THE ECCS CONTROVERSEY OF THE 1960s and 1970s, USA, in the Light of March 2011.

1. EXTRACTS FROM “The Menace of Atomic Energy” by Nader and Abbott, Outback Press, Victoria, Australia. Copyright 1977. ISBN 0 86888 0515. https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/john-abbotts/menace-of-atomic-energy/ juxtaposed with :

Dan Edge, Insider Japan’s Nulcear Meltdown”, BBC, Quicksilver, PBS, last image is of the whiteboard in the Fukushima Control room, March 2011, record created by tepco reactor staff.

This final photo above is from Dan Edge, BBC, Qucksilver productions, PBS, “Inside Japan’s Nucleae Meltdown”, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/japans-nuclear-meltdown/ video, transcript: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/health-science-technology/japans-nuclear-meltdown/transcript-4/ to quote: Inside Japan’s Nuclear Meltdown WRITTEN, PRODUCED AND DIRECTED BY
Dan Edge

March 11, 2011
Day 1
………

NARRATOR:This is the frantically scribbled log the engineers kept on a whiteboard in the control room as the nuclear plant slid towards disaster. “15:42, nuclear emergency declared. 15:50, loss of water level readings. 16:36, emergency core cooling system malfunction. No water can be injected.” end quote.

Who knew this would happen prior to and at the approval and licencing of the design in the USA? Consulting Nader and Abbott we can build a list of those who knew. There are two groups – independent scientists and technologists who were dissenters and the nuclear authorities themselves, as follows:

Henry Kandall and Daniel Ford. (Union of Concerned Scientists)
Dr Morris Rosen (Atomic Energy Commission)
George Brockett (AEC)
J. Curtis Haire (AEC)
Milton Shaw (AEC)
Dr Alvin M. Weinberg (Oak Ridge)
The Federal Republic of Germany Reactor Safety Committee, 1972.
The Federation of American Scientists, 1973.
The RAND Corporation, 1972 (CIA)
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 1972 (AEC)
The California Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Science and Technology 1973
Swedish government scientific opinion of US reactor design safety – ECCS
Pugwash Conference 1973
2,300 US scientists – petition to Congress. 1975.

How did they know? The knowledge was gained during tests of the ECCS commissioned by the ECCS as documented by Nader and Abbott:

Nader and Abbot, The Menace of Atomic Power, 1977, page 101.

So how long have competant nuclear authorities known of this scandal – that the ECCS upon which everyone from nuclear engineers to babes in the womb rely? Since 1970 for sure.

What did they do to fix the problem? spend millions trying to convince the world that the nuclear emissions mandated in order to lower reactor pressures to allow the entry of emergency coolant because the ECCS wont work in reactor overheat, was safe. Like a “CT scan” a single CT scan given without medical need to unconsenting people who are not the patients of nuclear industry anyway. Nuclear industry is not a hospital, it is a threat to health. It is more than a single CT scan and the Sievert value for each fast particle is much greater than for a single CT scan x ray photon. There isan off switch for a CT scanner. They still havent “switched off” the Fuk reactors.

By the end of the public hearings in the USA in the mid 70s, no American with an interest in the topic could also have known. But noone allowed the Japanese people with credibility or without harassment. Even Fukushima Diiachi ended its construction phase (started 1967) and came on line. With the well known fault set in concrete within its deliberately mysterious bowels.

Now, let’s look at the rules and promises made in the 60s and 70s based on what was known and the statements made to the US people which resulted in the approval of multi megawatt plants in the USA and the export of the GE Mk1 to Tepco, particualrly in the light of the alleged unfalablity of the ECCS as asserted from the 60s on by nuclear authorities even though there had never been a full scale test of these systems, only scale model tests which had been incomplete.

Given the warnings from the 1960s on, given the response of industry to objectors such as Nader, Abbott and their sources, the white board comment recorded by the Tepco engineers on their control room white board should have come as no surprise to anyone.

It begs the questions though, why for forty years the global nuclear industry ignored the warnings, maintaining them to be wrong. And why for forty years only the disenfranchised have continued to carry the warning as a valid description of consequence of design in response to trigger.

For the industry maintained for the same forty years, that no matter what the trigger, the ECCS and the rules governing reactor emergency response and core performance were inviolate and guaranteed safety. This was the guarantee given at public hearings in the 1970s which resulted in the approval of multi megawatt reactors and the export of these reactors to Japan.

