no mention of using sea-water to cool the core. To pump seawater into the core is to destroy the reactor. The only reason you’d do that is no other water or coolant was available.”

Problems with the fractured, deteriorating, poorly repaired pipes and the cooling system had been pointed out for years. In 2002, whistle-blower allegations that TEPCO had deliberately falsified safety records came to light and the company was forced to shut down all of its reactors and inspect them, including the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant. Kei Sugaoka, a GE on-site inspector first notified Japan’s nuclear watch dog, Nuclear Industrial Safey Agency (NISA) in June of 2000. Not only did the government of Japan take more than two years to address the problem and collude on covering it up, they gave the name of the whistleblower to TEPCO.

In September of 2002, TEPCO admitted to covering up data concerning cracks in critical circulation pipes in addition to previously revealed falsifications. In their analysis of the cover-up, The Citizen’s Nuclear Information Center writes: “The records that were covered up had to do with cracks in parts of the reactor known as recirculation pipes. These pipes are there to siphon off heat from the reactor. If these pipes were to fracture, it would result in a serious accident in which coolant leaks out. From the perspective of safety, these are highly important pieces of equipment. Cracks were found in the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant, reactor one, reactor two, reactor three, reactor four, reactor five.” The cracks in the pipes were not due to earthquake damage; they came from the simple wear and tear of long-term usage.

On March 2, nine days before the meltdown, the Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) gave TEPCO a warning on its failure to inspect critical pieces of equipment at the plant, which included the recirculation pumps. TEPCO was ordered to make the inspections, perform repairs if needed and give a report to the NISA on June 2. The report is not confirmed to have been filed as of this time.

The problems were not only with the piping. Gas tanks at the site also exploded after the earthquake. The outside of the reactor building suffered structural damage. There was some chaos. There was no one really qualified to assess the radioactive leakage because, as the Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency admits, after the accident all the on-site inspectors fled the site. And the quake and tsunami broke most of the monitoring equipment so there was little information available on radiation afterwards.

Before the dawn on March 12, the water levels at the reactor began to plummet and the radiation began rising. Meltdown was taking place. The TEPCO Press release issued on March 12 just past 4am stated, “the pressure within the containment vessel is high but stable.” There was a note buried in the release that many people missed. “The emergency water circulation system was cooling the steam within the core; it has ceased to function.”

According to The Chunichi Shinbun and other sources, a few hours after the earthquake extremely high levels of radiation were being measured within the reactor one building. The levels were so high that if you spent a full day exposed to them it would be fatal. The water levels of the reactor were already sinking.After the Japanese government forced TEPCO to release hundreds of pages of documents relating to the accident in May, Bloomberg reported on May 19 that a radiation alarm went off 1.5 kilometers from the number one reactor on March 11 at 3:29 p.m., minutes before the tsunami reached the plant. TEPCO would not deny the possibility that there was significant radiation leakage before the power went out. They did assert that the alarm might have simply malfunctioned.

On March 11, at 9:51 p.m., under the CEO’s orders, the inside of the reactor building was declared a no-entry zone. Around 11 p.m., radiation levels for the inside of the turbine building, which was next door to the reactor, reached hourly levels of 0.5 to 1.2 mSv. The meltdown was already underway.

Oddly enough, while TEPCO later insisted that the cause of the meltdown was the tsunami knocking out emergency power systems, at the 7:47 p.m. TEPCO press conference the same day, the spokesman in response to questions from the press about the cooling systems stated that the emergency water circulation equipment and reactor core isolation time cooling systems would work even without electricity.

Sometime between 4 and 6 a.m. on March 12, Masao Yoshida, the plant manager decided it was time to pump seawater into the reactor core and notified TEPCO. Seawater was not pumped in until hours after a hydrogen explosion occurred, roughly 8:00 p.m. that day. By then, it was probably already too late.

