Archive for September, 2012

Karl Morgan and Group-Think

September 30, 2012

under construction . Chapter Four of Karl Morgan’s book is entitled “My Biggest Mistake”, and relates the occassion where he was to speak at an international conference against one set of nuclear technologies and in favor or another. While enroute to the international conference, things changes back at the lab. The Oak Ridge Lab, Karl’s employer had previously advocated in the same way as Morgan. The US President had, during Karl’s absence from America, decided otherwise. And funding was to be forthcoming for the very technology Karl had previously considered very dangerous. He was censored, and had a choice.

Karl Morgan: “I check us in on the flight to Frankfurt. When the ticket agent recognized my name, she exclaimed in her limited English, Go to the phone, call this number, our police and your FBI are looking everywhere to find you!”

On ringing Oak Ridge, Karl was told all the 250 advanced copies of his speech had been destroyed because the speech was now against policy. The speech contradicted a decision made far higher up.

Karl continues: “We believed the Molten Salt Thermal Breeder and our unified system would be substantially safer safer than the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor or the proposed Boiling Water Reactor or Pressurized Water Reactor….(these devices) “would allow billions of curies of fission products to remain in the reactor for the fuel lifetime, essentially waiting for an explosion (like those that later occurred at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl) to smear them around the world.”

“Culler revealed the real reason management wanted to muzzle me when he admitted that I was getting crosswise with Washington with powerful elements in the nuclear industrial complex. (Oak Ridge National Laboratories coveted large contracts for its development). He told me in effect..”..Don’t youo realize the President has decided to allocate $30 million dollars of extra money to expedite the building of a demonstration Liquid Metal Faster Breeder Reactor? You are jeopardizing the welfare of the Laboratory. ” Culler also implied that if Karl went ahead with his original speech, Karl would be responsible for the loss of “hundreds of Oak Ridge jobs.”

Would he stick to his guns or would he accept the censorship of his technical viewpoint, which favored, at that stage in his life, one type of fission technology over another?

It’s the old either /or debate, rather than considering the whole range of energy options. And the chosen technology Karl was being ordered to endorse was the one he objected to in part because it was the one which most efficiently produced bomb fuel.

Which is why, in part, the President favored it, i guess.

Contamination Outside Fukushima  福島の範囲を超える汚染

September 29, 2012

Asia Pacific Journal, Japan Focus

http://www.japanfocus.org/events/view/112

Contamination Outside Fukushima  福島の範囲を超える汚染
Sep. 04, 2011

Matthew Penney

The extent of radioactive contamination in Fukushima Prefecture is at the center of important debates as some scientists, NGOs, and citizen’s groups argue that the Japanese government has not gone far enough in dealing with the fallout from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and has deliberately downplayed the potential health effects of radiation. With so much attention focused on Fukushima, however, there has been less consideration of the impact of the crisis, ongoing since March 11, on other parts of Japan. The August 22 issue of AERA magazine, published by Japan’s major progressive newspaper Asahi Shimbun, ran a feature on contamination in the Kanto region entitled Kanto no ko kara hoshano (Radiation Detected from Kanto Children), which broadens discussions of the Fukushima Daiichi crisis’ potential impact. Below is a summary of the AERA article, published under the byline of editor Yamane Yusaku.

The Kanto region is a large area of central Japan that includes Tokyo and nearly 1/3 of Japan’s population including Tokyo. The Japanese government has taken the position that no one outside of the vicinity of the Fukushima Daiichi plant is likely to suffer health effects from the radiation that has been released since March. Many Japanese, especially parents of young children, are doubtful. The article begins by reiterating a point that has been made frequently by critics of the Japanese government – that we simply do not know what effects low levels of radiation and the presence of isotopes in the human body will have on long-term health. The piece tells the story of a mother in Saitama Prefecture who, in the absence of direct government support, arranged to have a sample of her daughter’s urine tested. The test indicated that despite stringent efforts to protect her fifth grader from exposure to contaminated food and airborne radiation, the result was 0.4 Bq of Cesium 137 per kilogram of urine. Cesium 137, with a half-life of just over 30 years, is one of main radioactive isotopes released from the Fukushima Daiichi plant. “I felt a mixture of shock and a feeling that of course this is the case”, laments the girl’s mother.

Measures that the mother took to protect her daughter from exposure included hunting down produce from Kyushu – the southernmost of Japan’s major islands and the furthest from Fukushima – even going so far as to buy 80 eggs at a time from a mail order company in the far south. She has also used bottled water exclusively and washes clothes, umbrellas, and the walls and floors of her home daily. Stories like this one are by no means uncommon as many in the Kanto area have become increasingly mistrustful of the safety of their food supply, despite government claims that health risks are negligible. The story also alludes to the strength of alternative information networks in the wake of the March crisis – after announcing her daughter’s test results on Twitter, the mother’s number of followers jumped from a number of close acquaintances to 700 people asking for details and advice about how to have their own children tested. There are other reports of mothers who have strictly controlled their children’s behavior (such as not allowing them to play in parks and making them always wear a mask outdoors) finding trace amounts of Cesium upon arranging urine tests with private companies.

Urine tests conducted on children in Fukushima show considerably higher levels of radioactive isotopes than anything that has been seen in Kanto – over three times as much in some cases. The Japanese Ministry of Education, Science and Technology has deemed these levels “extremely small” and claim that they will not result in health effects. Sakiyama Hisako, a doctor and influential radiation health researcher, disagrees, “We cannot simply state that there are no potential health problems because the amount detected is low. We simply do not know what happens when even extremely low levels of radiation move through internal organs, the nervous system, and the brain.”

While airborne radiation has lessened as emissions from the Fukushima Daiichi plant have decreased, there are concerns across the Kanto region of radioactive buildup in the soil. Citizen’s groups, taking radiation testing into their own hands, have conducted tests in 130 locations around Tokyo, Saitama, Chiba, and Ibaraki. In over 30 places they have detected levels of radioactive cesium of over 37,000 Bq per square meter, a level greater than that found in the area designated contaminated after the Chernobyl disaster. Readings in one area of Saitama were over 900,000 Bq – a level greater than that which resulted in forced relocation after Chernobyl. Areas of Tokyo, Chiba, and Ibaraki resulted in measures of over 200,000 Bq – a level which would have qualified residents for voluntary relocation after Chernobyl. There are reports that some children are complaining of headaches, nosebleeds, sore throats, worsening allergies, and other symptoms. Dr. Yamada Makoto, who runs a family practice in Hachioji and heads the “National Network of Pediatricians for Protecting Children from Radiation”, reports that parents face a dilemma – too much control or preventing children from going out can give rise to stress and related symptoms. On the other hand, parents must try their best to limit exposure. A balance between protection and the necessity of living in an environment with elevated levels or radiation must be struck. So far, however, the Japanese government’s focus on Fukushima instead of heavily contaminated areas outside and insistence that levels of radiation detected are “safe”, even when they exceed levels considered decidedly unsafe after Chernobyl, has not offered citizens outside of Fukushima adequate help in finding this balance.
end quote

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Who to Believe in regard to the effects of radiation exposure

September 29, 2012

One lesson from Chapter 3 of Morgan’s book, The Angry Genie, quoted in the previous post, is that levels of radiation exposure doses considered safe by authorities do produce, decades later , a cause of death which is more likely to be radiation related than had the allegedly safe exposures not taken place. The workers involved were all adults when they commenced working in the environment of a radiation lab or in the industrial plants operated in the United States. Nuclear industry and governmental organisations disagree that the exposures shortened lives. Arguments about this have taken place in the scientific literature for decades. I have covered this theme over a number of posts in 2010 and 2011. It is the industry style arguments which have guided policy in Japan since the Fukushima accident. This is my understanding and based on government statements. It is the government which determines what is safe or unsafer, and the people often have little choice but to live where they live, for many cannot afford to do anything else.

It is clear that in the case of high doses, the link between radiation exposure and the health of the individual after exposure is more likely to be accepted by authorities because the effect of a high dose produces illness within a short space of time. (Though there are cases where even events such as this are refuted by authorities). If a person’s signs and symptoms complies with a collection of effects which is diagnosed as “Acute Radiation Syndrome”, then the authorities will consider accepting radiation as the cause. The cause, radiation exposure, is in the very name of the syndrome.

However, Morgan in Chapter 3 is very vague in terms of symptoms relating to the victims of the lower doses. He states: “Even the individual who received only 22.8 rad showed some symptoms of radiation injury.” 22 Rad is not a low dose. d In my little period as a radiation worker in a radiation laboratory/military setting, such a dose would have been seen as very serious. The permissible doses were measured in milli rad. None the less, Morgan does not say, at this point in his book, what the symptoms produced by 22 rad were. And I assume he means immediate symptoms.

The thought I wish to convey is this: In the accident described in Chapter 3 of his book presented as a primarily external radiation risk. Sudden release of neutron and gamma radiation. Once the people left the scene, their exposure ceased. The area was cleaned up and things went back to normal. No one was forced to work thereafter on work benches covered in radioactive dust, and the air was not contaminated by radioactive dust. Or at least, these aspects after the accident returned to what was considered to be normal levels of radiation (to be brief) for that work site.

In humans living in a contaminated area, radioactive substances move into and out of select tissues and are constantly taken up, stored and excreted. Over a period a particular radionuclide may build up to an “equilibrium dose”, where uptake rates and excretion rates result in an amount in tissues which is the highest it can possibly be.

Inhalation pathways are another matter in addition to sources from diet.