Again, compare the record of Nader and Abbott, 1977, from their informants and sources with this:


“16.36 hours, ECCS failure”

Of course, there is record of what the nuclear industry thought of Nader, Abbott and their sources and informants. None of them were or are complementary. However, the official record of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission shows just who is being honest about the facts here. And it is not the nuclear industry. The industry which has produced such a convoluted narrative of Fukushima Diiachi via the mass media that the ECCS as it has stood for decades, and the final arbitration provided by the engineers of Tepco and the proof of their white board record, has been lost in plain sight amid the engineered confusion. It is quite actually. The industry was so adamant in its eternal promise of ECCS infalibility and in the inviolate nature of reactor regulation in order to unleash multi megawatt reactors upon the nations that they plainly lied.

“16.36 hours, ECCS failure”. Tepco March 2011.

If the original warnings were greeted with derision fromt the nuclear elite, it is only the hope that the people have the memories of gold fish which should cause that elite any faint hope of joy.

Not if I can help it. They have lied for so long that the young ones among them do not know the lie or its origins.

2. The origins of the ECCS controversey.

Emergency core cooling : report
Author: W K Ergen; U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Advisory Task Force on Power Reactor Emergency Cooling.
Publisher: Oak Ridge, Tenn : USAEC, Division of Technical Information Extension, [196?]
Edition/Format: Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database: WorldCat
Rating:

Nuclear reactors — Safety measures.
Nuclear reactors — Cooling.

full text (thanks to Aaron) : https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2013/11/22/the-ergen-report-1967-eccs-meltdown-studies/

With the realisation that cooling failure could produce meltdown in multi megawatt reactors, the US AEC understood that meltdown could not be allowed to become a realistic possiblity in the public mind. It commissioned the Ergen report to study meltdown, the condequences of metdown and the steps and equipment needed to prevent meltdown. . With the completion of the report , with industry assistance , in 1967, it became understood that the control of meltdown and the mitigation of meltdown was heavily dependentant upon soil type beneath the reactor. A quote from the Ergen report : “Page 166 -168 gives some clues:

1. Size of Molten Sphere in Various Soils 1
To illustrate the magnitude of the decay heat release from a 3,200Mwt
core in terms of the heat capacity of several common materials, the
size of a molten sphere containing one-hour-aged fission products was
calculated using dry sand and limestone as the heat absorbing material.
The model for this calculation assumed that the molten material in the
sphere was all at the melting temperature – 3,133 degrees F for dry sand and
4,4600 degrees F for limestone – and had the same density as the surrounding
material so that no settling or floating of the sphere would occur.
Conduction heat transfer from the sphere was included on the basis of
infinite medium surrounding the molten sphere. Fig. 1 shows the sphere
radius as a function of the time after shutdown for dry sand and limestone
as heat sink materials; the sphere radius for the adiabatic – i.e.
no conduction – condition is also shown for dry sand. These results
indicate that molten spheres of approx 60 ft diameter for limestone and
approx 90 ft diameter for dry sand would be required to absorb and dissipate
the decay heat from a 3,200 Mwt core. Also the growth of a molten sphere
would continue for a approx 20,000 hours under these conditions.”

A figure from the Ergen report is reproduced here. Of course, few ordinary people read the Ergen report, but by the mid 70s most interested Americans were aware of the steps taken to prevent meltdown as advertised by the AEC – the infallible (allegedly) Emergency Core Cooling system. This ECCS, this same ECCS which was reported as failed by the Tepco staff on the whiteboard in the control room of reactor number 1 in March 2011. .

So the second question I have is “what is the soil type and the conditions beneath Fukushima Diiachi? ”

From the Ergen Report of 1967. The importance of choosing the underlying soil type to mitigate meltdown consequence in the event of ECCS failure. The report had been commissioned by US nuclear authorities prior to the start of construction of Fukushima Diiachi and was researched and written with industry assistance, including the assistance of General Electric. Who had, therefore, the foresight to choose the Fukushima Diiachi with meltdown mitigation as a site selection criteria. Cutting edge stuff. And known ever since by that industry.

