Dear (name deleted) the background is : The early power reactors were less than 1 megawatt in capacity. Their cores could not produce sufficient decay heat to produce meltdown. The power companies did not like these early reactors, apparently, as there was no profit to be made from them. When multi watt power reactors were mooted, the AEC was concerned about the much larger amount of decay heat these large cores produced. The AEC commissioned the Ergen Committee to example core melt down, what happens in meltdown and emergency core cooling systems to prevent meltdown occurring.
From reading Lapp, Ergen described the process of meltdown, including the extent of corium travel and expansion in dry sand.
Ergen, according to Lapp, described the corium as expanding to “60 feet” in diameter. I don’t know from what initial size. Again in dry sand.
Tepco and GE presumably quite deliberately chose the site for what was a significant addition to Japan’s reactor fleet.
The Fukushima site, for certainly Fukushima Diiachi, and probably Dani, has a hydrology which is, and probably was at the time prior to construction, well described.
The thesis is that the aquifer which runs under the NPP at Fukushima WAS CHOSEN is response to the findings of the Ergen Report. It is not a report merely about ECCS. It is fundamentally the first document to described the process of meltdown in a multimegawatt reactor.
The media throughout the 60s and 70s carried the public debate about reactor safety in terms originally defined in the Ergen report. It was on the basis of the report that ECCS were developed – within insufficient testing – and upon which public hearings held in the mid 70s were given the assurance that ECCS and rules governing the max permitted temp of zirconium would prevent melt down from occurring. It was on the basis of the Ergen Report that the GE Mk1 was designed and approved for license and export. Fundamentally.
The water crisis at Fukushima Diiachi is, in my thesis, a foreseen event predicated upon the selection of the site, I submit, on the basis of the fact that the relatively high wet season aquifer flow through the site would act as a natural source of coolant for ex vessel corium.
In the event , of course, noone knows where the coria are and I will be dead from old age before that information is known.
The contents of the Ergen report are most important in the context of the promises issued throughout
the late 60s and 70s – promises known by authorities to be false – but promises which allowed the US nuclear power reactor program to proceed.
I think as a result of the Ergen Report findings, merely 1 reactor, deemed to be too close to a city, was shut down in the US. This solution of siting reactors away from cities places them in rural areas and ensures the safety of food bowl areas are compromised. It is that risk which has been the subjected to vast amounts of propaganda by nuclear authorities.
It is mainly to learn what Ergen wrote in relation to the siting of Fukushima Diiachi that I need to read the report.
Oddly (or not), the Ergen report is missing from the online digital archive of documents available at DOE Opennet. documents relating to the amendments of the draft report are there, but not the Ergen Report itself.
The entire construct of nuclear industry using aquifers and faults in the earth as open latrines into which it might allow a gaggle of faulty reactors to excrete coria, is of course, an obscene one. Quite in character though, with nuclear industry. “It’s just like a CT scan for the previously healthy” is all they can say. Have a banana.
If the above construct is borne out by a reading of the Ergen Report, it will not be proof of Intelligent Design.
Rather, it will be proof the usual callous disregard nuclear authorities are known for and have been for, since 1945.