Biological half life of a radion-nuclide is defined at Wikipedia as follows: “The biological half-life or elimination half-life of a substance is the time it takes for a substance (for example a metabolite, drug, signalling molecule, radioactive nuclide, or other substance) to lose half of its pharmacologic, physiologic, or radiologic activity, as per the MeSH definition. In a medical context, half-life may also describe the time it takes for the blood plasma concentration of a substance to halve (“plasma half-life”) its steady-state. The relationship between the biological and plasma half-lives of a substance can be complex depending on the substance in question, due to factors including accumulation in tissues, active metabolites, and receptor interactions.[1]
Biological half-life is an important pharmacokinetic parameter and is usually denoted by the abbreviation t½.[2]
While a radioactive isotope decays perfectly according to first order kinetics where the rate constant is fixed, the elimination of a substance from a living organism, into the environment, follows more complex kinetics. See the article rate equation.” Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_half-life

The biological half lives of the radioactive substances which are biologically significant are known. For plutonium the Biological Half Life is 200 years (Source: Wikipedia citing the publication DOE staff. “Radiological control technical training”. U.S. Department of Energy. Archived from the original on June 30, 2007. Retrieved December 14, 2008.) The Biological Half Life is quite different from the radionuclide’s half life .

For Cesium 137 the Biological Half life is given as being about 70 days by Wikipedia, citing R. Nave, writing in Hyperphysics.

The Biological Half life of Iodine 131 is describes by the US EPA as follows: “In the body, iodine has a biological half-life of about 100 days for the body as a whole. It has different biological half-lives for various organs: thyroid – 100 days, bone – 14 days, and kidney, spleen, and reproductive organs – 7 days.” http://www.epa.gov/rpdweb00/radionuclides/iodine.html

Inhalation is one way radio nuclildes accumulate in the body. While it is true that most of the material we normally breath in is exhaled or removed from the lung tissue by normal lung cleansing mechanisms – if this were not true our lungs would be very congested – the normal mechanisms cannot be credited with removing everything. This is shown by the acknowledged diseases that asbestos causes as a result of not being removed from the lung – though asbestos is a specific example, it shows a principle. Not everything that is breathed out is removed. While there is a dose from the normal breathing cycle, in which one can say most material inhaled is exhaled, one cannot , I believe, say that all is removed. And this is borne out by inhalation studies using beagle dogs. Some of these studies show that plutonium dust breathed in by Beagle dogs was indeed retained in the lung and in fact, some of the plutonium moved from lung to lymph and to the lymph nodes. One such experiment to show this is the following (the abstract being reproduced here):

“Radiat Res. 1996 Mar;145(3):361-81.
Toxicity of inhaled plutonium dioxide in beagle dogs.
Muggenburg BA, Guilmette RA, Mewhinney JA, Gillett NA, Mauderly JL, Griffith WC, Diel JH, Scott BR, Hahn FF, Boecker BB.
Source
Inhalation Toxicology Research Institute, Alburquerque, New Mexico 87185, USA.
Abstract
This study was conducted to determine the biological effects of inhaled 238PuO2 over the life spans of 144 beagle dogs. The dogs inhaled one of two sizes of monodisperse aerosols of 238PuO2 to achieve graded levels of initial lung burden (ILB). The aerosols also contained 169Yb to provide a gamma-ray-emitting label for the 238Pu inhaled by each dog. Excreta were collected periodically over each dog’s life span to estimate plutonium excretion; at death, the tissues were analyzed radiochemically for plutonium activity. The tissue content and the amount of plutonium excreted were used to estimate the ILB. These data for each dog were used in a dosimetry model to estimate tissue doses. The lung, skeleton and liver received the highest alpha-particle doses, ranging from 0.16-68 Gy for the lung, 0.08-8.7 Gy for the skeleton and 0.18-19 for the liver. At death all dogs were necropsied, and all organs and lesions were sampled and examined by histopathology. Findings of non-neoplastic changes included neutropenia and lymphopenia that developed in a dose-related fashion soon after inhalation exposure. These effects persisted for up to 5 years in some animals, but no other health effects could be related to the blood changes observed. Radiation pneumonitis was observed among the dogs with the highest ILBs. Deaths from radiation pneumonitis occurred from 1.5 to 5.4 years after exposure. Tumors of the lung, skeleton and liver occurred beginning at about 3 years after exposure. Bone tumors found in 93 dogs were the most common cause of death. Lung tumors found in 46 dogs were the second most common cause of death. Liver tumors, which were found in 20 dogs but were the cause of death in only two dogs, occurred later than the tumors in bone and lung. Tumors in these three organs often occurred in the same animal and were competing causes of death. These findings in dogs suggest that similar dose-related biological effects could be expected in humans accidentally exposed to 238PuO2.
PMID: 8927705 [PubMed – indexed for MEDLINE]” http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8927705

So you can see inhaled plutonium can move around a fair bit in the tissues of Beagles, and any amount is not “perfectly safe”. As some fanatics claim. It is better to not have plutonium in the air than to have any government tell its people that an external dose from plutonium is perfectly safe.

And I am trying to work up, at this point, to Karl Morgan’s experience with radiation dose and physical amount of radionuclide and their impacts on health outcomes for exposed people.

It is certainly the case that Australia’s experience with land contaminated by nuclear activity at nuclear test sites is one in which the substance of most concern is plutonium. Even after millions of dollars was spent cleaning up the affected site, an area remains which remains unfit for permanent residence by the traditional owners.

Australia has a history of plutonium contamination at one of its nuclear test sites. The occupants of an area desired as a nuclear test site were forcibly removed. Nuclear testing took place. The testing finished. The authorities declared the area clean and safe. This authority was the British government. The Australian government repeated what it had been told to the Australian people. From this time, during the 1960s, various people, including Australian nuclear veterans claimed that the information was force, and that the land was contaminated with plutonium. Decades past. After years of battling this and other nuclear issues, nuclear veterans and other victims were able to participate in an investigation known as a Royal Commission. For the purposes of this, the Australian government graciously allowed military personnel to speak the truth without fear of being jailed. Earlier, this threat was a risk to the truth being told. Many had taken the risk in order to help achieve the investigation.

When the Australian finally got around to testing the nuclear test site for contamination, it found that the veterans and other witnesses were right. The nuclear test sire was heavily contaminated with plutonium, made worse by earlier British attempts to clean it up – they had ploughed the desert, ensuring the plutonium was more easily blown by the wind.

And of course, from that time on Australians realized that not only had Britain lied, but that the Australian government had lied. It had assured Australians it knew everything and in fact, if you believe the public account, it knew less than diddly squat. (I don’t believe the public account. Australian knew, I think. ).

So what can we say when an Army private is actually proven by a Royal Commission to know more than a Prime Minister who approved the use of the test site in the first place?

In whom do you place your trust? The authorities or the people who shout a warning?

Of course, governments called the nuclear veterans and aboriginal people who shouted warnings “scaremongers” “given to myths”. And some veterans got legally threatening phone calls in the middle of the night. Decades later it was should that newspapers eagerly suppressed information at the slightest suggestion by government that stories should not be printed. Not for National Security reasons, but , as it turns so the government could save itself from voters.

Would you believe such a thing? I do.

And so today I read about events in other lands and see a mirror image of what once happened here.

Up out of the ashes of past lies comes the same old routines of deception. This is my perception of events in Japan. This is what Japanese news stories bring forth in me.

So how much of Japan is contaminated anyway? Next post, I will quote an article which looks at that. Isotopic half life, biological half life, uptake routes, and assurances of safety.

If you ask an aboriginal Australian how many aboriginal people died from bomb smoke in 1953, you will get an answer that is very different to the Australian government answer. Still. No one knows but the witnesses. And that will always be the case. Often ordinary people truly experience what government considers to be impossible. In public. Not every country is like America, where many many documents are declassified and made available. What might take 30 years or less in the USA might take 200 in England to declassify. So, I will be dead of old age before perhaps some document is released in England which finally contain the official acknowledgement long sought from witnesses isolated out in the bush when the bomb smoke rolled through.

Believe who you like I suppose, and hope like hell it never happens to you.

Plutonium is not safe to eat or breath. Neither is strontium or cesium or iodine or any of the others.

Karl Morgan Describes a radiological explosion at Y-12

September 29, 2012

One of the eduring scandals of the Fukushima Diiachi nuclear disaster is the knowledge that a major cause of core overheating in the three afflicted reactors was the vulnerable battery power which is always used to power low voltage DC solenoid valves in the emergency cooling pipes. Noone is talking about the “countdown timer” this design in fact imposes on reactors, reactor staff, communities and nations. When the batteries fail, die or go flat, nuclear cores overheat. The American Nuclear Society report that the normal expectation is that the batteries should work for 8 hours. The fact that some died after 20 and 70 hours does not commend the idea as a good one, for the reactors failed and polluted a nation and compromised the entire biosphere. A main thrust of organisational education campaign post Fukushima seems to be NOT explaining, discussing, debating the real cause of the explosions and their effects. It seems to be any admission of faulty design, as opposed to faulty location, is being actively thwarted. In the setting of the mega nuclear factory that was the Fukushima Diiachi complex, the idea of instant and personal health physics expertise is alien. Following the nuclear emissions, the “Ultimate Containment” became the average home. “Shut your doors and windows and stay indoors”, the Prime Minister urgently cried.