The built it anyway. Telling the people of Japan only that nuclear power was perfectly safe. Objectors were harrassed, delayed and denied in courts and denied full participation in the economic and social life of Japan. Much the same fate suffered by the informants and sources cited by Nader and Abbott. These include:

Henry Kandall and Daniel Ford. (UCS)
Dr Morris Rosen (AEC)
George Brockett (AEC)
J. Curtis Haire (AEC)
Milton Shaw (AEC)
Dr Alvin M. Weinberg (Oak Ridge)
The Federal Republic of Germany Reactor Safety Committee, 1972.
The Federation of American Scientists, 1973.
The RAND Corporation, 1972 (CIA)
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 1972 (AEC)
The California Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Science and Technology 1973
Swedish government scientific opinion of US reactor design safety – ECCS
Pugwash Conference 1973
2,300 US scientists – petition to Congress. 1975.

All the above authorities saw the reality of ECCS and of the reality of catastrophic reactor contaminment failure and meltdown as a design led event due to the inadequacies of ECCS and reactor design.

Those authorities who spoke in secret memos only were economically and socially safe. Those who were not of the elite were vulnerable.

Despite the known hazards and the predicted potential failure of ECCS – as shown even by the semi scale tests – the AEC ccommissioners “released its decision on the ECCS Hearings. Its Final Acceptance Criteria for ECCS (October 1973) (Fukushima Diiachi No 1 not yet on stream) standards were only slight modifications of the Interim Criteria. The entire question of whether ECCS would actually work, or when experimental verification of ECCS would be available, was left up in the air ” Nader and abbott, pp 106.

Well its not up in the air anymore.

3. The hydrology and geology of Fukushima Diiachi.

While the American and Japanese people were being told that nuclear power was perfectly safe, the GE and TEPCO engineers were selecting a site for Tepco’s new reactor park, Unit 1 of which was commenced in 1967. What ground conditions did they carefully choose, being fully prepared by the findings of Ergen? .

wherre in Japan would they find wet sand? wet earth? wet limestone? wet anything to mitigate a molten core?

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3E04DD1DD13989BC8525785D004CCD7A-map.pdf

http://fukushima.over-blog.fr/article-the-geology-of-fukushima-88575278.html

Fukushima 福島第一

12 novembre 2011
The Geology of Fukushima

By Pierre Fetet, posted in Le blog de Fukushima

Translation from French: Robert Ash

download link: http://ddata.over-blog.com/4/37/62/00/The-Geology-of-Fukushima.pdf

quote” The Fukushima Daiichi Power Station is located on the east coast of Honshu island, in northeastern Japan, on a Cenozoic sedimentary ground, i.e. belonging to the current geological era (from 65.5 million years ago to the present). It is separated from the Abukuma granite plateau by the Futuba fault. Coring conducted by researchers shows that the layer of sedimentary rock which makes up the soil of the east coast of Japan over at least a hundred kilometers has a thickness of 815 meters at the latitude of Fukushima Daini.” Feret, Ash.

that is: Porous ground, lowered 10 metres at least, built over an aquifer with a fault line present, with basements below sea level. Which they use today in diversion to cool the reactors (who believes in “cold shutdown” now? the site conforms to Ergen, 1967. But in the public mind, the worst,by order of the nuclear elite, was not permitted to happen. And so this natural heatsink has never been mentioned. And even when the pollution got too much for even the nukers, they fiegned no prior knowledge in 2011, even though the geology and hydyrology would would been compulsory for the construction of even a public loo, let alone a reactor park. I remember 1967. It was not long ago. Please go to Feret’s site and read what they knew and slected to buld Fukushima Diiachi upon. . They have used that water to clean and flush the place since the day it was built. . I propose.

4. Sprung. From late 2011 Japanese and World nuclear authorities claimed that the emissions from the wrecked gaggle of reactors at Fukushima Diiachi no longer emitted radio chemical pollutants into the biosphere. People who observed or thought otherwise were called every name under the sun by the deceitful nuclear liars.

It was not until July 2013 that Japanese authorities, under pressure from reports which showed continued pollution, admitted that the leakage from the wrecked, failed reactors had continued unabated from March 2011 until the present time. The estimated rate of leakage was initially given as being 300 tons of contaminated water per day, recently undated by TEPCO to 400 tons per day.