On May 15, TEPCO went some way toward admitting at least some of these claims in a report called “Reactor Core Status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit One.” The report said there might have been pre-tsunami damage to key facilities including pipes. “This means that assurances from the industry in Japan and overseas that the reactors were robust is now blown apart,” said Shaun Burnie, an independent nuclear waste consultant. “It raises fundamental questions on all reactors in high seismic risk areas.”

As Burnie points out, TEPCO also admitted massive fuel melt –16 hours after loss of coolant, and 7-8 hours before the explosion in unit 1. “Since they must have known all this – their decision to flood with massive water volumes would guarantee massive additional contamination – including leaks to the ocean.”

No one knows exactly how much damage was done to the plant by the quake, or if this damage alone would account for the meltdown. However, eyewitness testimony and TEPCO’S own data indicates that the damage was significant. All of this despite the fact that shaking experienced at the plant during the quake was within it’s approved design specifications. Says Hasuike: “What really happened at the Fukushima Daiicihi Nuclear Power Plant to cause a meltdown? TEPCO and the government of Japan have provided many explanations. They don’t make sense. The one thing they haven’t provided is the truth. It’s time that they did.”

Jake Adelstein is an investigative journalist, consultant, and the author of Tokyo Vice: An American Reporter On The Police Beat In Japan. He is also a board member of the Washington, D.C.-based Polaris Project Japan, which combats human trafficking and the exploitation of women and children in the sex trade. David McNeill writes for The Irish Times, The Independent and other publications. He has taught courses on journalism at Sophia University and is a coordinator of Japan Focus. Stephanie Nakajima contributed to this article.

Photos via Reuters.

Nuclear injustice in Australia continues unabated. Leanne Patricia Byron (Jones) tells her story.

December 31, 2011

Leanne Patricia Byron (Jones)

Submitted on 2011/12/31 at 12:09 am

I am the daughter of William Cameron Jones. Not only did my siblings and I have our father taken from us at a very early age due to very cruel circumstances and a great deal of suffering relating to his illness, but we also lost our brother, Terry at the age of 45 yrs, on Christmas Eve 1999. Terry died from bowel cancer and it needs to be noted that he was conceived when dad returned from Emu Field back in 1953, our family often wonder about the effects of dad’s radiation poisoning on him and if indeed his cancer was a result of this.
Once again my mother and us siblings endured a great deal of pain and suffering as we watched her eldest son and our elder brother die, the same way as our dad (aged 39yrs) had, it was like watching history repeat itself.
Terry left behind a young wife and 5 year old daughter, who have suffered the same way we did. His first child was stillborn, she had fluid on her brain.
Our mother is now in her 80′s and suffering from dementia and now struggles to remember the events of the ‘Maralinga’ saga. During the legal battles she believed that she didn’t have to pay any fees, as she used legal aid. We have recently discovered that there is a $30,000 covenant on her house to cover legal costs endured over the years. How can this be? Her compensation was measily and now she has a huge bill which is expected to be paid upon the sale of her property.
My children and myself are now researching the events of Maralinga and the legal battle and question the effects of radiation, not only upon the victims themselves, but also for our own generations.
I wonder if there are any other families out there with similar circumstances?

Thanks for sharing this information Leanne. I have, via the Atomic ExServicemen’s Association magazine, Atomic Fallout, photos of the Centurion Tank your late father drove and had to spend much time stuck with in the contaminated zone at Emu Field. I will post these photos here asap. I urge Australian authorities to do the moral and correct thing in regard to the situation Leanne has documented here. Show some leadership Gillard and Abbott. Don’t run off to Whitehall for permission first either.
The tank Leanne’s Dad drove and was stuck with:
tank
Not sure if this is the same tank, but this what was done: Driving a Centurion tanks around in contaminated dust after a British bomb blast. tank
Another shot of a Royal Australian Electrical & Mechanical Engineers crew recovering a tank broken down as a result of being a nuclear bomb blast target response test vehicle. tank In all these shots, note the lack of protective gear, even though the personnel are in primary fallout areas near shot point. Australian and British Nuclear authorities have much to answer for. For these photos show crime scenes. They who make the law can break the law with impunity they think. Think again.

