From Andrew K : The US Downwinders and their Case – with Proof.

The following has been taken from Nuclear Crimes.Org. Source link is :
As this is Andrew’s work, you have to go to his site read the whole piece.
This question of whether serious biological damage is linked to exposure to relatively ‘low dose’ radiation is one that has never been adequately answered in the annals of science. Scientists concur that there is no safe level of radiation exposure. But they have a hard time agreeing how much exposure to radioactivity will result in cancer or leukemia, especially when that exposure is received in relatively small amounts over time.
We know that film is vulnerable to very strong forms of energy such as X-rays or gamma rays or particles called alphas or betas. Can these same forms of energy cause the atoms in our cells to become slightly unstable or altered chemically (not unlike the chemicals in Kodak’s film that were altered from the contaminants lodged in strawboard dividers), and thereby give rise to biological harm?
Film is analogous to human tissue when discussing radioactivity but the analogy breaks down when discussing what happens when chemical pairs fracture. The exposure of a sheet of photographic film to radiation will simply cause disassociation of some silver-bromide bonds that cause the film to ‘fog.’ Nothing else happens. Nothing ‘horrible,’ that is. In the body on the other hand, if chemical bonds, which are critically important to cellular processes, are broken or ‘ionized’ by radiation tracks they can end up attaching to the wrong things. Consider that each cell replicates itself by copying 5 billion bits of information. If one bit of this information is not copied exactly, then huge problems may occur down the line as the new cells become the templates for millions of more subsequent cell-replications. If chromosomes are damaged and never repaired, then genetic damage may result down the road in our defective offspring. Also, cells that have been artificially charged from ‘mass-stripping’ radiation may begin an unnatural process whereby a single cell starts growing and producing other cells that have no purpose, like a cancer. Cancerous growths, if left unremoved, can suffocate and impair functioning of our vital organs and lead to death. Cell-mutating sequences leading to a biological train-wreck can be caused by external exposures as well as internal exposures – internal exposures result from inhaling or ingesting fallout particles or radioactive gas. We must assume that the same airborne radiation that produced the spots on the radiograph from New York State gummed film in 1951 was being breathed by New Yorkers. If internal exposures were happening to New Yorkers, what about the local and regional residents of the Nevada Test Site. Wouldn’t they be receiving even worse ‘internal radiation injuries?’ (This fallout map is a composite of cloud trajectories from one of eight NTS atom bomb test ‘series’.)
Canary in the coalmine: the downwinders
Regrettably, virtually no one was looking out for serious internal radiation injuries and it wasn’t until a dramatic decline in the health of residents of the hardest-hit downwind areas was apparent that experts began to become concerned.
Harvey Wasserman and Norman Solomon chronicled in their 1982 book ‘Killing Our Own-The Disaster of America’s Experience with Atomic Radiation’ the onset of ailments afflicting families in ‘Dixie,’ the southern portion of Utah just over 100 miles from the Nevada Test Site13. The authors, having interviewed residents and amassed health reports, made this stunning compilation (numbers correspond to footnotes in original text):
‘… in Cedar City [Utah], Blaine and Loa Johnson buried their twelve-year-old daughter in 1965. She died of leukemia. A total of seven leukemia cases occurred for people within a two-hundred-yard radius of their home, in the space of a dozen years.[10]
In the next sizable town, twenty miles farther northeast along Interstate 15, residents in the devout Mormon community around Parowan were similarly hard hit. In 1978 Frankie Lou Bentley, whose mother and stepfather both died of cancer a year apart, listed more than 150 cancer victims in the Parowan-Paragonah-Summit area, which contained about fourteen hundred people during the nuclear tests in neighboring Nevada. The cancer was particularly startling because so few people smoked in the community. “It’s amazing that there should be so many cancer cases in an area as small as this,” she told a county newspaper. “It’s to the point now where there’s not a person in town who hasn’t lost at least one relative or knows of several people who have died of cancer.”[11]
A coworker with Frankie Lou Bentley at the Bank of Iron County office in Parowan, Wilma Lamoreaux, watched her fifteen-year-old son Kenneth die of leukemia in 1960.[12] During a two-year period, leukemia struck four youngsters in Parowan and Paragonah,[13] an extremely high rate for towns with a combined population of about one thousand. Normally, not even one leukemia would have been expected by medical statisticians.[14]
….In the nearby Escalante Valley cancer caused forty-eight of sixty-three “natural” deaths in official records since the atomic testing began–an extraordinarily high ratio.[16]
And there were other worries. One fifth of the male high school graduates of the 1950s and early 1960s in Cedar City discovered they were sterile,[17] …. For those who became parents, there were fears of genetic damage.