This admission came after a campaign of intimidation which saw at least one journalist (a Canadian) interrogated by authorities and deported after being roughed up by official thugs at Tokyo airport. The police are not gentle with Japanese citizens who choose to disagree, on the basis of science, with authorities.

One year ago Associated Press published the following report about the state of ocean and fish contamination off Fukushima. In this story the oceanographer cited explains that the then undiminished level of contamination offshore from Fukushima demonstrated that either 1. The seabed was holding contamination, ensuring fish remained contaminated or 2. that the reactors were still leaking.

It took another 12 months of abuse of the truth by Japan before the eventual admission that option 2 is indeed correct. As probably option 1 is also, ensuring at least a decade of contaminated fish IF Fukushima Diiachi stops leaking today (no show of that).

Just as well Woods Hole Institute isn’t located in Japan eh.

You can trust a nuclear expert as far as you can throw em. It seems.

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/cesium-fish-fukushima-not-declining

Associated Press

Cesium levels in fish off Fukushima not dropping
By MALCOLM FOSTER
— Oct. 25 9:07 PM EDT
You are here
Home » Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. » Cesium levels in fish off Fukushima not dropping

TOKYO (AP) — Radioactive cesium levels in most kinds of fish caught off the coast of Fukushima haven’t declined in the year following Japan’s nuclear disaster, a signal that the seafloor or leakage from the damaged reactors must be continuing to contaminate the waters — possibly threatening fisheries for decades, a researcher says.

Though the vast majority of fish tested off Japan’s northeast coast remain below recently tightened limits of cesium-134 and cesium-137 in food consumption, Japanese government data shows that 40 percent of bottom-dwelling fish such as cod, flounder and halibut are above the limit, Ken Buesseler, a marine chemist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Massachusetts, wrote in an article published Thursday in the journal Science.

In analyzing extensive data collected by Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, he found that the levels of contamination in almost all kinds of fish are not declining a year after the March 11, 2011 disaster. An earthquake and tsunami knocked out the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant’s vital cooling system, causing three reactor cores to melt and spew radiation onto the surrounding countryside and ocean.

“The (radioactivity) numbers aren’t going down. Oceans usually cause the concentrations to decrease if the spigot is turned off,” Buesseler told The Associated Press in an interview. “There has to be somewhere they’re picking up the cesium.”

“Option one is the seafloor is the source of the continued contamination. The other source could be the reactors themselves,” he said.

The safety of fish and other foods from around Fukushima remains a concern among ordinary Japanese, among the world’s highest per capita consumers of seafood.

Most fish and seafood from along the Fukushima coast are barred from the domestic market and export. In June, authorities lifted bans on octopus and sea snails caught off Fukushima after testing showed very low levels of radiation.

But the most contaminated fish found yet off Fukushima were caught in August, some 17 months after the disaster. The two greenlings, which are bottom-feeders, had cesium levels of more than 25,000 becquerels per kilogram, 250 times the level the government considers safe.

A government fisheries official, Chikara Takase, acknowledged that the figure for the greenlings was “extremely high,” but he added high numbers were detected only in limited kinds of fish sampled in the restricted waters closest to the plant. He acknowledged that “we have yet to arrive at a situation that allows an overall lifting of the ban.”

To bolster public confidence in food safety, the government in April tightened restrictions for cesium-134 and cesium-137 on seafood from 500 to 100 becquerels per kilogram. But the step led to confusion among consumers as people noticed more products were barred.

Plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. said some radioactive water used to cool the Fukushima reactors leaked into the ocean several times, most recently in April.

“Given the 30-year half-life of cesium-137, this means that even if these sources (of contamination) were to be shut off completely, the sediments would remain contaminated for decades to come,” Buesseler wrote in Science.

Experts suspect that radioactive water from the plant is seeping into the ground water at the same time, and is continuing to make its way into the ocean.

Hideo Yamazaki, a marine biologist at Kinki University, agrees with Buesseler’s theory that the cesium is leaking from the Fukushima nuclear plant and that it will contaminate seafood for more than a decade.

He said he believes the plant will continue to leak until cracks and other damage to the three reactors that melted down are repaired. It’s unclear when that work will be completed, or even how, because radiation levels in the reactors are too high for humans or even robots.

“The current levels of contamination in the fish and seafood from the Fukushima coast will continue for a while, perhaps more than 10 years, judging from the progress in the cleanup process,” Yamazaki said in an email.