A centurion tank used as nuclear bomb target respopnse vehicle during the British nuclear bombing of Australia. This one, and others, were later used in combat in Vietnam. tank

Recap: the Hansard record re William Jones:
I020 COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY HANSARD REPRESENTATIVES 20 MARCH 1980 Mr UREN (Reid) (12.35)

– in today’s grievance debate I want to raise further questions about the British nuclear weapons tests that were conducted in South Australia from the early 1950s to the early 1960s. In particular I would like to open up the question of the effect of those tests on the health of Australians who were involved in the weapons testing program at that time.

I raise this matter because I have received further evidence which I present to the House that people who formerly worked at the weapons test sites have since contracted cancer and some of them have died. I also raise this matter because there is more and more evidence in the United States that many have suffered as a consequence of the Nevada nuclear weapons tests. Yet in this country the Fraser Government still refuses to acknowledge that there have been people whose health has been affected by such tests. It even refuses to carry out or follow up any studies of health by the Australian personnel who worked at Maralinga and Emu Last year I was approached by a Melbourne woman concerning her continued attempts to gain fair compensation for herself and her children for the death of her husband in 1966. The woman’s late husband. William Jones had been a member of the Army from 1952 to 1965 when he was discharged as medially unfit for military service. He died of carcinoma nine months later in 1966 at the age of 39. Mrs Jones says that her husband was sent on a secret mission for several months from his home base at Puckapunyal to Woomera in South Australia in late 1953. She says that his crew took a tank to be placed in the blast of an atomic explosion.

She believes that after the explosion he went back to bring the tank out but it did not work; so he remained in the blast area for two days waiting for parts. There is evidence to support her story in the book Blast the Bush by Len Beadell. It is the story of the first atomic test at Emu on 15 October 1953. Mr Beadell says that a Centurion tank was transported to Emu and placed close to the bomb with a dummy inside to test the effects of the atomic blast. I believe that Mrs Jones’ claims should be examined and investigated. After her husband’s death Mrs Jones applied for compensation for herself and her five children on his behalf. After a long battle she was finally awarded compensation in 1974. under the Compensation (Australian Government Employees) Act. The delegate of the Commissioner for Employees Compensation determined that the disease William Jones had suffered from constituted a disease due to the nature of his employment with the Army.

I want to stress that aspect It was a metastatic carcinoma of bone. He also determined that William Jones death resulted from a disease due to the nature of his employment. I seek leave to have these two determinations incorporated in Hansard. Leave granted. The documents read as follows –