Karl Morgan describes the processes used to respond to a radiological explosion:

Carl Morgan: “No one at the Y-12 operation apparently considered the black janitor significant enough to be part of an informed operation. (Precis: Not being informed of container size limits, or why the limit had been imposed, the janitor had placed a 55 gallon drum and placed it under a leaky pipe in the plutonium facility. For weeks the little drips of liquid accumulated in the drum)

“On the morning of June 16, 1958, a sharp bang from the 55 gallon drum and a blinding blue flash of light caused everyone in the building to immediately rush for the nearest exists – a criticality accident was underway. ”

“I was in my office at X-10 that morning when the phone rang. I picked up the receiver to hear someone shouting, “we have a criticality accident at Y-12 and thousands of employees are evacuating the plant!”

“I reached for my emergency kit and rushed for the door……(and) drove the 10 miles to Y-12”

When Yockey and I entered the windowless building that contained the problem, darkness engulfed us. …(After this, flashlights became an essential part of all our emergency kits.) A faint light shone from a battery operated emergency lamp in the far end of the building, and we “homed in” on the life-threatening barrel as best we could. Unable to see the scales on the Geiger counter, we could hear the clicks sounding faster and faster as we approached the far end of the building.” .” (Footnote 9)

Footnote 9
Karl Morgan’s footnote to the above meter “saturation” experience: “As the Geiger counter was brought closer and closer to a source of ionizing radiation, clicks were produced faster and faster until the counter could not recover during counts. (a low resolving time) . Then the counts stopped and the pointer on the its meter dropped to zero. Any competent health physics surveyor would realize this was an acutely dangerous situation.” Karl Z. Morgan, Ken M. Peterson, “The Angry Genie”, University of Oklahoma Press, 1999, ISBN 0-8061-322-5, pp 59, 60.
Further explanations of Geiger tube false zero readings include: http://www.qsl.net/k/k0ff/Deadtime/
http://radiation.fallout.cz/htm/radmeters.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geiger%E2%80%93M%C3%BCller_tube
https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2012/01/21/arpansa-responds-to-a-citizens-detection-of-a-radiation-spike-in-queensland-january-2012/

Karl Morgan continues: “Yockey and I drove quickly to the security gate and told the waiting engineers that there was no longer a critical assembly in the barrel, but that they must be very careful and spend only seconds as they attempted to “defuse” the barrel because it was very radioactive. They put on protective clothing and masks, rushed into the building , and poured into the barrel a concentration of borax, which absorbs neutrons and “kills” any any possibility of a critical assembly in the fluid. The barrel could be removed in a few hours because of the short half life decay of the radio-nuclides.”

“Minutes later, with the help of the Y-12 health physicists, we rounded up all the employees who had been in the building at the time of the accident . We required them to shower immediately and scrub repeatedly. The Y-12 medical doctors provided me with 5 cubic centimeters of blood from each of eight highly exposed workers . They added a few drops of Heparin to each blood sample to prevent coagulation. I took the blood samples to our low-background counting facility , where we analyzed them. We determined that each individual had received an impermissibly high neutron and gamma dose. “ (Table of dose estimates shown in the book is not reproduced here. See page 61 of the quoted text.)

“The lax health physics regulations at Y-12 contrasted sharply with our X-10 facility. None of the eight persons was wearing a personal dosimeter at the time of the accident.

The doses were determined by Hurst and his group, and given in energy absorption units of rads. The proper value in damage units or rems depends on the type of damage considered. Today (1999, when the Morgan book was written) the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommends a Q value of 30 for fast neutrons. Five of the Y-12 workers experienced radiation sickness and epilation (loss of hair). Those who received 365 and 236 rads of radiation experienced some hemorrhaging. The five with the highest doses suffered considerable epilation. Even the individual who received only 22.8 rad showed some symptoms of radiation injury. Of the eight Y-12 employees listed in the table , three died of cancer and three others were diagnosed with cancer. One died of a stroke, and one had no major health problems at least as of 1995, when I last checked. Perhaps he was the one with the lowest dose, or he may have possessed the most efficient immune system. “

“Yockey and I incurred a radiation exposure dose of about 5 rem during this emergency. The Y-12 accident had a sobering effect on me . I tightened up even further the radiation protection measures at X-10. I thank God that we never experienced a criticality accident in the X-10 area where I was responsible. “ At this point, Morgan refers us to his footnote 3, in which he writes the following: “ Despite our ostensible success, however, a thorough analysis of death certificates and film badge reading records fifty years later revealed a statistically significant increase in all types of cancer from even these exposures.”

Source: Karl Z. Morgan, Ken M. Peterson, “The Angry Genie”, University of Oklahoma Press, 1999, ISBN 0-8061-322-5, pp 59, 61, footnote 3, page 180.

End quote.

When the nuclear lab is turned into an nuclear industrial plant, such as Fukushima Diiachi, the results of radiological emission becomes an international event. Particularly the nation’s citizens, in no way employed by TEPCO become subject to industrial exposures. In the case of employees, a worker agrees to work as a radiation worker, along with the risks and benefits of the job. Chldren in particular who are exposed to risks and treated by the corporation and state as if they were employees, are being subject to assault with permission. That alone is a crime.

Before a nuclear enterprise is allowed, one must find out how much area it will subsume if its activities spread over a fallout zone. This immediate fallout will reduce citizens to mere subject of radiation laws which were intended in the first instance to apply to people on the payroll in the first instance. If one is not on the payroll, and did not agree to the exposure, the exposure is illegal. It is not medical, it is not beneficial, it is an assault on the individual and the group.

Morgan was able to track the exposed employees and find out their fate easily. Non employees do not have an individual exposure dose record which is confirmed by documented detection records.

Even within the employee cohort, obaining justice is very difficult. If the exposure is confirmed the employer and or the state that as others survived at higher doses, no damages are payable. However, Morgan’s account does reflect on a well known effect: varying out comes from exposures of a cohort due to individual genetic makeup.

Although the authorities give and assume uniform individual effects from a given dose of radiation, the actual outcomes vary for two reasons: 1. The doses were higher than admitted. 2. Individual variation.

Whenever the same dose outcomes are stated by government for a given population after a given event, it is guaranteed that some people within the population will suffer higher degrees of resultant disease. Because of individual response.

There are many lessons in this short passage from Morgan’s book. As Morgan continued to work, he continued to watch and learn. At a certain point in his life, what he had seen and learned was not appreciated by those who had paid his wage. And from that time on, he had to fight in order to be heard.

In a very importance sense, the process of “progress” is often used as an excuse by authorities to claim history as redundant. Progress as a means of forgetting the learning and lessons of the past.

The past is not redundant. Only if one does not know the history as presented and preserved by such a Karl Morgan would one believe the claims by nuclear authorities today. For instance, fission fuels and fission products are not safe to eat.

Nuclear industry even attempts to justify its emissions because of the existence of the banana. The emissions from a nuclear power plant are not fruit.

I have looked at the folly of the “banana equivalent dose” in a previous post. Tobacco industry style “positive spin” is not science. Even if Rothman’s cigarettes do “aid digestion” would you start smoking to ease a stomach ache? Rather, if you were a smoker, you of course light up after meals. The process of killing oneself is not medicine. It is the reverse of it. In my opinion.

In footnote 3, Chapter 3, Morgan reports the fact that of the workers he was responsible for none had received radiation exposure doses which were considered unsafe. The exposure doses were all considered small by the employer (ie the United States of America, ultimately). And yet on studying the death certificates of those same employees five decades later revealed a higher rate of cancer deaths than the cancer rates found by examining the same data in people who were not radiation workers.

The more nuclear industry there is, the fewer unexposed people there will be. And the lower the risk the low doses seem to be. In my opinion. As the years passed, Japan’s cancer rate had been increasing. Then Fukushima happened in March 2011. The proportion of the Japanese not exposed to routine reactor emissions is now very low. It will be against the increasingly exposed total population that the Fukushima children will be compared as the years pass. It will become harder and harder to see the truth.

San Onofre Reactor

September 28, 2012

http://decommission.sanonofre.com/

reactor

Ralph Lapp – Thoughts on Nuclear Plumbing, 1971. Where would you put ’em now, Ralph?

September 28, 2012

Ralp Lapp – Unsafe core cooling systems in Reactors, 1971
NEW YORK TIMES 12 DECEMBER 1971

THOUGHTS ON NUCLEAR PLUMBING

Where would be safe to be now Ralph? Ralph was a member of the AEC when he wrote the above. His suggestion that reactor dangers were diminished if they were located far from cities can be shown to have ruined much of Japan’s food basket.

Ralph Eugene Lapp (August 24, 1917 – September 7, 2004) was an American physicist who participated in the Manhattan Project.
He was born in Buffalo, New York, and attended the University of Chicago. After completing his graduate studies at the University he joined the Manhattan Project; and became the assistant Director of the Metallurgical Laboratory. He then accepted a position with the War department General Staff as a scientific advisor on atomic energy. When the research and development board was formed, Doctor Lapp became executive director of its committee on atomic energy. After this he acted as Head of the Nuclear Physics branch of the Office of Naval Research. He wrote Nuclear Radiation Biology, A Nuclear Reference Manual, Must We Hide ?, and assisted Doctor H.L. Andrews from the National Institute of Health in writing Nuclear Radiation Physics. He became an activist later in life and wrote a book, Victims Of The Super Bomb (1957).
In his book The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and The Uses of Power, Lapp describes the increase in funding for science and the growing influence of scientists in American politics after the invention of the atomic bomb.
Mr. Lapp was interviewed by Mike Wallace in 1957.[1]
In 1971, he coined the expression “China Syndrome.”
Wikipedia.