Buesseler, who led an international research cruise off northeastern Japan in 2011 to study the spread of radionuclides from the Fukushima plant, says predicting patterns of contamination requires more than monitoring data on fish. Careful study of the ocean waters and sediments is also needed to determine how quickly the system will recover.

__

Associated Press writer Mari Yamaguchi contributed to this report.

end quote

5. The Myth of Containment at all times.

The tanks are a pantomime aimed at giving an appearance of control. If one cannot control the pollution, it is imperative to control the perceptions of people. For there is an original promise made by the nuclear elite from which all the other and later promises follow. That is: “A sealed source WILL NEVER BE UNSEALED TO PLACE THE PUBLIC AT RISK”. This is the promise they have broken every day since 1942. http://oregonstate.edu/ehs/rso/training/sealedsource-2

From Oregon State University Website, Environmental Health and Safety page.

Definition of Sealed Source
“Sealed Source” is a term used to describe radioactive sources that have been designed to prevent spread of radioactive material under normal working condition. Here is the definition from the State of Oregon Rules for Control of Radiation:

“Sealed Source” means radioactive material that is permanently bonded or fixed in a capsule or matrix designed to prevent release and dispersal of the radioactive material under the most severe conditions which are likely to be encountered in normal use and handling.
(Oregon Administrative Rules (OAR) 333-100-0005)

(an example of the sealed souyrce rule) Every fuel rod is a sealed source and must not be unsealed and released into the lving space or biosphere. Pictures of sealed sources and allegedly recontained escaped sources follow:


sealed sources


allegedly recontained escaped sources. This does not add up.

6. Tepco needs that water . Even as it denied the leaks for 2 years, they used that water to cool and cleanse the plant, and let it flow to sea. The presure and flow rate of the fukushima aquifer is determined by snow melt n the moutains and rainfall. Lake Barrett , on a mission of perception mitigation from US DOE is in Japan saying is all is well. When did he arrive in relation to the variation of the flow rate? At the point where it naturally dimishes. At 3 Mile Mile Island he had the luxury of letting the water evaporate. That would take a few years and few more acres at Fukusima. I have gotten this far in trying to figure the plan, written in 1967, in the event of worst case. The case post 3/11: https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2013/08/27/cold-shutdown-leaky-reactors-changed-ground-water-flow-and-leaky-tanks/ The stark admission by New Scientist that the ground water is being diverted TO the reactors being the key to understanding the situation. If Fukushima’s soil was dry, it would all go to the air. But because water is involved with nuclear fuel, Mr Ergen would not be entirely pleased. Because of the “Devil’s Balance”.

The flow rate of the Fukushima aquifer is determined by the snow melt in the mountains and the rainfall on the Fukushima Plains.

They need the water and divert it: The following extract from New Scientist magazine describes the use to which Tepco has put the ground water:

” Every day, 400 tonnes of groundwater flows down from peaks overlooking the complex, invades the stricken reactor halls and is contaminated. At present, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco), which runs the plant, redirects the water over the reactor cores to keep them cool. After filtering to remove radioactive caesium, the water is stored in tanks. Huge volumes are being placed in 1060 tanks, each holding up to 1000 tonnes.” New Scientist, http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24100-should-fukushimas-radioactive-water-be-dumped-at-sea.html#.UhyDWM5R4vR Should Fukushima’s radioactive water be dumped at sea? Updated 10:17 27 August 2013 by Andy Coghlan.

7. the Devil’s Balance. “reactors are designed to operate with a moderator. This is a substance, spread throughout the reaction space, containing light nuclei that do not absorb neutrons. In collision with a light nucleus (such as hydrogen or carbon), the neutron scatters, and as result loses a considerable fraction of its energy. After a few such scatterings, its energy gets down to the level where it has a high probability of absorption by 235U. The moderator in most American reactors is water…..The reactor consists of a large pool of water. Immersed in this pool are a large number of fuel rods. These are narrow cylinders that contain small pellets (about the size of a pea) of uranium. Neutrons released in one fission will usually travel out of one of the fuel rods, and have to pass through some water before they encounter uranium in another fuel rod. The effect of the water, primarily its hydrogen nuclei, is to slow the neutrons, and allow them to initiate further fissions. Without the moderator fission probability is too low and the reactor stops WITHOUT THE THE MODERATOR (in this case, water) FISSION PROBABLITY IS TOO LOW AND THE REACTOR STOPS.” http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/physics/sobel/Nucphys/pile.html