COMPENSATION (AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ) ACT I 971-1973 William Charles Jones, also known as William Cameron JONES Ex 34221 Warrant Officer Department of Defence (Army Office) In the matter of the claim of William Charles JONES also known as William Cameron JONES for compensation in respect of muscle weakness upper and lower limbs DETERMINATION 1. on the evidence before me including specialist medical opinion I find that the condition of metastatic carcinoma bone and carcinomatous neuropathy suffered by the said William Charles Jones also known as William Charles Jones constituted a disease due to the nature of his employment by the Department of Defence ( Army Office) within the meaning of section 10 of the Commonwealth Employees’ Compensation Act 1930, as amended 2. NOW THEREFORE in pursuance of the provisions of the Compensation (Australian Government Employees) Act 1971-1973 including Sections 4 ( 2 ) and 104 (1) of that Act I hereby determine: (a) the determination dated 30 Oct 1964 is hereby revoked. (b) the said William Charles Jones also known as William Charles Jones contracted a disease namely metastatic carcinoma of bone and carcinomatous neuropathy in circumstances under which the Department of Defence (Army Office) would have been liable to pay compensation under the Commonwealth Employees’ Compensation Act 1930 as amended, and the Department of Defence (Army Office) is therefore liable to pay compensation in respect of the said disease in accordance with the provisions of the Compensation (Australian Government Employees) Act 1971-1973. D E RUMBLE Delegate of the Commissioner for Employee’s Compensation 2 April 1974 COMPENSATION (AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES) ACT 1971-1973 William Cameron JONES ( Deceased) also known as William Charles JONES-Warrant Officer – Department of Defence (Army Office ) In the matter of the claim of Audrey Beagle JONES for compensation in respect of the death of William Cameron JONES also known as William Charles JONES formerly Warrant Officer Department of Defence (Army Office) DETERMINATION ( 1 ) on the evidence before me I now find that the death of the said William Cameron Jones also known as William Charles Jones on 9 January 1966 resulted from a disease due to the nature of his employment by the Department of Defence (Army Office) within the meaning of section 10 of the Commonwealth Employees ‘ Compensation Act 1930 as amended ( 2 ) NOW THEREFORE in pursuance of the provisions of the Compensation (Australian Government Employees) Act 1971- 1973 including sections 4 (2) and 104 (1) of that Act I hereby determine : (a) the determination dated 5 May 1972 is hereby revoked (b) the death of the said William Cameron Jones resulted from a disease in circumstances which the Department of Defence (Army Office) would have been liable to pay compensation under the Commonwealth Employees’ Compensation Act 1930 as amended (c) the Department of Defence (Army Office) is therefore liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Compensation (Government Employees) Act 1971- 1973 (d) the dependants of the said William Cameron Jones also known as William Charles Jones are: Audrey Bessie Jones widow Terrence William Jones born 13 July 1954 Leanne Patricia Jones daughter born 3 January 1959 Tracy Darlene Jones daughter born 29 October 1962 and Rick Cameron Jones son born 29 October 1962 (e) the amount of compensation payable to the said Audrey Bessie Jones in accordance with the provisions of sections 43 (3) and 104 (4) of the Compensation (Australian Government Employees) Act 1971-1973 is $8,600 (f). the amounts of compensation payable in accordance with sections 5(1), 43(5) and 104(8)of the Compensation (Australian Government Employees) Act 1971- 1973 (i) in respect of Terrence William Jones are $2.25 (two dollars twenty five cents) per week from 10 January 1966 until 8 November 1967. $2.45 per week from 9 November 1967 until 2 December 1968, $2.50 per week from 3 December 1968 until 23 June l970 and $2.80 per week from 24 June 1970 until 13 July 1970. (ii) in respect of Leanne Patricia, Tracy Darlene Jones and Rick Cameron Jones, are $2.25 per week each from 10 January 1966 until 8 November 1967, $2.45 per week each from 9 November 1967 until 2 December 1968, $2.50 per week each from 3 December 1968 until 23 June 1970, $2.80 per week each from 24 June 1970 until 24 May 1971, and $5.00 per week each from 25 May 1971 until a date to be determined by the Commissioner or his Delegate. and I further determine: (i) the amount of $8,600 shall be Paid in a lump sum to the said Audrey Bessie Jones; and (ii) unless otherwise directed by the Commissioner or his Delegate, the weekly amount payable in respect of Terrence William Jones, Leanne Patricia Jones, Tracey Darlene Jones and Rick Cameron Jones shall be paid to the said Audrey Bessie Jones (g) the amount Payable in accordance with the provisions of sections 44 and 104 ( 10) of the Compensation (Australian Government Employees) Act 1971-1973 in respect of funeral expenses is $120 and the said amount shall be paid to the said Audrey Bessie Jones. D E RUMBLE Delegate of the Commissioner for Employees’ Compensation Mr UREN – I thank the House. Let us examine the evidence these documents present.