Elizabeth Catalan, who was a teenager while growing up in southwest Utah during the 1950s, lost her father to leukemia when he was forty-three, and a sister to complications from an enlarged thyroid. A surviving sister’s daughter remained on her mind: “I watched my beautiful little niece, Kay’s child, cope with the birth defect that left her with a ganglia that doubled the size of her tongue and wound around, like a weed, inside her neck and down into her shoulder.”[18] Elizabeth Catalan thought too about girls she grew up with, now women, coping with aftermaths of miscarriages and physical abnormalities in their children.
…In 1960 the population of Fredonia [Arizona, across the Utah border from Kanab] was 643. By 1965 four had passed away from leukemia–a truck driver, who died at age forty-eight; a fourteen-year-old girl; a lumber crane operator, thirty-six; and Gayneld Mackelprang, by that time forty-three years old and superintendent of the Fredonia Public Schools. A secret memorandum by the U.S. Public Health Service’s leukemia unit director, Dr. Clark W. Heath, Jr., noted, “This number of cases is approximately 20 times greater than expected.”[29] In the entire previous decade 1950 to 1960 no cases of leukemia had been reported among Fredonia residents. The memo, dated August 4, 1966, and sent to the head of the federal agency’s Communicable Disease Center, was marked “FOR ADMINISTRATIVE USE ONLY, NOT FOR PUBLICATION.”[30]
….Cancer became commonplace in Fredonia. Rose Mackelprang ticked off the names of the next towns north along Highway 89–Kanab, Orderville, Glendale–where cancer and leukemia had appeared. “Some of them have died with leukemia, we have a lot of cancer, and it’s not the end of it. It’s still going on.” Federal agencies continued to deny responsibility.’
The spotlight shines
Residents of the ‘downwind areas’ knew what was going on since the 1950s – they couldn’t help but notice increasing leukemia and thyroid cancer rates in their towns and counties. Yet they just didn’t know who to believe. Since the mid- to late-1950s, few journalists, scientists and politicians were of the mind that the fallout was dangerous and likely to blame for some of these diseases, and deaths. But a vigilant and proactive public relations effort by the AEC, and a behind-the-scenes suppression of vital information – such as health analyses, and evidence that fallout may have already caused harm – kept downwinders confused.
By the summer of 1979, all of that had changed. Wrote Susan Q. Stranahan in ‘Downwind Deals,’ one in a series of freelance articles about victims of radiation poisoning and compensation published in AFP Reporter14:
“Several well-publicized Congressional hearings into the matter had been held …The governor of Utah, who had released 11 pounds of secret federal documents pertaining to the tests and the resulting fallout on the residents downwind of the Nevada Test Site…visited the White House seeking the president’s aid. A year before, a federal task force had determined that there were no safe levels of radiation and that exposure to radiation at low levels could in fact also cause cancer. But the report ignored the question of government liability for injuries caused by exposures from the testing. And a growing number of people were demanding an answer to that issue….”[15]
That wasn’t all. Also in 1979, a large number of files by the AEC became declassified and a University of Utah scientist published a study documenting an increase in leukemia rates among children in Utah. Dr. Joseph L. Lyon’s study was published in one of the most reputable medical journals, The New England Journal of Medicine.16
Concurrent with this explosion of information about and attention to the downwinders, two ‘torrents of justice’ flowed towards their cause. Stranahan notes: “Out in Utah, Arizona and Nevada, lawyers were busy filing claims against the government on behalf of downwind residents. The amount sought in the claims already exceeded $2 billion and the attorneys were still processing others. They made it clear they were ready to go to court.” Literally hundreds of Utah and Arizona residents filed suit in federal courts alleging that exposure to Nevada fallout radiation was a major contributing factor in their contraction of cancers, leukemias, melanomas, and in some cases even the death of their kin.17
Determined to get a handle on the increasing number of lawsuits dealing with fallout, the Federal District Court of Utah struggled with the idea of pursuing each and every claim. By 1979, the district court counted nearly 1,200 total claims by plaintiffs seeking fallout-related damages relating to deaths and injuries.