The assessment of radiation exposures in Native American communities (Nevada)

September 28, 2012

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10795343

Risk Anal. 2000 Feb;20(1):101-11.
The assessment of radiation exposures in Native American communities from nuclear weapons testing in Nevada.
Frohmberg E, Goble R, Sanchez V, Quigley D.
Source
Clark University, Center for Technology, Environment, George Perkins Marsh Institute, Worcester, MA 01610, USA.
Abstract
Native Americans residing in a broad region downwind from the Nevada Test Site during the 1950s and 1960s received significant radiation exposures from nuclear weapons testing. Because of differences in diet, activities, and housing, their radiation exposures are only very imperfectly represented in the Department of Energy dose reconstructions. There are important missing pathways, including exposures to radioactive iodine from eating small game. The dose reconstruction model assumptions about cattle feeding practices across a year are unlikely to apply to the native communities as are other model assumptions about diet. Thus exposures from drinking milk and eating vegetables have not yet been properly estimated for these communities. Through consultations with members of the affected communities, these deficiencies could be corrected and the dose reconstruction extended to Native Americans. An illustration of the feasibility of extending the dose reconstruction is provided by a sample calculation to estimate radiation exposures to the thyroid from eating radio-iodine-contaminated rabbit thyroids after the Sedan test. The illustration is continued with a discussion of how the calculation results may be used to make estimates for other tests and other locations.
PMID: 10795343 [PubMed – indexed for MEDLINE]

Big Time Deja Vu – Dosimetry reconstruction and Fukushima Children. Nuclear Test Veterans, dig this.

September 28, 2012

These poor people. The fiddle is the same old one.

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201209280064

Quote.
“THE ASAHI SHIMBUN September 28 2012.
Critical data is missing for two-thirds of children tested for thyroid problems in Fukushima Prefecture, because their families have failed to declare the children’s hour-by-hour whereabouts during the immediate post-disaster period. (note: how cruel. In the middle of this horror, they had to stop and record notes every hour in order to fulfil this one.)

Investigators need residence records for the four months following March 11, 2011, when radioactive fallout was high from a nuclear disaster and ingested iodine isotopes could have damaged the thyroid glands of growing children. (note: but the authorities spent 2011 saying it wasn’t.)

The records are arduous to complete, but are needed in order to estimate a possible dose. (Note: This is such Deja Vu) Absence of a dose estimate could make people ineligible for compensation (note: Bingo) if they later develop serious problems such as thyroid cancer, because of an inability to establish a cause. (Note: Right on the standard script.)

By late September, about 100,000 children had their thyroid glands tested because of their relative proximity to the melted-down reactors at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, following the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami. (Note, but they spent weeks in 2011 denying melt down)

The tests targeted those living in districts such as the 13 municipalities near the crippled nuclear plant, and Fukushima city, the prefectural capital. Results for 80,000 tests are now available. (Note: so why send them back, and not fully evacuate to reduce total dose?)

The thyroid gland testing program is run by the Fukushima Medical University. It plans to petition parents and guardians for the missing data, at briefing sessions from October.

Of the 38 test subjects who took more detailed follow-up tests, one was diagnosed with cancer and 27 were found to have benign tumors. But prefectural government officials have said those cases are unlikely to have anything to do with the nuclear disaster because it occurred only 18 months ago.

As it investigates the possible impact of radiation on health, the prefectural government is evaluating likely doses received during the first four months of the nuclear disaster. All residents of Fukushima Prefecture are eligible for that survey.

But Fukushima Medical University officials say only slightly more than 30 percent of the 80,000 children who had thyroid gland tests have received estimates of their external radiation dose. (Note: the well rehearsed routine.)

External doses are calculated on the basis of the individuals’ whereabouts in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. The factors include records of airborne radiation levels and the time the individuals spent outdoors.

Examinees are required to fill out detailed 24-hour records for the first two weeks, and the number of hours they spent outdoors each day for the rest of the four-month period.

If Fukushima Prefecture residents develop cancer of the thyroid gland in the future, authorities will determine the likelihood of the disease being linked to the nuclear disaster. They will base the decision on comprehensive assessments of individual doses and any increase in the cancer rate in the wider community.

Radiation damage to the thyroid gland depends largely on the body’s internal dose, but knowing external doses helps to inform the general trend in internal conditions, experts said. (Note: Yea, if you get any external reading, internal hazard present, evacuate. At the time, the authorities stated the reverese, that the external dose readings were perfectly safe. They must not be allowed to have it both ways. But they will get away with it, all over the world since 1945 they have.)

When dose data is unavailable, there is no way to tell whether an abnormality in the thyroid gland has anything to do with the nuclear accident. (Note: in general, this is precisely why authorities issued film badges to nuclear veterans prior to the bombs, and when the troops got back after the bombs, the fildm badges were just thrown into a bucket with no names on them. But after decades of legal wars, the veterans are cohort with some access to some justice, though feeble, in some countries, and that is one applicable lesson. The Fukushima victims must remain a cohort, group, association, a family).

“Dose estimates are essential for evaluating a causal relationship between disease and radiation in those cases where people unfortunately fall ill and consider applying for compensation,” said Saburo Murata, deputy director of the Hannan Chuo Hospital in Osaka Prefecture.

In the past, Murata has helped atomic bomb survivors and nuclear plant workers apply for health compensation.

“I advise people to keep records of any changes in their health conditions and their whereabouts, including from now on,” he said.

(This article was written by Yuri Oiwa and Teruhiko Nose.)

THE ASAHI SHIMBUN” end quote.

(Note: government authorities will say there is insufficient data to conclude uniform causality when illness strikes. They always have. eg Carl Johnston, example: his paper: “Plutonium Hazard in Respirable Dust on the Surface of Soil” https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:WB8xAC-SlFoJ:wuos.org/content/193/4252/488.full.pdf+inhalable+dust+soils+rocky+flats+johnson&hl=en&gl=au&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjwZlPPNdIHkEgJNGMEybFZ8gTCluQZkGBBdzYXGYvS4RhQT-6V5LaJDV5JXIJlMJQoaek_D8gBulRuBiZBSMx3s_t-zXkYndwcPAfSuQm24SqOlHRDwtjwY450FWWKHNFzJdY4&sig=AHIEtbS9Xtbe-Z-7K895YNY8pWlCtL7y4A

He got sent to the basement for that one. And, decades later, when Rocky Flats was closed, no one got justice, but home owners got paid an amount for the loss of market value of their houses. The whole thing ignored the deaths over decades. And the money was paid because it was hard to sell houses affected by Rocky Flats.)

how history repeats.

For the THE ASAHI SHIMBUN article above:

child
File photo from March 2011 used by the newspaper in the above article, showing children undergoing external radiation checks.

I guess everyone remembers the youtube video proof of nuclear authorities point blank refusing evacuation, and refusing point blank to test the urine samples of children parents asked to be tested at that town meeting in March 2011. The isolation of nuclear victims is the constant theme. It has been the same for decades and decades.

The youtube video is up, here it is:

And my notes at the time:

Similar to the refusal by British and Australian medical authorities to diagnose radiation related health effects in the period 1953 to 1984 in Australia. Instead of claiming to have lost medical records as happened in Australia, the Japanese government does all it can to prevent the medical records being created in the first place. Very efficient aren’t they?

There is no attempt on the part of the officials in this video to even attempt to attend to the needs of the people.

And the original source:

July 28, 2011, Fukushima: Health tests of children refused, Officials walk out.
http://www.huntingtonnews.net/6482

Fukushima Parents Plead Test Children’s Urine; Japanese Officials Walk Out

Thursday, July 28, 2011 – 02:53
EDITED BY TONY RUTHERFORD FROM MULTIPLE REPORTS

Parents challenge the government for refusing to test Fukushima children’s urine which now has a radiation standard different from other portions of Europe.

After parents continue their complaints with “shame on you,” Japanese officials walk out of the meeting, despite pleas, “what about the children” and “test their urine, why are you refusing.”

Put the 28 Sepotember 2012 article above together with the March 2011 article and video, and this is the essential dynamic of exclusion, isolation and denial. And so they will guess the internal dose. Dose Reconstruction. And they will say “Guess amount not big enough, reactor was safe for you, goodbye.”

they use very advanced algebra to prove their guesses.

It make you want to weep to see the same dynamic of lies and deceit again, and again, and again, and again.

No Nukes.

Directly relevant is this about an earlier event:

https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2011/04/10/letter-to-governor-general-from-major-alan-batchelor/

Letter to Governor General from Major Alan Batchelor
Quote:
29 March 2011
Her Excellency Ms Quentin Bryce AC
Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia
Government House
Dunrossil Drive
YARRALUMLA ACT 2600

Your Excellency

INTRODUCTION

This submission is made to the Governor General in Council in accordance with Australian Military Regulations and Orders as they existed in the 1950s. It requests a review and cancellation of the currently accepted study of the health of Australian nuclear veterans contained in Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia by Dr Gun et al. Both the hazardous environments and resulting detriments to the health of many nuclear veterans have been incorrectly assessed in this document, leading to many false exposure and compensation assumptions that also need revision and remedial action.