The delegate has determined that some factor in William Jones ‘ Army work caused him to get this cancer. If Mrs Jones’ story is accurate then we can conclude only that this factor was radiation at Emu. (South Australian Nuclear Test Site). If her story is denied by the authorities then we must also be told what was the factor that led to the delegate’s determination. But the evidence as it stands suggests that William Jones was a victim of radiation at Emu and that this was reluctantly admitted even within the bureaucracy. One of the features which stands out in this case is the frustration and secrecy which confronted Mrs Jones throughout her struggle. William Jones tried to get compensation for his illness before he died, but failed. Mrs Jones says that she then first sought compensation as far back as 1968, but from the start she was hampered by secrecy. Everyone associated with her late husband’s trip to Woomera had been told to keep quiet. They were too scared to say too much and the Army was not about to offer any information. That is the sad situation in these sorts of cases.

The Army had little concern for Mrs Jones and the children she was struggling to bring up. She persisted. despite knock backs. until 1974 when she won the determinations to which I have referred. Eight years after her husband’s death a lump sum of $8.600 and small weekly payments for each child were awarded. and I am pleased to see that the Minister for Finance ( Mr Eric Robinson) who is sitting at the table. is listening intently to this speech. But the Army then haggled for three and a half years over how much should be paid for William Joneses medical expenses and lost wages. The amount of $585 that was awarded is still disputed by Mrs Jones. But 12 years after her husband ‘s death she has had enough. Mrs Jones still feels that her husband ‘s life was worth more than the compensation she received in 1974. Why has Mrs Jones had to battle so long for fair compensation? Why has there been so much delay and frustration? These questions should be answered. We also must ask how many other people who worked on the weapons tests have cancer. How many of them have sought compensation? How many have been too intimidated to try?
emd quote.

I weep, but it doesn’t solve anything. Readers, don’t forget this story and the people who suffered and suffer still.

Japan’s Nuclear History in Perspective – Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

December 31, 2011

One can track the TEPCO culture which has resulted in the consequences of the disaster in March 2011 back decades.

http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/japans-nuclear-history-perspective-eisenhower-and-atoms-war-and-peace

Japan’s nuclear history in perspective: Eisenhower and atoms for war and peace
By Peter Kuznick | 13 April 2011

Article Highlights

The United States heavily promoted nuclear energy in Japan after World War II, and, despite an initially reluctant public, the industry eventually flourished.
President Dwight Eisenhower’s promises of peaceful nuclear energy applications masked a huge increase in the US arsenal, as well as an increased reliance on nuclear weapons in war planning.
The catastrophe at Fukushima could lead to a reassessment of nuclear energy in Japan that leads the country to reject the perceived necessity of the US nuclear umbrella.

It is tragic that Japan, the most fiercely antinuclear country on the planet, with its Peace Constitution, three non-nuclear principles, and commitment to nuclear disarmament, is being hit with the most dangerous and prolonged nuclear crisis in the past quarter-century — one whose damage might still exceed that of Chernobyl 25 years ago. But Japan’s antinuclearism has always rested upon a Faustian bargain, marked by dependence on the United States, which has been the most unabashedly pro-nuclear country on the planet for the past 66 years. It is in the strange relationship between these two oddly matched allies that the roots and meaning of the Fukushima crisis lay buried.

Japan embarked on its nuclear energy program during the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, a man now best remembered, ironically, for warning about the rise of the very military-industrial complex he did so much to create. Eisenhower is also the only US president to have criticized the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Fearing the bombings would destroy the prospects for friendly post-war relations with Russia, at one point he advocated international control of atomic energy and turning the existing US stockpile over to the United Nations for destruction.

Yet by the time he took office in 1953, Eisenhower’s views on nuclear weapons had changed. Not wanting to see the United States “choke itself to death piling up military expenditures” and assuming that any war with the Soviet Union would quickly turn nuclear, he shifted emphasis from costly conventional military capabilities to massive nuclear retaliation by a fortified Strategic Air Command. Whereas President Harry Truman had considered nuclear arms to be weapons of last resort, Eisenhower’s “New Look” made them the foundation of US defense strategy.

