Radiological Warfare defined

Chapter 6 of the publication at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/dodhre/Narratv.pdf

On the 15th March 2011 the nature of the emissions from Fukushima Diiachi changed. No longer consisting of fractionalised radionuclides separated due to their chemical nature (Iodine and Cesium in the main), the emissions were added to by the undifferentiated emissions from the damaged fuel rods in spent fuel pool 4.

The contents of the whole fuel pool need not have been involved to greatly add to the number of radio-chemicals released from the plant.

There is absolutely no need to confuse nuclear explosions with the much smaller detonations needed to disperse the substances used in a radiological weapon. As initially envisaged, in World War 2, as suggested by Lawrence and detailed by Hamilton, a radiological weapon would contain selected material from the Hanford reactor, ground up, mixed with High Explosive and packed into a shell. If the A bombs didnt work, this is what would have been dropped over Japan in the attempt to dissuade the USSR from invading Honshu.

The events pre 15 March 2011 pale to events of that day.

Effects Predictions
the new. http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/research/soar.html

The old. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WASH-740

The volume of the USNRC SOARCA report
at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1233/ML12332A057.pdf states the following in relation to the accident at Fukushima Diiachi (Appendix A):

SOARCA AND THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT

Objective

TheState-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses
(SOARCA) study was nearly at the end of
its peer review when the Fukushima Daiichi accident occurred on
March 11,2011
. Following the accident, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) began a cooperative effort to use the MELCOR code for aforensic analysis
of event progression to develop a more detailed understanding of the accident. This cooperative
effort is ongoing.

Based on limited information currently available, the Fukushima accident has many similarities
and differences with some of the Peach Bottom sequences analyzed in SOARCA. The objective
of this appendix is to
compare and contrast the Fukushima accident and the SOARCA study for
the following topics:
(1)operation of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system,
(2)hydrogen release and combustion,
(3)48-hour truncation of releases in SOARCA,
(4) multiunit risk, and
(5)spent fuel pools…….

It must be emphasized that there are significant gaps in information and uncertainties about what actually occurred in the Fukushima reactors. These uncertainties do not allow firm conclusions on comparisons with SOARCA results. It is expected to take a number of years for the Japanese organizations involved to beable to access the containments and fully evaluate the (3)48-hour truncation of releases in SOARCA, (4)multiunit risk, and (5)spentconditions of the nuclear fuel and other equipment to allow a more complete understanding of the
events. fuel pool (SFP) risk. It must be emphasized that there are
significant gaps in information and uncertainties about what actually occurred in the Fukushima
reactors. These uncertainties do not allow firm conclusions on comparisons with
SOARCA results. It is expected to take a number of years for the Japanese organizations involved to be able to access the containments and fully evaluate the conditions of the nuclear fuel and (3)48-hour truncation of releases in SOARCA, (4)multiunit risk, and (5)spentotherequipment to allow a more complete understanding of the events. …….”

“One reason for the extended length of RCIC operation at Fukushima, in
comparison to the unmitigated LTSBO timeline in the SOARCA analysis, is the station batteries
at Fukushima were d
esigned to provide dc power for a longer period of time than the batteries at
Peach Bottom (8
hours for Fukushima versus 2
hours). At both plants, the actual duration of dc
power would be longer than the design basis because of margins incorporated into t
he system
design, as well as manual actions that can be taken to shed nonessential loads on the dc
emergency bus. The maximum length of time that dc power was available at Fukushima appears
to have been considerably longer than the maximum battery duratio
n considered in the SOARCA
analysis for Peach Bottom, even when load shedding is taken into account. ”

“These differences in the
factors contributing to the duration of RCIC operation at Fukushima and
the SOARCA analyses result in two differences in the observed chronology of events that follow
the eventual loss of coolant injection. First is the difference in the times at which co
re damage
and fission product release to the environment begin. These events were predicted to begin at
20
hours in the SOARCA unmitigated LTSBO analysis, but they began at Fukushima Units
2
and 3 on the third and second day of the accident, respectively.
Second, sustained operation of
the RCIC system at Fukushima resulted in a larger cumulative transport of heat from fission
product decay (in the form of steam) from the RPV to the suppression pool in the containment
(torus). Suppression pool temperature
s at the time the RCIC pumps ceased operating in
Fukushima Units
2 and 3 were, therefore, much higher than the calculated pool temperature in
the SOARCA analysis of the unmitigated LTSBO scenario. Increases in suppression pool
temperature result in additi
onal evaporation of water from the pool to the containment
atmosphere; this in turn results in an increase in containment pressure. Therefore, containment
pressure in the Fukushima reactors at the time core damage began was higher than the pressure
calcul
ated in the Peach Bottom LTSBO scenario. When hydrogen, generated by oxidation of
Zircaloy cladding in the core, was released to the containment atmosphere, containment pressure
increased further. The combination of a high base pressure from long

term ev
aporation of steam
and accumulation of noncondensible hydrogen gas in the Fukushima containments likely
resulted in pressures that were sufficiently high to induce leakage through the drywell head
flange while in

vessel core damage was underway. Release o
f hydrogen to the reactor building
through the drywell head flange likely led to the destruction of the Fukushima reactor buildings
by hydrogen combustion. In contrast, the shorter duration of RCIC operation in the unmitigated
LTSBO scenario resulted in l
ess heating of the suppression pool, less evaporation of water to the
containment atmosphere, and a lower base pressure in containment at the time core damage and
hydrogen generation began.
The extended period of core cooling by sustained RCIC operation
at Fukushima affected more
than the timeline for core damage and containment pressure at the time core damage began. The
mechanisms for hydrogen (and fission product) leakage out of containment into the reactor
building were affected by differences in co
ntainment thermodynamic conditions, which were
influenced by the operation of the steam

driven RCIC system.
Hydrogen Release and Combustion
The
physical
d
amage to Fukushima
reactor buildings will perhaps be the most enduring visible
image of plant damage
initiated by the earthquake and tsunami
in
Japan in March
2011
.
The
apparent
cause
was
combustion of hydrogen that was generated
by
high

temperature oxidation of
fuel
cladding.
Extensive clad
ding
oxidation and core material melting is believed to have
o
ccurred in Fukushima Units
1, 2
,
and 3, although the timelines for core damage differed in each
u
nit
because of
differences in equipment
and operator
response.

For Fukushima, as discussed above, the operators delayed releases beyond the SOARCA
assumption, so substantial releases occurred beyond 48
hours. In addition, the operators at
Fukushima were not able to flood the reactor buildings, as as
sumed for SOARCA.

As demonstrated by the Fukushima
accident
, severe accidents that affect multiple reactors
located at a common site are possible.”

end quotes.

There is absolutely nothing in this report which sheds light on the events and consequences of the 15 March 2011 as they reportedly impacted Spent Fuel Pool Number 4.

One Response to “Radiological Warfare defined”

  1. CaptD Says:

    The “Fallout War” has started by Japan “nuking” themselves and the rest of the Planet, particularly the West Coast of North America, which will receive the brunt of both Japans ocean borne ongoing radioactive leakage (think poisoned seafood) and wind borne fallout as Japan continues to burn radioactive debris!

    Unmentioned is the damage that these radionuclides are doing to the upper atmosphere, which I believe is having a great effect on our current weather patterns, but is only acknowledged as part of “Global Warming”…

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