[A summary is available on page10]

BACKGROUND

The basis on which the Cancer and Mortality Study was constructed omits several important areas of consideration and makes no effort to explain the effect of these omissions.
• It confined the study to the carcinogenic effects of ionising radiation, ignoring:
o Non-carcinogenic effects following exposure to internal radioactive emitters with long biological half-lifes resulting in;
• Loss of immune competence,
• Short and long term sterility, miscarriages, stillbirths, etc,
• Heredity defects in subsequent generations,
• Accelerated aging, and/or
• Psychological damage;
o Carcinogenic effects of non-ionising materials also present at the tests such as;
• About 30 kg of beryllium used as a fast neutron reflector in some weapons,
• Asbestos wool particulate filters used in WW2 gas masks as an expedient in protective clothing;
• The range of health effects (such as “radiation sickness”) suffered by nuclear veterans during the tests was concealed from the study by the non-production of relevant records from:
o Operation Hurricane “Health” ship (HMS ZEEBRUGGE);
o The Emu and Maralinga hospitals and related outstations.
o RAAF Base Hospital Amberley:
o RAAF Woomera Hospital.
• The availability of a dosage document by the UK Government “Listing of Persons at UK Overseas Defence Nuclear Experimental Programmes – Citizens of Australia” (known as the “Blue Book”) has resulted in a lessened appreciation of the hazardous dosages actually present
o Servicemen working in highly exposed situations have been omitted, eg;
• Crew of HMAS KOALA responsible for dragging the floor of the Monte Bello Lagoon almost immediately after detonation and many subsequent days,
• Aircrew, ground-crew and decontamination parties involved with fallout cloud collection sorties after Hurricane and Totem 1 (film badges were not issued);
• Yellow entry training during inter-trial period at Maralinga;
• Vehicle mechanics recovering yellow vehicle breakdowns;
• Buffalo and Antler military engineers engaged on tasks such as telemetry retrieval functions commencing shortly after detonation;
• Many “Indoctrinee Force” servicemen;
o No mention was made of doses resulting from inhaled/ingested radioactive material, particularly where long biological half-lives were involved;
o Many other film badges had not been processed;
o In any case, the UK denied responsibility for the document’s content (page (ii)).
• Statistics collected before 1982 were mainly collected from Death Certificates, leaving both cancer and cancer mortality incidence between 1952 and 1981 open to question;
• Work program, re-entry schedule and task allocation documentation have long since disappeared. The linking of individuals to the possibly numerous range of their employments and then summing the total dosage for each individual was well beyond the capabilities of the Dosimetry subcommittee. This resulted in guesswork based on a person’s basic trade, ship’s name, corps designation, etc (limited by the entry in the “job” field of the information spreadsheet);
• An estimated constant gamma dose rate of 0.01 mSv/hr was used for calculations involving gamma exposure. No adjustments were made for weapon yield, distance from GZ, time post detonation or other environmental factors. This formula tends to level out dosages resulting from high exposure situations, particularly Immediate and Early Re-entry tasks involving dusty inhalation/ingestion conditions.
• The above background discussion provides a number of conditions that reduce the viability of the Cancer and Mortality Study and should have, as a minimum, been taken into account in the findings. In addition, Royal Commission Conclusion 201 (15.6.13) goes even further and questions the feasibility of attempting such a study:

“Because of the deficiencies in the available data, there is now little prospect of carrying out any worthwhile epidemiological study of those involved in the tests nor of others who might have been directly affected by them.”

FACTORS

There are a number of factors that have adversely affected the integrity of the Cancer and Mortality Study.

Scientific Bias. Bias is the act of presenting a partial perspective at the expense of possibly equal or better alternatives. If a study is to be scientifically coherent, it must avoid bias and present facts and other valid points of view that may have a bearing on the outcome. Government influence, including overt and covert censorship, bias in the media, market influence ((including the nuclear industry), author selection, etc, are all areas of potential bias.

The Cancer and Mortality Study includes references to a number of other studies that provide support in a mutually cyclic manner. They omit mention of many other studies by reputable scientists/organisations that question the methodology adopted by the Cancer and Mortality Study. Some examples are as follows:
• Dr Keith Baverstock, previously head of the Radiation Protection Division of the World Health Organisation and currently Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Kuopia, Finland. In his paper “Science, Politics and Ethics in the Low Dose Debate,” he points out the following problems in the British NRPB study of UK Nuclear Veterans (many references in the Cancer and Mortality Study) and other study areas;
o When a large excess of leukaemia was found in comparison with the controls, a scientifically unacceptable alternative comparison was made with the general population where the undesirable excess disappeared,
o Further UK Nuclear Veterans discovered in 1988 were not included in the original NRPB Study, revealing the omission of 30% of multiple myeloma cases,
o The lack of dosimetric data did not justify the lumping together of exposed and unexposed individual dose assessments,
o It is clear that the science and associated ethics have been perverted for political ends,
o Uranium is chemically toxic and its geno-toxicity should be assessed together with its radioactive properties and bystander effects,
o The ICRP routinely uses essentially untested models to determine the risks from internal emitters.
• Professor Shoji Sawada is a theoretical particle physicist and Emeritus professor at Nagaya University. He has written a paper titled “ Cover-up of the Effects of Internal Exposure by Residual Radiation from the Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki” accepted 3 Oct 2006. The paper, based on inadequate dosage assessments, inappropriate comparison groupings and US concealment of weapon effects, disagrees with the epidemiological research carried out by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF). The ICRP dosage model is identified as being based on the RERF studies where the effects of internal exposures were given little attention. The Protocol for the Cancer and Mortality study places a great deal of reliance on the RERF studies (Vol 2, pp 119-124) as well as the ICRP dosage model.

The following abstract from the Professor’s paper identifies the origin of many of the incorrect findings in the Cancer and Mortality Study and referenced studies:

“The criteria certifying atomic bomb disease adopted by the Japanese government are very different from the actual state of the survivors. The criteria are based on epidemiological research by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation, the successor to the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC). The ABCC studied only the effects of primary radiation from the atomic bombing on the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and ignored the damage from residual radiation. Analysis of acute radiation disease, the rate of chromosomal aberrations, and the relative risks of chronic disease among the survivors, shows that the effects of residual radiation from fallout exceeds that of primary radiation in the area more than 1.5-1.7 km distant from the hypocentre of the Hiroshima bombing. The effects of internal exposure due to intake of tiny radioactive particles are more severe than those of external exposure, explaining the difference between the official criteria and the actual state of the survivors.”

• Australian Institute of Criminology. In a book titled “Wayward Governance: Illegality and its Control in the Public Sector,” Chapter 16 is devoted to “A Toxic Legacy : British Nuclear Weapons Testing in Australia”. It provides a brief but comprehensive coverage of the British nuclear tests held in Australia. The Chapter illustrates some of the many ways in which nuclear veterans may have been harmed by the actions of the two governments concerned:
o Public debate on the costs and risks borne by the Australian public was discouraged through official secrecy, censorship, misinformation and attempts to denigrate critics;
o D-notices were applied in such a manner that Australian journalists were forbidden from reporting items which had already been published freely in the UK;
o The Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee (AWTSC) was more sensitive to the needs of the British testing program than to its Australian constituents.;
o The AWTSC was criticised as ‘deceitful’ and having allowed unsafe firing to occur;
o Agreed with the Royal Commission statement that Professor Titterton (AWTSC) may have been more a de facto member of the British Atomic Weapons Research Establishment than a custodian of the Australian public interest;
o Committed to the continued mining and export of uranium, Australian officials were disinclined to dwell extensively on the mistakes of the past, or to highlight the risks posed by radioactive substances. Concerned about reducing government expenditure, they sought to minimise outlays for compensation. The generosity which led previous Australian governments to spend millions of dollars to host the British tests had become a thing of the past;
o The major obstacle faced by claimants was the formidable task of proving that their disability resulted from exposure to radiation produced by the tests. The task was compounded by the fact that in these cases, the ex-service claimants are totally dependent upon their former employer for the evidence necessary to present their case;
o Cancer has many causes, and to demonstrate conclusively that a particular case was caused by Maralinga exposure and not by smoking, diet, exposure to X-rays, or some inherited predisposition is extremely difficult. The Royal Commission’s recommendation that the onus of proof be borne by the government was not accepted. For this reason, most claims have thus far been unsuccessful;
o The Commonwealth government, concerned over the possibility of having to defend common law actions alleging negligence in its involvement in the testing program, vigorously contested each claim. Public assurances that the nuclear veterans were being well looked after did not appear to be borne out in the courts and hearing rooms of Australia.

• European Committee on Radiation Risk (ECRR). This Committee was formed in 1997 by the European Parliament to examine the Basic Safety Standards Directive (Directive Euratom 96/29). There were 46 members and advisors whose research and advice contributed to the “2003 Recommendations of the European Committee on Radiation Risk” published as “Health Effects of Ionising Radiation Exposure at Low Doses for Radiation Protection Purposes”. The listing of members contained in Chapter 15 is preceded by the following declaration:

“At 5th November 2002 the following individuals are members, advisors or consultees of the ECCR. Their inclusion in this list may not mean that they endorse all the contents of the report but does imply that they are convinced that the ICRP system of modeling seriously underestimates the risk from low level ionising radiation from anthropogenic sources.”

The ECCR concluded “that ICRP models have not arisen out of accepted scientific method. Specifically, ICRP has applied the results of external acute radiation exposure to internal chronic exposures from point sources and has relied mainly on physical models for radiation action to support this. However, these are averaging models and cannot apply to the probabilistic exposures that occur at the cell level. A cell is either hit or not hit, minimum impact is that of a hit and impact increases in multiples of this minimum impact, spread over time, Thus, the committee concludes that the epidemiological evidence of internal exposures must take precedence over mechanistic theory based models in assessing radiation risk from internal sources.”

The ICRP risk model makes assumptions that are based on value judgments that do not support its use as the basis for the Dosimetry study. This has resulted in dosage estimates in the Cancer and Mortality study that run counter to actual dosage records and epidemiological results. This is despite the exposure dilution and over-simplification of task identification applied in the dosimetry estimates. The Cancer and Mortality study has not been able to address ionisation density in time and space at the cellular level placing its viability in question.