Just like a bullet? On occasion, Eisenhower spoke almost cavalierly about using nuclear weapons. In 1955, he told a reporter: “Yes of course they would be used. In any combat where these things can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” When Eisenhower suggested to Winston Churchill’s emissary Jock Colville that “there was no distinction between ‘conventional’ weapons and atomic weapons: all weapons in due course become conventional,” Colville recalled, horrified, “I could hardly believe my ears.”

Eisenhower began transferring control of the atomic stockpile from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to the military. Europeans were terrified that the United States would start a nuclear war, which Eisenhower threatened to do over Korea, over the Suez Canal, and twice over the Taiwan Strait islands of Quemoy and Matsu. European allies begged Eisenhower to show restraint.

Public revulsion at the normalization of nuclear war threatened to derail the Eisenhower administration’s plans. The minutes of a March 1953 meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) stated: “the President and Secretary [John Foster] Dulles were in complete agreement that somehow or other the tabu [sic] which surrounds the use of atomic weapons would have to be destroyed. While Secretary Dulles admitted that in the present state of world opinion we could not use an A-bomb, we should make every effort now to dissipate this feeling.”

Atoms for Peace buried in radioactive ash. Eisenhower decided that the best way to destroy that taboo was to shift the focus from military uses of nuclear energy to socially beneficial applications. Stefan Possony, Defense Department consultant to the Psychological Strategy Board, had argued: “the atomic bomb will be accepted far more readily if at the same time atomic energy is being used for constructive ends” (p. 156). On December 8, 1953, Eisenhower delivered his “Atoms for Peace” speech at the United Nations. He promised that the United States would devote “its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.” He pledged to spread the benefits of peaceful atomic power at home and abroad.

But the subsequent March 1954 Bravo test almost derailed those plans. Fallout from the US hydrogen-bomb test contaminated 236 Marshall Islanders and 23 Japanese fisherman aboard the Daigo Fukuryu Maru (“Lucky Dragon no. 5”), which was 85 miles away from the detonation and outside the designated danger zone. A panic ensued when irradiated tuna was sold in Japanese cities and eaten by scores of people.
The international community was appalled by the bomb test. Belgian diplomat Paul-Henri Spaak warned, “If something is not done to revive the idea of the President’s speech — the idea that America wants to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes — America is going to be synonymous in Europe with barbarism and horror.” Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared that US leaders were “dangerous self-centered lunatics” who would “blow up any people or country who came in the way of their policy.”

Eisenhower told the NSC in May 1954, “Everybody seems to think that we are skunks, saber-rattlers, and warmongers.” Dulles complained, “Comparisons are now being made between ours and Hitler’s military machine.”

Criticism was fiercest in Japan. In Tokyo’s Suginami ward, housewives began circulating petitions to ban hydrogen bombs. The movement caught on across the country. By the next year, an astounding 32 million people, or one-third of Japan’s population, had signed petitions against hydrogen bombs.

Long-suppressed rage over the 1945 atomic bombings, squelched by US occupation authorities’ total ban on discussion of the bombings, had finally erupted. The Operations Coordinating Board of the NSC recommended that the United States contain the damage by waging a “vigorous offensive on the non-war uses of atomic energy” and even offer to build Japan an experimental nuclear reactor. AEC Commissioner Thomas Murray concurred, proclaiming, “Now, while the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain so vivid, construction of such a power plant in a country like Japan would be a dramatic and Christian gesture which could lift all of us far above the recollection of the carnage of those cities.”

Selling the peaceful atom in Japan. The Washington Post applauded Murray’s idea as a way to “divert the mind of man from his present obsession with the armaments race.” “Many Americans are now aware … that the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan was not necessary. … How better to make a contribution to amends than by offering Japan the means for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. How better, indeed, to dispel the impression in Asia that the United States regards Orientals merely as nuclear cannon fodder!”

Murray and Rep. Sidney Yates (Democrat of Illinois) suggested locating the first electricity-producing nuclear power plant in Hiroshima. In early 1955, Yates introduced legislation to build a 60,000-kilowatt generating plant there that would “make the atom an instrument for kilowatts rather than killing.” By June, the United States and Japan had signed an agreement to work together on research and development of atomic energy.