Can we all see the inherent danger of watrer moderated reactors and corium stuck in ground water? And why, perhaps,, for as long as Tepco has blessed the world with its live camthose who do watch it have seen regualr eruptions of steam. Steam eruptions which have only been admitted by Tepco as ocurring only since late 2013. Anbd then once or twice. Why would nuclear industry beam 24/7 video to a limited global net audience and tell another story to the majority of the world’s population? Those who do not watch the live cam? Most of those who do, I bet , being anti nuke. the reason for the live cam has something to do with this: http://sociology.about.com/od/D_Index/g/Deviance-Amplification.htm Nuclear indsutry wants the majority of the world to view its opponents as extremists. Careful how you play your cards.

GE has always made great play of the alleged safety of of its water moderated reactors. The control rods in its reactors are never used to throttle the reactor, they are only inserted at full shut down. At all other times they are fully withdrawn. How are such reactors controlled then? how is their power outpurt and rate of fission varfied? by varying the speed of the water pumps. the faster the pumps, the denser the water, the more neutrons are slowed, the faster the rate of fission, the greater the power output and the more heat there is. The slower the pumps, the less dense the water, the less moderation of neutrons there is, the slonwer the rate of fission. Which is all very well in a small reactor, but when the core is big enough to create such decay heat during full shut down as to melt itself, then what do they do? . They enter the realm of the Devil’s Balance. The more water they pour in the greater the chance of fission, the longer they need to pour water in. More water = power up, less water = power down. Every power up = more fission products which = more decay heat to dissipate over time. It’s been nearly years and the joint is still steaming. And as for the corium, it is the aquifer which is the automatic throttle. The ice wall is plainly a piece of futrist crap. If it were not for the aquifer though and will only ever be mooted and never enacted. Still if it were not for the aquifer and the contamination it has entrained, Tokyo would be a dead zone perhaps. The down side is, that over aeons, its top bit encased in concrete or not, Fukushima Diiachi will end up like a second lost land of Mu. Washed out to sea and at the bottom of it. Aaron, unless Arnie can calculate the additional amount of fission product created since March 2011, he cannot say how much residual energy there is in the ex vessel or in vessel fuel. The longer it takes for people to get a close look at the joint, the better the nukers will like it. I’ll be dead before anyone gets inside the salient places.

A typical image shown to the internet user with a nuclear interest by Tepco via its Fukushima Diiachi Live Cam since March 2011. It portrays a vision of Fukushima which is at complete loggerheads with most mass media reports.

If one does not use the same sources, everything becomes cognitive dissonance and little if any rational debate is heard. Because the visions of the event totally disagree. Hiddin in all this is the truth of the matter. There is no industry narrative of the Tepco Live Cam. Just Deviancy Amplification and an escalation of assertion and denial. It is total crap that steam has issued twice from the site and only since September 2013. It has been issuing smoke and steam and flashes of light since the disaster occurred and Tepco put the cameras in, connected to the world wide web. You will find no mention of this data and image source in any mass media publication from March 2011 until now. Just stories which contradict the continuous video feed. Goebbels would be pleased.


The bottom of every GE Mk1 and Mk2 is peppered with 70 holes and seals fo the bottom up control rods and tubes. When ECCS fails and fuel melts, escape of corium is fast – the control rod seals are not steel and melt quickly. The GE reactors are the ones with hernias in their bases.

The record shows that nuclear authorities knew the ECCS would not work even before the Fukushima Diiachi Unit went on line in the 1970s.


Rather than feighning ignorance, the nuclear industry should own up and actually explain why it needs the water under Fukushima Diiachi. And then it can explain its green clean claim again.

or try to.


Is this a schematic of the Fukushima aquifer or a schematic of an emergency corium and vessel cooling system? Why, its both.

That’s why they put it there.


The DEvil’s Balance : water is the moderator: the more water the faster the reaction goes. The less water the slower it goes.

Mother Nature as a corium throttle = intermittent steam. Since March 2011. IMO. Source: The Tepco Live Cam.


Tepco inducing us plebs to argue amongst ourselves.