• Dr Rosalie Bertell Ph. D., GNSH, on 21 Apr 1998, provided testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. She was a biometrician (specialty in mathematics applied to biomedical problems). In her testimony she addressed two major questions, mainly based on the errors carried forward from the ABCC and RERF studies of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bomb casualties. Her statement commented on the basic factors used for dose reconstruction in the determination of causality for cancer or other radiation diseases:
o The atomic bomb study radiation risk factors apply directly only to external radiation, high dose and fast dose rate exposure. This research says nothing about the internal contamination with radio-nuclides experienced by any veteran participating in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki cleanup, in atmospheric weapon testing, or in radium implants. This research says nothing about the incorporation of radio-nuclides into bone with the subsequent long term chronic irradiation of the surrounding tissue;
o The Atomic Bomb Research was not designed to establish a dose below which exposure was “safe”. Had this been the case, careful examination of the harm from low dose exposures would have been mandatory;
o The atomic bomb researchers assumed (but did not demonstrate or prove) that below 1 rem exposure from the original bomb blast no radiation related cancer deaths would occur. Therefore this data base can tell us nothing about such low dose exposures because the researchers assumed their exposure was “safe” and did not test for an effect. In philosophy we call this “begging the question” and it results in an invalid “proof”;
o Atomic bomb research generally assumes that the only damage one should care about (clearly a self-serving judgement not a scientific fact) is direct damage to DNA which results in a cancer which is fatal. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki research on cancer incidence rates was not published until 1994. A comprehensive report on other chronic disease prevalence has never been forthcoming.;
o When the un-repaired or mis-repaired damage due to radiation, occurs in the germ cells, sperm (and stem cells which produce sperm) or ovum, that damage will be incorporated into every cell of the offspring made from that damaged DNA. It may show up as a miscarriage, still birth, teen age cancer or mid-life heart disease, but these are not considered to be “detriments” – another value judgment and not a scientific fact;
o It should be very clear that the Radiation Research which had been done by the ABCC and RERF has never clearly addressed the problems of non-cancer effects of exposure, Instead, they have relied on their earlier judgment that these other biological endpoints were “not of concern” and should not be studied. Cancer incidence rates were not even reported until 1994. Incidence rates for other chronic diseases have not yet even been collected in the data base, which is concerned with first cause of death. A disease like neuralgia is not likely to be the first cause of death;
o None of this mathematical reconstruction actually measures the dose which really initiated a cancer process. This dose would likely be localised to a few dozen cells in the immediate vicinity of the internal radionuclide, and these cells would constitute a very small part of an organ or tissue. When this concentrated energy release is converted to an average dose to the whole organ, and that organ dose is weighted to give an estimate of effective equivalent whole body dose, the dose appears to be very small, but locally it is significant because of its concentration.
• Professor C D’Arcy J Holman, University of Western Australia, published an article in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health titled “A Survey of Suppression of Health Information by Australian Governments” (submitted June 2007). He warned that Australia may be slipping from its formerly enviable position of relative freedom from political censorship and official corruption.

It may not have been by chance that Professor Holman undertook his research after completing his participation as a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee for the Cancer and Mortality study. It should also be noted that the Professor did not attend the last meeting of the Scientific Advisory Committee (May 2006) where the Cancer and Mortality Study received its initial approval.

In the results it was stated that “The rates were higher in 2005/06 than in earlier years. No State or Territory was immune from suppression. Although governments most commonly hindered research by sanitizing, delaying or prohibiting publications (66% of events), no part of the research process was unaffected. Researchers commonly believed their work was targeted because it drew attention to failings in health services (48%), the health status of vulnerable groups (26%), or pointed to a harm in the environment (11%). The government agency seeking to suppress the health information mostly succeeded (87%) and, consequently, the public was left uninformed or given a false impression. Respondents identified a full range of participative, cognitive, structural and legislative control strategies.

It was concluded that “The suppression of public health information is widely practised by Australian governments.”

International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) In its assessments of internal radiation dosages, the Dosimetry study has placed a great deal of reliance on the tables published by the ICRP. The intended result was to make a retrospective assessment of organ/tissue dose for use in an epidemiological study. The legitimacy of the Dosimetry study using the ICRP risk model for this purpose is placed in serious question by the following ICRP statement (http://www.icrp.org/c2_fl.asp). Statement recently removed without explanation.

“It is not appropriate in all circumstances and guidance is given on when its use is not appropriate, for example in retrospective assessments of organ/tissue dose for epidemiological studies, in individual risk assessments after exposures above dose limits and especially after exposures to high radiation doses.”

The objectivity of the ICRP radiation risk model has been questioned for many years. The following extracts are relevant:
• “Comments by Professor Dr Chris Busby B Sc, Ph D, C Chem, MRSC concerning the death of a soldier exposed to uranium weapons during Gulf War 1;
o “The area of radiation risk from internal exposures is one of major and polarised scientific controversy. However, more and more evidence is appearing in the peer-review literature and the grey literature also, both from epidemiology and from laboratory experiments or theoretical work, that there are many serious shortcomings with the current risk model, that of the ICRP.”
o “The ICRP models cancer on a quantity termed ‘absorbed dose’ which is defined as energy per unit mass. This is an average of the ionisation over large amounts of tissue, kilograms, and is a reasonable unit for quantifying the effects of external radiation e.g. from an atom bomb’s gamma rays but is not scientifically justified for internal anisotropic radiations where there are large doses in one place and no dose everywhere else. An analogy would be to compare the same acquired by warming oneself in front of a fire with eating a red hot coal. This ‘hot particle effect’ has been the basis for most of the arguments about cancer and DU (and indeed also plutonium and fuel particles after Chernobyl and the atomic tests and near nuclear power stations).”
o “To back up their position large sums of money are given to ‘safe’ research scientists to conduct research or to produce reports that back up this position. The veterans have no money for their own research and few scientific advisors. Any other affiliated scientist soon gets to learn the disadvantage of opposing the military, the government or industry (who largely pay for all research, and hence all the wages and mortgages). The bias that exists in the science policy interface is horrifying.”
• In a paper prepared by Dr Rosalie Bertell, “Limitations of the ICRP Recommendations for Worker and Public Protection from Ionising Radiation” she discusses the viability of the data collected from atomic bomb studies (ABCC and RERF) and the closed composition of ICRP:
o “The atomic bomb studies followed, and did not precede the setting of the radiation protection guidelines recommended by ICRP and followed internationally until 1990. The main recommendations were set in 1952, and the first doses assigned to A-bomb survivors were not available until 1965. Moreover, the research was designed to determine the effects of an atomic bomb, not the health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation. The research was undertaken by military researchers from both the US and Japan familiar with and primarily concerned with military use of atomic, chemical and biological warfare agents. The research has come too late for standard setting needs, it has focused on cancer deaths, is uncorrected for healthy survivor effect, and is not inclusive of all of the radiation exposures of cases and controls (dose calculations omit fallout, residual ground radiation, contamination of the food and water, and individual medical X-ray), and fails to include all relevant biological mechanisms and endpoints of concern.”
o “It is normally claimed that biological basis of the cancer death risk estimates used by ICRP, is the atomic bomb studies. However, these studies are not studies of radiation health effects, but of the effects of an atomic bomb. For example, the radiation dose received by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors from fallout, contamination of food, water and air, has never even been calculated. Only the initial bomb blast, modified by personal shielding, is included in the US Oak Ridge National Laboratory assigned “dose”.
o “The data base for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Life Span Study, the basis for the mortality estimates, was first identified in the 1950 Japanese Census. The information was not collected and ready for analysis until around 1957, and because it depends on first cause of death information, it was based on only a small percentage of deaths for the first seven years. It was heavily dependent on the accuracy of death certificates. Deaths in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki population between 1945 and 1950 are not included in the study.”
o “Although the A-bomb scientists have now admitted that more cancers were caused per unit dose of radiation than previously thought, ICRP has now given itself risk reduction factors for slow dose rate and low dose. This introduction of an unsubstantiated “correction factor” gives evidence of the inadequacy of the data base to answer important questions about worker and public exposures, which are almost all at low doses and slow dose rate. It also indicates that the ICRP knows that it is inadequate. There is no supporting human evidence for this reduction of the risk factors, and considerable evidence that it is not warranted.”
o “The ICRP is profoundly undemocratic and unprofessionally constituted. It is self- appointed and self-perpetuated. Certainly a recommending body could be composed of individuals elected from professional societies such as international associations of professionals trained in occupational health, epidemiology, public health, neonatology, pediatrics, oncology, etc.”
o “The ICRP assume no responsibility for the consequences attributable to a country following its recommendations. They stress that the Regulations are made and adopted by each National Regulatory Agency, and it merely recommends. However, on the National level, governments say they cannot afford to do the research to set radiation regulations, therefore they accept the ICRP recommendations. In the real world, this make no one responsible for the deaths and disabilities caused!”

Elevated Chromosome Translocations.

North Shore Hospital, Sydney. The Centre for Genetics Education, in a Fact Sheet (7) on chromosome translocations stated that a “Change in the amount or arrangement of the genetic information in the cells may result in problems in growth, development and/or functioning of the body systems;” and these may be inherited from the parent. Miscarriages and infertility were among the outcomes identified.

Western General Hospital, Edinburgh. In 1983/4 this hospital was routinely identifying chromosome damage in patients exposed to ionising radiation from industrial or therapeutic sources. Blood samples had been collected from two British Nuclear Veterans. These had been submitted but not processed on the possibility of the Medical Research Council (MRC) being involved in an epidemiological study (blind analysis of random slides) of nuclear participants. When the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) accepted the study, the council went ahead and carried out an analysis of the two blood samples. One of the patients “in fact has quite a high degree of chromosome damage present in his blood cells” and “this would not be inconsistent with having received radiation exposure 20 or more years ago.” The MRC, probably on political direction, refused permission to advise the treating physicians, the patient, NRPB or to continue with the epidemiological study.