But selling this idea to the Japanese people would not be so easy. When the US Embassy, US Information Service (USIS), and CIA launched their vigorous campaign to promote nuclear energy in Japan, they turned to Matsutaro Shoriki, the father of Japanese baseball, who ran the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper and the Nippon Television Network. After two years’ imprisonment as a Class-A war criminal, Shoriki had been released without trial; his virulent anti-communism helped redeem him in American eyes (see Tetsuo Arima, “Shoriki’s Campaign to Promote Nuclear Power in Japan and CIA Psychological Warfare,” unpublished paper presented at Tokyo University of Economics, November 25, 2006). Shoriki’s newspaper agreed to co-sponsor the much-hyped US exhibit welcoming the atom back to Japan on November 1, 1955 with a Shinto purification ceremony in Tokyo. The US ambassador read a message from Eisenhower declaring the exhibit “a symbol of our countries’ mutual determination that the great power of the atom shall henceforward be dedicated to the arts of peace.”

After six weeks in Tokyo, the exhibit traveled to Hiroshima and six other cities. It highlighted the peaceful applications of nuclear energy for generating electricity, treating cancer, preserving food, controlling insects, and advancing scientific research. Military applications were scrupulously avoided. The nuclear future looked safe, abundant, exciting, and peaceful. The turnout exceeded expectations. In Kyoto, the USIS reported, 155,000 people braved snow and rain to attend (p. 176).

The steady spate of films, lectures, and articles proved enormously successful.
Officials reported, “The change in opinion on atomic energy from 1954 to 1955 was spectacular … atom hysteria was almost eliminated and by the beginning of 1956, Japanese opinion was brought to popular acceptance of the peaceful uses of atomic energy” (p. 179).

Such exultation proved premature. Antinuclear organizing by left-wing political parties and trade unions resonated with the public. An April 1956 USIS survey found that 60 percent of Japanese believed nuclear energy would prove “more of a curse than a boon to mankind” and only 25 percent thought the United States was “making sincere efforts” at nuclear disarmament. The Mainichi newspaper blasted the campaign: “First, baptism with radioactive rain, then a surge of shrewd commercialism in the guise of ‘atoms for peace’ from abroad.” The newspaper called on the Japanese people to “calmly scrutinize what is behind the atomic energy race now being staged by the ‘white hands’ in Japan.”

But intensified USIS activities over the coming years began to bear fruit. A classified report on the US propaganda campaign showed that in 1956, 70 percent of Japanese equated “atom” with “harmful,” but by 1958, the number had dropped to 30 percent. Wanting their country to be a modern scientific-industrial power and knowing Japan lacked energy resources, the public allowed itself to be convinced that nuclear power was safe and clean. It had forgotten the lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In 1954, the Japanese government began funding a nuclear research program. In December 1955, it passed the Atomic Energy Basic Law, establishing the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC). Shoriki became minister of state for atomic energy and first chair of the JAEC. Japan purchased its first commercial reactor from Britain but quickly switched to US-designed light water reactors. By mid-1957, the government had contracted to buy 20 additional reactors.

In the United States, the AEC aggressively marketed nuclear power as a magic elixir that would power vehicles, feed the hungry, light the cities, heal the sick, and excavate the planet. Eisenhower unveiled plans for an atomic-powered merchant ship and an atomic airplane. In July 1955, the United States generated its first commercial nuclear power. In October 1956, Eisenhower informed the United Nations that the United States had agreements with 37 nations to build atomic reactors and was negotiating with 14 more.

By 1958, the United States was becoming almost giddy with the prospect of planetary excavation under the AEC’s Project Plowshare, which proposed to use peaceful nuclear blasts to build harbors, free inaccessible oil deposits, create huge underground reservoirs, and construct a bigger and better Panama Canal. Some wanted to alter weather patterns by exploding a 20-megaton bomb alongside the eye of a hurricane. One Weather Bureau scientist proposed a plan to accelerate melting of the polar icecaps by detonating 10-megaton bombs. Only Eisenhower’s reluctance to unilaterally break a Soviet-initiated nuclear test moratorium halted this sheer folly.