The second ‘torrent’ was happening in the nation’s capitol. U.S. senators – led by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and the late Teddy Kennedy (D-Mass.) – brought to Washington, D.C. expert after expert to aid them with the thorny issues of compensating large numbers of persons who sought injury-related damages from NTS fallout. Congress was intent on passing legislation to compensate downwinders.
Two thoughtful souls
These two torrents landed at the feet – so to speak – of two remarkable men who spent more time than just about anyone else at wrapping their heads around radiation compensation issues.
One was Bruce Jenkins of Utah, who was selected by the Utah District Court to preside over a collective trial for 24 select cases (out of the over 1,100 cases). Those two-dozen cases would act as ‘bellwethers’ to determine a judicial boiler-plate to apply to the other similar cases overloading Utah’s docket. This wasn’t to be a class-action suit. Jenkins told the federal government’s and the downwinders’ lawyers to select 24 “typical” cases and his decision, he later wrote, would ‘provide a legal and factual pattern against which the remaining issues in the pending cases may be subsequently matched.’
Following Jenkins’ final decision, a downwinder could, hypothetically, present his or her claims to a federal court judge and if their case met eligibility requirements then the judge would simply, and rather quickly, decide the severity of the damage and allot a suitable monetary award.
During the same general time period, the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources invited Dr. Charles W. Mays to testify on their draft, proposed bill titled ‘The Atom Bomb Fallout Compensation Bill of 1982′.
Quotes from Jenkins decision about AEC monitoring
“The attention of the NTS [Nevada Test Site] off-site monitoring programs was focused almost exclusively on measurement of external gamma dosage received in the few hours immediately following each detonation….”
“The off-site monitoring activities at NTS between 1951 and 1962 were overwhelmingly geared toward assessment of the … acute phase of fallout hazard….”
“Little attention was directed to careful monitoring of lower-energy gamma rays, or to measurement of beta radiation or determination of beta/gamma ratios. … Actual measurement of off-site fallout exposure continued only for a matter of a few hours at best; particularly in the early series; the few off-site monitors, pressured by tight scheduling of detonations, would return quickly to the NTS and leave again to monitor the next test before data from the previous test could be properly analyzed.”
“..Five days after the last explosion, there remained no one in the off-site organization to take any measurements. Everyone was gone…”
“Internal dose assessment based upon inhalation of fallout particles involved a similar lack of direct monitoring….Those persons responsible for off-site radiation safety were aware that a number of persons in the Nevada/Utah/Arizona area surrounding St. George and Cedar City worked out-of-doors, and faced an increased risk of inhaling “hot” particles. Yet warnings to stay indoors were sporadic and lasted only a couple of hours. Even when fallout persisted in the area at levels measurably in excess of background, the assumption that inhalation of fallout involved a negligible risk of harm was not tested by direct examination until limited studies during Operation TEAPOT (1955) which were published 3 or 4 years later…”
(Paul : this next bit is at the crux of the contention of the claim by ALRM regarding lack of proof which appears to be the justification for its decision to cease proceedings against the British government on behalf of radiation affected Aboriginal Australians. ie the claim (a feeble one on the evidence to hand as I have seen it and reported it) that there is no proof say disease is caused by radiation in the context of the claimants. However, Jenkins, the judge, had already established negligence existed. And he did not need to re prove radiogenic disease exists. That is accepted by any responsible authority.)
Making a case for radiation lodged in downwinders
The confluence of new information – from the autoradiograph of the ape lung tissue, to the facts and ideas presented in Congressional hearings, to the testimony gleaned by trial lawyers in Jenkins’ Salt Lake City, Utah, courtroom 18 – was sweeping laypersons, writers, journalists and politicians into a newly sparked debate about the linkage between low-level radiation exposure and health damage. Some must have been asking themselves: what possibly could a federal judge do to move this issue towards resolution (since it was really a question for scientists and medical researchers to answer)? That no one, at that time, could prove a link between radiation exposure and cancer was acknowledged by Jenkins, who wrote in his 215-page decision about the inability to “demonstrate through evidence a direct cause-in-fact relationship between radiation from any source and their own cancers or leukemias.”19
Does our cell structure behave much like Kodak’s photographic film? Is it vulnerable to – and damageable from – radiation that enters our bodies? Did the repeated exposures – including ingestion and inhalation of fallout from radioactive clouds from Nevada – increase Utahn’s and Arizonan’s chance of cancer and leukemia?