Massey University Report. This is a study investigating sister chromatid exchange in New Zealand nuclear veterans that has been published under the title of “New Zealand Nuclear Veterans’ Study – a Cytogenic Analysis.” and accepted for publication by the prestigious journal “Cytogenic and Genome Research.” It is an assessment of cytogenic damage in naval personnel on two New Zealand frigates that were present at the British nuclear tests code named Operation Grapple. “The result show elevated translocation frequencies in peripheral blood lymphocytes of New Zealand nuclear test veterans 50 years after the Operation Grapple series of nuclear tests. The difference between the veterans and the matched controls with this particular assay is highly significant. The total translocation frequency is 3 times higher in the veterans than the controls who showed normal background frequencies for men of this age group. This result is indicative of the veterans having incurred long term genetic damage as a consequence of performing their duties relating to Operation Grapple.”

Note the use of matched controls, not the local country population as used in the Australian study. In the Summary, it is stated that:

“We submit the view that the probable cause of the veterans elevated translocation frequencies is radiation exposure. This view is supported by the observation of a comparatively high dicentric chromosome score in the veterans which is characteristic of radiation exposure.”

In the Pilot Project conducted prior to the Massey University Study, the psychologic impact on the New Zealand Nuclear Veterans produced the following recommendations:

• “these veterans are offered assistance to help them cope with the chronic stress that some of them are experiencing. As long as the situation they find themselves in remains unresolved, stress levels are likely to remain high. There exist a number of useful techniques that could be taught to these men to help them cope with stress.”
• “given the clear evidence that at least some of the Exposed men are living with a compromised quality of life (in comparison to Controls and NZ men of similar age), there is an urgent need to formulate appropriate strategies that addresses these health inequalities.”

The Psychological Impact study of New Zealand nuclear veterans has been reviewed by Dr W Barclay AM MB BS MSc DPM FRANZCP who states that the findings of the report “might be expected to apply equally to Australian Nuclear Veterans.”

The occurrence of chromosomal damage in nuclear test veterans was first recognised in the UK in 1983. The suppression exercised at the time demonstrated knowledge of the potential harm to the health of a vulnerable group that should have been investigated. The much delayed reinforcing discovery by the Massey University demonstrates a health hazard that must not be ignored. The Cancer and Mortality Study requires drastic amendment as a result.

Dosage Anomolies

Tables 6.8 and 7.5. As mentioned earlier, Table 6.8 of the Dosimetry Study has set the figure for external gamma radiation estimations at 0.01 mSv/hr (as explained in the paragraph under the Table). Table 7.5 listing actual gamma readings for a member of the Joint Services Training Unit (JSTU), shows a reading of 20 mSv on D + 67. This was received during a 3 or 4 hour plant collection exercise (details in Lt Jenkinson’s statement to Royal Commission). This is 5 or more mSv/hr and at least 500 times the constant gamma dose rate used for dosimetry estimates. In addition, Jenkinson’s reading was recorded after 67 days of radioactive decay and because it involved plant collection would have been well outside the blast area. Based on their own Tables, the Dosimetry Study external dose rate estimations can not be justified.

Radiogenic Cancers. Certain cancers have been reported by UNSCEAR to be causally associated with ionising radiation (colon, liver, lung, thyroid, stomach, bladder, non-CLL leukaemia and non-melanocytic skin cancer). The Cancer and Mortality Study has identified:
• An SMR of 1.63 for cancer deaths in this group; and
• An SIR of 1.19 for cancers in this group.

These results were hidden from all but a detailed investigation, at the bottom of Tables 5.6 and 10.1. In a study concentrating on cancers “causally associated with ionising radiation,” these results should have received priority treatment in the Main Findings, not left to a chance unearthing.

Inappropriate Comparison Cohort. The study was unable to find an acceptably matched comparison cohort against which it could compare the cancer and cancer mortality statistics of the nuclear veterans. Instead, it was decided to use the readily available general Australian population statistics for this task. The methodology adopted did not make any allowance for the many differences (confounding factors) in the two populations that should have included consideration of the “Healthy Serviceman Effect”. The error involved is demonstrated when a comparison is made with the Vietnam Veteran’s cancer statistics, where the Nuclear Veterans Standardised Incidence Ratio for cancers increases from 1.23 in the Study to 2.95, despite significantly less confounding factors being involved except for a possible cause of excess cancers resulting from exposure to Agent Orange.

SUMMARY

The criteria on which the Cancer and Mortality Study was based, omitted consideration of:
• The total range of adverse health effects (non-carcinogenic effects of ionising material and carcinogenic effects of non-ionising material) resulting from service in a nuclear weapon test area;
• The lack of data available;
• The errors identified in dosage estimation models, particularly in the area of long term, short range, internally deposited radiation emitters;
• The warning by the Royal Commission that “there is now little prospect of carrying out any worthwhile epidemiological study.”

The elimination of hospital records for all operations, in conjunction with the discriminatory British dosage records (Blue Book), where those employed in hazardous situations had been removed, could only further degrade an already dubious study.

The study was conducted without any factual information identifying which individual carried out which function (or range of functions), for how long, location(s), potential for inhalation/ingestion of resuspended hazards or handling of radioactive target response equipments. This lack of estimation data for each individual and the fallibility of other records made it almost impossible to approximate exposure levels for an individual shown in the Cancer Registry (initiated 1982).

Many prestigious scientists and scientific organisations have made it clear that the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) has made assumptions that are based on value judgements that are not soundly based. These have resulted in study estimates that are counter to epidemiological results and a number of practical dosage records. Even more importantly, the Study has not been able to address ionisation density in time and space at the cellular level. Instead it has converted the concentrated energy release to an average dose to the whole organ, and that organ dose is weighted to give an estimate of effective equivalent whole body dose that appears to be very small. This action conceals the significance of a highly concentrated locally applied dose. This was despite the ICRP not recommending the use of its risk model derivations for retrospective epidemiological studies.

The presence of excessive chromosome translocations caused by ionising radiation in nuclear veterans has been dishonestly concealed by the UK Government since 1984. The Massey University Report has rediscovered and published a similar finding, emphasising the need for investigations into the range of adverse health effects overlooked in the Cancer and Mortality Study.

ARMY HEADQUARTERS DIRECTIVE

AHQ Directive – Nuclear Warfare (DCGS/517). Any country that places its servicemen in harm’s way, particularly when exposure to the effects of nuclear weapons is involved, has a duty of care for their future welfare. The question of whether this exposure involved overseas service, or otherwise, is irrelevant to this undertaking. The responsibility for treating “all aspects” of any detrimental health effects resulting from exposure to the effects of nuclear weapons was made the responsibility of the Adjutant General’s Branch in DCGS/517 dated 22 Feb 1956 in the following terms:

9 (a). “All aspects of treatment of personnel subjected to the effects of nuclear weapons.”

In addition, paragraph 6 of the same Directive states that current policy requires “training personnel of all units in personal protection and in the use of radiac instruments.”

The majority of Australian personnel posted in support of Ministry of Defence operational requirements did not receive training in health physics, protective procedures or use of radiac instruments and did not receive follow-up health checks or treatment.

When this lack of care began to emerge, the Repatriation Medical Authority undertook a study completed 21 Jul 2000 titled Report of the RMA Subcommittee on Ionising Radiation Dose. The report discarded its original “sound medical-scientific evidence” that service personnel “having been within four kilometres of the epicentre of the atomic bomb explosions on either Hiroshima or Nagasaki within the seven days immediately following the explosion on either of those cities” could potentially contract and also die from certain nominated diseases. If these “sound medical-scientific evidence” conditions were applied to Australian nuclear veterans in the British nuclear tests, it would have been applicable to all immediate and early re-entrants.

The RMA report, without making an examination of the British nuclear tests in Australia, determined that certain sarcomas caused by atomic radiation would require a proven dose 10 times higher if peace service (Balance of Probabilities) was the condition of service involved. To state that operational conditions of service (Reasonable Hypothesis) only requires one tenth of the dose required in peacetime to produce the same cancer, or death from this cancer, is not based on sound medical-scientific evidence, a stated requirement in each Statement of Principles (SOP).

This biased assessment was further expressed in SOP Bulletin No 42 issued on 3 Oct 2000 and titled “New Atomic Radiation Factors in RMA SOPs Interim Advice.” Paragraph 2 effectively ignores the involvement of Australian servicemen in the British nuclear tests in Australia when it identifies those servicemen with known atomic radiation exposure as:

• “POWs who were in the Nagasaki area on 9 Aug 1945;
• Personnel who served in or visited Hiroshima in connection with the occupation of Japan by the British Commonwealth Occupation Force from February 1946”.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The various strategies that have been employed to conceal the adverse health and genetic detriments of nuclear service have culminated in the Repatriation Commission sponsored study Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia. The inaccuracies in this document and all that depends on its content should be acknowledged by the Government and purged from all past and future considerations.

After half a century of neglect, nuclear veterans or their widows should be compensated for their relegation to the nuclear scrapheap. To assist in their remaining years, they should also be provided with a proper pension and a supporting gold card.

Note: A more comprehensive coverage is available in my witness statement (132 pages supported by 2,000 plus pages of exhibits).