Still, Project Plowshare achieved its goals. Lewis Strauss, chairman of the AEC, admitted that Plowshare was intended to “highlight the peaceful applications of nuclear explosive devices and thereby create a climate of world opinion that is more favorable to weapons development and tests.”

Atoms for Peace masks nuclear weapons buildup. Under the cover of the peaceful atom, Eisenhower pursued the most rapid and reckless nuclear escalation in history. The US arsenal went from a little more than 1,000 nuclear weapons when he took office to approximately 22,000 when he left. But even that figure is misleading. Procurements authorized by Eisenhower continued into the 1960s, making him responsible for the levels reached during the Kennedy administration — more than 30,000 nuclear weapons. In terms of pure megatonnage, the United States amassed the equivalent of 1,360,000 Hiroshima bombs in 1961.

Few know that Eisenhower had delegated to theater commanders and other specified commanders the authority to launch a nuclear attack if they believed it mandated by circumstances and were out of communication with the president or if the president had been incapacitated. With Eisenhower’s approval, some of these theater commanders had in turn delegated similar authority to lower commanders (I am grateful to Dan Ellsberg for this information). And given the fact that there were then no locks on nuclear weapons, many more people had the actual power, if not the authority, to launch a nuclear attack, including pilots, squadron leaders, base commanders, and carrier commanders.

In 1960, Eisenhower approved the first Single Integrated Operational Plan, which stipulated deploying US strategic nuclear forces in a simultaneous strike against the Sino-Soviet bloc within the first 24 hours of a war. The Joint Chiefs were subsequently asked to estimate the death toll from such an attack. The numbers were shocking: 325 million dead in the Soviet Union and China, another 100 million in Eastern Europe, 100 million from fallout in Western Europe, and up to another 100 million from fallout in countries bordering the Soviet Union — more than 600 million in total.

The price of denial. While Americans were preparing for nuclear annihilation, the Japanese were living in their own form of denial. From its shaky beginnings in the 1950s, the Japanese nuclear power industry flourished in the 1960s and 1970s and continued to grow thereafter. Prior to the tsunami-precipitated Fukushima accident last month, Japan had 54 functioning nuclear power reactors that generated 30 percent of its electricity; some projected it would not be long before Japan reached 50 percent. But the terrible nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima has forced the Japanese to deal for a third time with the nightmarish side of the nuclear age and the fact that their nuclear program was born not only in the fantasy of clean, safe power, but also in the willful forgetting of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the buildup of the US nuclear arsenal.

A reckoning with Japan’s nuclear legacy is now taking place. Hopefully, the Japanese will move forward from this tragedy to set a path toward both green energy and repudiation of deterrence under the US nuclear umbrella, much as they blazed a path with their Peace Constitution and antinuclearism following the horrors of World War II.
end quote. See previous post.

So you see, today’s events are part of a deliberate plan. It seems to me, that, unlike in Germany, there was no de-Nazification of the power elite in Japan. In fact, it seems to me, there was a deliberate policy to merely disarm the Japanese Nazis and maintain them in their positions of power and influence. The resultant criminal culture which infects TEPCO has therefore a long and concious history. Its aim: At attempt at keeping the Japanese voters in the dark and passive. It is beginning, in the wake of the Great Disaster, to unravel. I hope the one bitten badly on their bums by the dragon of history will be those who hold to the values which resulted in Imperial Japan and its consequences from 1942.

For the evidence shows, these people were seen by the Western Alliance as assests, not threats, so long as they were unable to strike externally. Suppressing ordinary Japanese – well that was a natural consequence and of no interest to the geo-politics of the USA which resulted in a nuclear powered Japan and the Fukushima disaster.

The experiment continues……