It would seem to most ordinary persons that the downwinders would have no case since, as noted Jenkins: “the injury is not specifically traceable to the asserted cause on an injury-by-injury basis.” A cancer doesn’t leave a tag, or note, saying “This tumor was caused by a few atoms of plutonium that lodged in the lower right part of the left lung from 1952 fallout.” A cancer caused by non-radioactive carcinogens, for example, doesn’t look any different than one caused by radioactive carcinogens.
Although in the 1980s scientists had reached a consensus that any exposure to radiation increases your chances of genetic damage, no matter how low of a dose, there was continued debate about what else (besides gene damage) is caused by low-levels of radiation. The ‘jury’ was still out on the effects of low-level radiation impacts on overall biology.
But, as Jenkins points out, just because you can’t prove an effect doesn’t mean that effect doesn’t occur: “While the extent of radiation injury to cells inflicted at “high” dose rates may perceptibly affect the functioning of the organism more dramatically than a series of “low” doses imparted to cells over a period of time, injury may nevertheless result. At the level of the individual cell, ionization is ionization, and a linear energy transfer is a linear energy transfer.”
What’s more is that just because you can’t prove someone caused an effect doesn’t mean they didn’t cause it to occur. Jenkins makes the fascinating point that lack of scientific proof of a radiation cause-and-effect and even lack of traceability to a specific cause doesn’t make proving liability an impossible task. Jenkins:
“That the court cannot now peer into the damaged cells of a plaintiff to determine that the cancer or leukemia was radiation-induced does not mean (1) that the damage was not in fact caused by radiation; (2) that the radiation damage involved did not result from the defendant’s conduct; or (3) that a satisfactory factual connection can never be established between plaintiff’s injury and defendant’s conduct for purposes of determining liability. Experience and the evidence in the record indicate that indeed it can.”
(Paul: the following is the crux:)
The Matrix of Justice
The climax of most Hollywood courtroom drama flicks has an embattled lawyer bursting through the courthouse doors at the last-minute waving iron-clad evidence – a fax, a shoe, a book, etc.. – that liberates their wrongly-accused client as the gavel-toting judge makes out the words “Case dismissed”. But evidence is so rare in the real world. That’s why, largely, we established courts and judges – because evidence is not always sufficiently abundant to prove absolute guilt or innocence. There is nearly always uncertainty. Judges and juries are tasked with deliberating and weighing incomplete evidence against the law as written – or as can best (the law) be interpreted to fit the situation.
Juries consider motive and possibilities. They determine if injury was deliberate, or not. They determine if injury was caused by accident, or not. They determine if either party acted in negligence, or not. The reason why citizens serve on jury panels is because there is no robot or expert that can do the job better.
One needs to see the matrix of justice20, not just the ‘trees.’ Justice is a natural belief, one that is universal across cultures and, arguably, time periods. And justice is more complicated than a ‘liberating’ shoe, or a book, or a photo, or a scientifically established fact. Technological evidence, like the expertly-conjured forensic proof we see nowadays on primetime television, argues Jenkins, is “merely one evidentiary element in the judicial matrix of decision and not necessarily as the sole justification for the judge’s legal decision.”
As it would turn out, lack of technological evidence isn’t grounds for a ‘case dismissal’ – not if the defendant deliberately failed to warn or help someone whose injury was contributed by the defendant’s actions. Not giving warnings or offering help was incidentally what angered ‘downwinders’ the most – that the AEC never warned them about the tests or the fallout radiation when it was allegedly known by the AEC that harm could result from such exposures. At the very core of it all the downwinders were leveling an accusation that the federal government and the AEC treated downwinders inhumanely.
When people are harmed by ‘Acts of God’ – like tornadoes or earthquakes – that is not inhuman; that’s nature. But when humans cause death and injury to other humans simply because they don’t want to tell a group of people that deadly chemicals are coming their way because their deaths and injuries would be bad PR that might jeopardize their bomb testing program, then this is inhumanity. Regardless of whether one can prove radiation caused an injury, the fact that harm could result from the fallout and the government could have chosen but didn’t choose to help or warn downwinders suggests the moral failure of individuals. Jenkins writes: “At the core of this case is a fundamental principle -a time-honored rule of law, an ethical rule, a moral tenet: [T]he law imposes [a duty] on everyone to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of others. The more particularized rules of negligence and proximate cause as a basis for liability which are applied in the body of this opinion are rooted in this principle of duty.”
