The guiding legislation of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

No doubt Japan has its equivalent.

When organisations are charged with profound with duties involving the preservation of nations, crimes against individuals are not excused. Repeatedly, in the Western experience, and most easily demonstrated in the American experience, individuals have been denied justice by the very authorities charged with the task of ensuring justice survives.

The law as it stand protects the abusers. For instance the governing legislation in the USA is here: http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/governing-laws.html

The current 1954 Atomnic Energy Act as amended is here:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0980/v1/sr0980v1.pdf#page=19

On document page 22 and 23 of this Act we find the following definitions:

“y. The term “restricted data” means all data concerning (1) design,
manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of
special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the
production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed
from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 142.

z. The term “source material” means (1) uranium, thorium, or any
other material which is determined by the Commission pursuant to the
provisions of section 61 to be source material; or (2) ores containing one
or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the
Commission may by regulation determine from time to time.
aa. The term “special nuclear material” means (1) plutonium, uranium
enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material
which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section 51,
determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include source
material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing,
but does not include source material.
bb
.
The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense
includes all territories and possessions of the United States, the Canal
Zone and Puerto Rico.” end quote.

It seems to me the NRC as it is governed by the above law fosters public dissent pursuant to the act of “declassifing or removing data regarding “special nuclear material”
from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 142.”
It seems a noble thing to induce the NRC to re assign as much data as possible from the restricted list to the public domain. As such when nuclear industry protests, that industry attacks the foundations of American protest. I have little doubt that the internal conflict within the NRC in the wake of Fukushima, a conflict which saw the then Chairman resign, was centred around the issues of what to disclose, what not to disclose and how to portray the nature of the nuclear disaster in Japan. One does not have be very bright to see the probablity. It’s enshrined in the law. Who decides what to declassify what information in relation to special nuclear material used to produce energy? Any such process delays the release of information to the public.

In additoin, From the link http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/csg/s2unclas/ucni.htm
comes the partial quote:

“Unclassified Controlled
Nuclear Information (UCNI)

Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) under jurisdiction of the Department of Energy includes unclassified facility design information, operational information concerning the production, processing or utilization of nuclear material for atomic energy defense programs, safeguards and security information, nuclear material, and declassified controlled nuclear weapon information once classified as Restricted Data (RD).

Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (DoD UCNI) is unclassified information on security measures (including security plans, procedures and equipment) for the physical protection of DoD Special Nuclear Material, equipment, or facilities.

Information is designated UCNI only when it is determined that its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by increasing significantly the likelihood of the illegal production of nuclear weapons or the theft, diversion, or sabotage of Special Nuclear Material, equipment, or facilities.” “Enforcement

Violation of Section 148 of the Atomic Energy Act carries a civil fine not to exceed $110,000. In addition, the individual may be subject to a criminal penalty under Section 223 of the Act.”

It is little wonder that dissonance exists between the experience of people and the utterances permitted by government. If a publication were fined $110,000 each time it printed the truth, it would not return much to share holders.

Meanwhile the share holders of nuclear industrial stock benefit from the effective govenment guarantee that the disclosure true state of affairs in reard to special nuclear materials will be restricted from market and public scrutiny.

Who then are the crazy ones really? The time lag between the initial cover up statements and the eventual declassification (as far as it goes) of the truth sows the seeds of public unrest, aggitation, and distrust.

In around August 2011 the Japanese government reported the existence of plutonium miles from the broken reactors. It confirmed that the plutonium had been released by the reactors. The Japanese government then ceased reporting on the presence of this special nuclear material. Instead, it continued a campaign extolling the safety of plutonium when ingested.

While inhaled plutonium is more dangerous, plutonium is not a condiment. It is not safe to eat.

Who does one believe? Who are the crazy ones? Why is the corporate press so late with the truth, and why does it persist so long with the lies? There is a basis within the laws which govern nuclear disclosures by which insight into this process may be discerned.

For all of nuclear industry’s soothing deciept, it cannot deny the historical record.

There is a whiteboard in the control room at Fukushima Diiachi. The TEPCO engineers recorded the progress of the disaster on this whiteboard. The writing is obviously in Japanese. Save for the record of the failure of one critical system : ECCS.

The history of the ECCS controversy extends back to the late 1960s, and reveals the power possessed by nuclear industry, protected as it is from full disclosure, to manipulate governments, regulators and the public.

https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2011/03/24/thoughts-on-nuclear-plumbing-by-ralph-lapp-1971/

https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2011/03/27/ralp-lapp-unsafe-core-cooling-systems-in-reactors-1971/

The failure of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems at Fukushima Diiachi was foreseen not just by Lapps but by dozens of engineers decades ago. At the same time that TEPCO was turning the first sods at Fukushima in order to build Unit 1, American engineers and the public were locked in conflict and dissent with the AEC over the likely failure of reactors in situations which would render their emergency core cooling systems useless.

In March 2011 what had been long foreseen came to pass. The response of nuclear authorities was to delay acknowledgement of the facts, including the fact of multiple reactor meltdown, for at least 3 months.

Not long after a civil war broke out in the NRC and the Chairman was replaced.

Same old, same old. The NRC history of the US ECCS controversy of the late 1960s and 1970s is here:
https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2012/09/21/the-nrc-account-of-the-eccs-controversy/

Nuclear industry elites crow about the fact that for decades Fukushima Diiachi produced electricity. What they do not admit is the obvious truth that in order to do that, the industry put more faith in its ability to manipulate nuclear regulators and the national governments of the USA and Japan than it did in the Emergency Core Cooling Systems. For they have known since the results of the 70s semi scale test that the ECCS would fail. And so they did.

I would say that 40 years of technical misrepresentation of the truth is long enough, and is mere proof not of technical prowess but of inbuilt ignorance and denial. Many saw it coming and were dismissed. This may not be what the press discloses, but it is what the historical record shows.


The photo above of the TEPCO control room whiteboard above is a still taken from ‘Inside Japan’s Nuclear Meltdown’, February 28, 2012, Dan Edge, BBC/Quicksilver http://www.npr.org/2012/02/28/147559456/one-year-later-inside-japans-nuclear-meltdown It reads, “ECCS malfunction. Unable to pump water into reactor cores.” This eventually was foreseen from 1969 on.

NRC short history of the ECCS controversey of the 1970s .http://dwb4.unl.edu/Chem/CHEM869Z/CHEM869ZLinks/www.nrc.gov/SECY/smj/shorthis.htm#Core%20Cooling

Today’s nuclear industry has been dragged kicking into its future as foreseen by the independent and competent circa 1972. What bentness enabled the industry to persist with the lies for so very long?

One Response to “The guiding legislation of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission”

  1. CaptD Says:

    Great article, Thanks!

    It’s dangerous to be right when the government is wrong. – Voltaire

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