Yours sincerely

Major Alan Batchelor (Ret’d) MBE AMIET psc

Copies to:

Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister (Senator the Hon Kate Lundy)
Minister for Defence (The Hon Stephen Smith MP)
Minister for Health and Ageing (The Hon Nicola Roxin MP)
Minister for Veterans’ Affairs (The Hon Warren Snowden MP)
Minister for Resources and Energy (The Hon Martin Ferguson AM MP)
➢ Repatriation Commissioner (Maj Gen Mark Kelly (Ret’d) AO DSC)
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“paul langley” , jeff_liddiatt, “Dennis Hayden” , “Roy Sefton” “‘SHIRLEY DENSON’”
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* Letter GG Redress.docLetter GG Redress.doc

Dear Professor Johnston

I have just received a copy of the British Nuclear Veteran’s comments on the ARPANSA critique of the Massey University study that re-discovered elevated translocation frequencies in Nuclear Veterans. Also included was your summary reply with little explanation of your reasoning.

Despite not receiving a copy of your paper, it seems to me that the critique was a desktop study that did little research outside of the content of the Massey University study. I would like to examine the critique in the light of past experience with ARL/ARPANSA.

As you know, I was a member of the Consultative Forum that was supposed to assist in the writing of “Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia”. ARPANSA was represented by one member (Dr Burns) at one of the many meetings. Dr Williams was a member of the Dosimetry sub-committee with Dr Wise being co-opted as a member of the Dosimetry Exposure Panel because of his excellent reputation in the field of mathematics. On the other hand, how is it that Dr Wise stated on page 2 of ARL/TR105 that the ADORED computer program had excluded calculations for “personnel involved directly in nuclear test activities,” yet this same program appears in the Calculation Addendum of the Cancer and Mortality study? Perhaps the fact that Wise had hearing problems and did not take part in discussions unless he was addressed in a near shout may explain his lack of association.

Despite this wealth of experience, I am still amazed at the level of omissions and bias that were built into the study. Some of these problems are identified in the attached letter to the Governor-General in Council and should have been worthy of comment in a Minority Report at the time.

Incidentally, for a short time, I was part of the Dosimetry sub-committee until it became obvious that it had no knowledge of who did what, where, when or for how long. This was a basic requirement (to some degree) if dose was to be linked to those in the Cancer Registry (only available from 1982). From the time that this problem became apparent, no assistance was requested from the Consultative Forum.

Another interesting factor, Dr Loy was a member of the RMA sub-committee that produced the “Report of the RMA Subcommittee on Ionising Radiation Dose”.This report identified the minimum cumulative dose that had to be applied to a specific organ before a cancer could be accepted as being of nuclear test origin. The Report did not address the British nuclear tests and therefore could not be quoted as sound medical-scientific evidence when stating that particular cancers were not of British Nuclear Test origin. The extension of these figures into the Statements of Principles, as applied to individuals, where they had never been measured previously or instruments for their current measurement are not available, must have been known to Dr Loy. No attempt was made in the Report to calculate the dose received from internally deposited ionising radiation emitters.

There should have been calculations for such situations as a particle of plutonium oxide, measuring 2 microns in diameter and emitting 8,000 alpha particles per day. How many sieverts/day are produced by this particle in a sphere measuring about 5 cells in radius (approximate range of an alpha particle in tissue)? Perhaps one of your experts could explain how it was possible for such a large ionising radiation dose at the cellular level to be diluted to such a small whole body dose in the Cancer and Mortality study.

As you can see, I need convincing that ARPANSA has made an unbiased assessment of the Massey University study.

Sincerely
Alan Batchelor
End Quote

Well done Alan.

This folks is maybe some indication of what some victims of Fukushima will be going through still in 60 years time.

Diggers do have some tenancity regarding the truth, so the intervening decades have not wearied survivors as far as the opponents can see. And the whites of the offenders’ eyes are clearly visible in contrast to the dark condemnation of the deciept. In my opinion. Par for course in regard to nuclear victims vs nuclear authority. In the case of using Australian troops as “proxy enemy”, some people might consider the events to be various forms of treason. Perhaps. I think its reasonable to think along those lines at any rate.

What do you reckon honest answers and full disclosure to the above submission would mean for nuclear industry? Radiation Health, as authorities use it, is built upon what authorities have gotten away with since 1945.

Best of luck Japan.

Reactor at operating power hit by Orphan Tsunami (no local quake) . What would be different to 3/11?

September 28, 2012

http://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/pp1707/

U.S. Geological Survey
Professional Paper 1707

Prepared in cooperation with the Geological Survey of Japan (National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology), the University of Tokyo, and the University of Washington.
Published in association with University of Washington Press.

The Orphan Tsunami of 1700—Japanese Clues to a Parent Earthquake in North America

By Brian F. ATWATER ,
MUSUMI-ROKKAKU Satoko ,
SATAKE Kenji ,
TSUJI Yoshinobu ,
UEDA Kazue ,
and David K. YAMAGUCHI

2005

quake
A simulated tsunami reaches Japan ten hours after its start along the Pacific coast of North America

“One winter’s night in the year 1700, a mysterious tsunami flooded fields and washed away houses in Japan. It arrived without the warning that a nearby earthquake usually provides. Samurai, merchants, and villagers recorded the event, but nearly three centuries would pass before discoveries in North America revealed the tsunami’s source.
The Orphan Tsunami of 1700 tells this scientific detective story through clues from both sides of the Pacific. The evidence uncovered tells of a catastrophe, a century before Lewis and Clark, that now helps guide preparations for future earthquakes and tsunamis in the United States and Canada.” Source: AS above.

http://oregonstate.edu/ua/ncs/archives/2012/jul/13-year-cascadia-study-complete-–-and-earthquake-risk-looms-large

“13-YEAR CASCADIA STUDY COMPLETE – AND EARTHQUAKE RISK LOOMS LARGE

8-1-12

CORVALLIS, Ore. – A comprehensive analysis of the Cascadia Subduction Zone off the Pacific Northwest coast confirms that the region has had numerous earthquakes over the past 10,000 years, and suggests that the southern Oregon coast may be most vulnerable based on recurrence frequency.

Written by researchers at Oregon State University, and published online by the U.S. Geological Survey, the study concludes that there is a 40 percent chance of a major earthquake in the Coos Bay, Ore., region during the next 50 years. And that earthquake could approach the intensity of the Tohoku quake that devastated Japan in March of 2011.

“The southern margin of Cascadia has a much higher recurrence level for major earthquakes than the northern end and, frankly, it is overdue for a rupture,” said Chris Goldfinger, a professor in OSU’s College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric Sciences and lead author of the study. “That doesn’t mean that an earthquake couldn’t strike first along the northern half, from Newport, Ore., to Vancouver Island.

“But major earthquakes tend to strike more frequently along the southern end – every 240 years or so – and it has been longer than that since it last happened,” Goldfinger added. “The probability for an earthquake on the southern part of the fault is more than double that of the northern end.”

The publication of the peer-reviewed analysis may do more than raise awareness of earthquake hazards and risks, experts say. The actuarial table and history of earthquake strength and frequency may eventually lead to an update in the state’s building codes.

“We are considering the work of Goldfinger, et al, in the update of the National Seismic Hazard Maps, which are the basis for seismic design provisions in building codes and other earthquake risk-mitigation measures,” said Art Frankel, who has dual appointments with the U.S. Geological Survey and the University of Washington.”

Link to full paper: http://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/pp1661f/

From the point of view of reactor cooling systems, the scenario of an orphan tsunami is technically very interesting. If reactor designers design for a repeat of Fukushima Diiachi 2011, they have to consider full power output and full engagement of the primary coolant system by the reactor. And with the reactor (reactors, both sides of the Pacific) in question would first experience shut down and emergency cooling ready mode (if the solenoids work) , but the destruction of the primary cooling when it is in full use. The backup pumps would useless, and probable loss of control.

And that I think is actually very frightening. It would be an entirely different type of reactor response and consequence than that seen in March 2011.

There is a way of course of alerting reactors to approaching orphan tsunamis. I hope there is a procedure for it in the manual. And that it is not covered in TEPCO Black Ink.

A Picture of a Pump at the Reactor

September 28, 2012

pump
http://www.nucleartourist.com/areas/bwr-in1.htm
Maintenance workers training inside recirculation pump mockup

One type of pump local to each reactor.

sketch
Sketch illustrating relationship and flow paths for major emergency systems – Residual Heat Removal, High Pressure Core Spray, Low Pressure Core Spray, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, Standby Liquid Control, Suppression Pool, Safety/Relief valves.

Some of the systems shown in this sketch are intrinsically powered (via decay heat steam) and don’t need diesel backup. These are the emergency systems. All of them can function without the large primary heat exchangers by the sea. (The ones seen in overhead photos of tsunami wreckage). Even if the primary exchangers and diesels were 100 feet under water, the emergency systems were designed to work.

The question is: Why did the emergency systems break down? What part of the emergency system was not intrinsically powered by reactor decay heat steam?

The low voltage DC for the pipe valve solenoids.

This is my opinion, agree, disagree but do not simply believe or disbelieve. Please. System design is not a religion.

The fatal design assumption was that 8 hours was enough time, it wasn’t it took more than 70 hours, the disaster ensured in sequence according to the unintended and incredibly stupid timer made effective by the run down and destruction of batteries.

Americana in a quake and tsunami zone. The written record of this goes back to at least the 1700s.

And who says the assumption of 1960s suburbia, that you can fix things quickly, will apply in the USA tomorrow?

The NRC have ordered a patch to be put in place. It took until March 2012 for the NRC to issue the order. Longer term upgrades are in train. The assumption at the heart of the technical disaster is reflective of similar assumptions involved in the siting disaster. None should be anywhere. In my opinion.