Negligence and the burden of proof
The word ‘negligence’ appears 132 times in Jenkins’ decision. The word ‘negligent’ appears 51 times.
Paul : Is ALRM and or the legal firm engaged by ALRM to take the Aboriginal case to the British courts really saying that negligence and inhumanity did not occur during the British nuclear bombing of Australia? The denial of diagnosis for 30 years is one case in point. It is of course not the only one. The British admit negligence toward Aboriginal people (“A handful of natives” would not stand in the way of the British Commonwealth…” etc.) Aboriginal people know their own history better than I do. So the termination of the legal case on their behalf by the legal firm and or ALRM as “justified” by various statements in the media point internal considerations within the organisations rather than the actual merits of the case. An anonymous legal expert has already given his views as to the reasons for the dropping of the case. And none of those reasons involves the actual merits of the case. For the merits of the case are indeed abundant and clear.

Andrew continues:
‘Case law,’ or the body of decisions on legal cases that addresses specific issues not adequately addressed by the Constitution or federal or state codes of our judicial system, sets aside precedent for an exception to the premise ‘innocent until proven guilty.’ Jenkins writes in his decision:
“In some of the cases in which plaintiff has been injured, but has no means of identifying the specific cause-in-fact of the injury, the burden of proof has been placed upon the defendant to establish the factual details of the incident and show that defendant’s conduct did not contribute to the victim’s injury.”
Jenkins referred to cases in which one person was harmed and although the blame couldn’t be pinned on the defendant, if it is proven that the defendant acted in a blatantly negligent fashion that could have caused the injury, then the burden of proof lies with the defendant.
Jenkins cited – as “probably the best known example” – a 1948 federal case, Summers v. Tice, that reads like a bar story, or brain teaser: Three people were in a forest and two fired their shotguns. The non-gun-firing third person gets hit in the eye with a pellet. Both shotguns are aimed in the direction of the victim but no one knew, or could know, from which gun discharged the pellet that ended up in the victim’s eye. The pellet couldn’t be traced to either gun.
In Summers v. Tice, the court relied upon an even earlier precedent – a 1927 case – whereby the third person (in this case the victim was a boy) was hit by a pellet from two hunters shooting at pigeons from across a highway. The court found that “… each is liable for the resulting injury to the boy, although no one can say definitely who actually shot him. To hold otherwise would be to exonerate both from liability, although each was negligent, and the injury resulted from such negligence.”
So, in cases of the sort – that involve radioactive ‘bullets’ or shotgun pellets or inept hospital staff – if the plaintiff can present evidence not necessarily to prove a particular act but rather can “give[s] rise to an inference of negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury,” a court can rule nonetheless against the defendant.
Did the AEC act negligently?
So, the task of the plaintiff lawyers shifts from having to prove atomic-bullets caused leukemias and cancer to having to prove that the AEC acted negligently in ways that resulted in harm.
Of course, a series of loony questions follow: How exactly can one conduct a nuclear test negligently? Can one conduct a nuclear test and be ‘careful’ and un-reckless while doing it?
Aiming and shooting a shotgun in the direction of a boy or a fellow hunter is clearly negligent. But if you’re conducting above-ground nuclear tests that no matter what you do they will spew radioactive ‘bullets’ across the country – it happened with Trinity in 1945 and ‘Able’ in 1951 – how could you exercise better control? Is the answer that you shouldn’t blow up nukes at all? Or blow them up but say certain things to the public?
No one even today can control clouds – they break up, rejoin with other clouds and meanwhile traverse thousand of miles of sky. One former test site manager bemusingly told a journalist for a radio documentary that they never deliberately tried to hurt downwinders at the Nevada Test Site; there wasn’t any motivation, he argued, to do harm to people. But if there was no choice but to blow up nukes, while these test site managers demonstrated a degree of responsibility for conducting tests ‘safely’ they also to a degree ignored another responsibility and that failure constituted negligence which caused harm.
Writes Jenkins: “Distilled to its essence plaintiffs do not complain of what defendant did do. They complain of what defendant didn’t do – namely that it did not adequately warn, did not adequately and contemporaneously measure, and did not adequately educate the population at hazard in simple and inexpensive preventative and mitigating measures. At no time has the defendant ever asserted that as a matter of conscious choice it deliberately adopted a policy of not warning, not measuring and not educating the populace at hazard.”
The AEC was conducting nuclear tests and it was what they didn’t do before, during and after the explosions that was at issue.
Jenkins notes: “At the operational level employees of the United States had a duty to prepare and conduct tests carefully with full regard for public safety. The citizen adjacent to the testing site had a right to have that duty fulfilled.”
In the legal world, the word negligence has to do with something called ‘due care.’ The term ‘due’ refers to the term ‘duty’ – that a person needs to act in such a way to not harm the rights of others. They have the duty not to harm others if they can help it. If they have choices, they need to choose to not harm others. Those who choose to be careful fulfill that duty. Those who choose to be careless don’t. Depending on their choices, others’ rights’ might or might not be violated.
end quote.
At this point I will stop stealing Andrew’s work and ask the question: Does anyone remember the name of the Aboriginal man, a resident of the Warburton Mission, who died of thirst in a dried up creek bed in 1957 on the Warburton Reserve?
The British had fenced off many many acres of land, including the Reserve’s main water supply.
The British and Australian scientists needed the land for the nuclear weather and fallout monitoring station. And they needed to have access to the water. For in an area of high fallout, the scientists needed to wash thoroughly at least daily, and their Land Rover’s needed full radiators in the hot drought of 1957.
And even though the sticky paper fallout papers record the fallout at the station, the nuclear authorities did not say a word while the West Australian Parliament debated moving the children at the reserve further West. For their safety. In the end the WA government decided to leave the children where they were. (Warburton Range Film, Nicholls, Grayden and others, 1957, AIATSIS.)
Titterton’s response at the time was “If the Aborigines are so against the nuclear tests, let them vote against them at the election”. (He did say to that effect, in the 1950s.) The Aboriginal people of Australia were not recognized as citizens until after the `1967 referendum. And most could not vote. They were people who were not the responsibility of the Federal Government, but of the States. However the States acted as entities defined, as I feebly understand it, as being subject to Her Majesty’s pleasure and so the Aboriginal people were under Crown Protection none the less. And so it seems to me, feebly, for I am not a lawyer, that those who breached that duty of care so many times, should now, in the sense of the institutions who issued the orders, On Her Majesty’s Service, take full account of what was done. And this must demonstrated in the full gaze of the law as it is written.
No Matter How Much it Costs or who now it offends.

“After more than a year of reviewing his notes and thousands of documents, in early May 1984 Judge Jenkins announced his ruling. It was summed up in an article heading in the May 12th issue of the New York Times: ‘RADIATION-CANCER LINK KEY TO RULING.’30 The article noted “The landmark ruling Thursday by a Federal district judge that the Government had been negligent in the way it conducted nuclear tests in Nevada was based on the ”contributory role” that radiation from the explosions played in causing 10 cancers, nine of them fatal.”

That is not the total count. That is merely the number of participants in the action who were successful in that case.

The US Federal government appealed the Jenkins’ decision and won, primarily on that the basis that the Executive can do what it likes with impunity. As Andrew writes it: ” The panel argued that Congress gave the Executive Branch the right to devise its plans as seen fit because of the ‘broad safety language’ in legislation. It is not up to the Judiciary to interfere with Executive decisions, even over a decision to rank civilian safety as a secondary or tertiary consideration when blowing up nuclear bombs. The Judiciary cannot (a) contemplate nor (b) interfere with the serious and complex considerations weighed upon the Executive Branch such as how warning civilians or monitoring their safety might be an unwise allocation of either public monies or more personnel or even an error judgement in ‘social psychology’ (i.e., whether scaring people would be more harmful than the fallout). This, unbelievably, was the Appeals Court’s position – regardless of what happened to innocent people, the separation of powers must be respected and AEC be given full immunity.38″

And so I ask, given that the Aboriginal people were under Crown Protection at the time, where does English justice stand on the matter? What is Crown Protection if the events suffered by so many and the consequences endured by so many are taken into account by that Crown?

If Aboriginal People in Australia were under Crown Protection at the time, where is the immunity where that stated obligation is clearly breached?

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