8. The official US NRC history of the ECCS controversey. main page: http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/short-history.html topic page: http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/short-history.html#core-cooling (see also http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/short-history.html#meltdown )

People will say I’m making all this up. The quotations are real, the sources are real and if the reader would rather read the belated US Nuclear Regulatory Commission version of the ECCS Controversey, here it is. Compare to Nader and Abbott and other impartial sources and the NRC confirms them. The NRC is short on history, it is a “short history”.

QUOTE: “The Emergency Core Cooling Controversy

At the prodding of the ACRS, which first sounded the alarm about the China syndrome, the AEC established a special task force to look into the problem of core melting in 1966. The committee, chaired by William K. Ergen, a reactor safety expert and former ACRS member from Oak Ridge National Laboratory, submitted its findings to the AEC in October 1967. The report offered assurances about the improbability of a core meltdown and the reliability of emergency core cooling designs, but it also acknowledged that a loss-of-coolant accident could cause a breach of containment if ECCS failed to perform. Therefore, containment could no longer be regarded as an inviolable barrier to the escape of radioactivity. This represented a milestone in the evolution of reactor regulation. In effect, it imposed a modified approach to reactor safety. Previously, the AEC had viewed the containment building as the final independent line of defense against the release of radiation; even if a serious accident took place the damage it caused would be restricted to the plant. Once it became apparent that under some circumstances the containment building might not hold, however, the key to protecting the public from a large release of radiation was to prevent accidents severe enough to threaten containment. And this depended heavily on a properly designed and functioning ECCS.

The problem facing the AEC regulatory staff was that experimental work and experience with emergency cooling was very limited. Finding a way to test and to provide empirical support for the reliability of emergency cooling became the central concern of the AEC’s safety research program. Plans had been underway since the early 1960s to build an experimental reactor, known as the Loss-of-Fluid-Tests (LOFT) facility, at the AEC’s reactor testing station in Idaho. Its purpose was to provide data about the effects of a loss of coolant accident. For a variety of reasons, including weak management of the test program, a change of design, and reduced funding, progress on the LOFT reactor and the preliminary tests that were essential for its success were chronically delayed. Despite the complaints of the ACRS and the regulatory staff, the AEC diverted money from LOFT and other safety research projects on existing light-water reactor design to work in the development of fast-breeder reactors. A proven fast breeder was an urgent objective for the AEC and the Joint Committee; Seaborg described it as “a priority national goal” that could assure “an essentially unlimited energy supply, free from problems of fuel resources and atmospheric contamination.”

To the consternation of the AEC, experiments run at the Idaho test site in late 1970 and early 1971 suggested that the ECCS in light-water reactors might not work as designed. As a part of the preliminary experiments that were used to design the LOFT reactor, researchers ran a series of “semiscale” tests on a core that was only nine inches long (compared with l44 inches on a power reactor). The experiments were run by heating a simulated core electrically, allowing the cooling water to escape, and then injecting the emergency coolant. To the surprise of the investigators, the high steam pressure that was created in the vessel by the loss of coolant blocked the flow of water from the ECCS. Without even reaching the core, about 90 percent of the emergency coolant flowed out of the same break that had caused the loss of coolant in the first place….” END QUOTE (read the whole thing please. The record shows that they knew it would not work….Hence, in worst case, the choice of site at Fukushima. Where mother nature provides the coolant loop of last resort. Poor fishes, farmers and people though.

(Remember the photogrpah of the Fukushima control room white board. The ECCS fails. It is no longer controversial. They have been lying for decades and they know it. )

See also :

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/short-history.html#meltdown official US NRC history “The Problem of Core Meltdown”.

That the spirit of Chester E. Holifield still taints nuclear industry and guides its dilberations is revealed in the decades long knowledge the industry has the ECCS does not work.

Chester E. Holifield
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Chester E. Holifield, US Representative from California, 1970
The Chet Holifield Federal Building

Chester Earl “Chet” Holifield (December 3, 1903 – February 6, 1995) was a United States Representative from California. He was born in Mayfield, Graves County, Kentucky. He moved with his family to Springdale, Arkansas in 1912. He attended the public schools and moved to Montebello, California in 1920 where he engaged in the manufacture and selling of men’s apparel from 1920 to 1943. He was chair of the Los Angeles County Democratic Central committee of the 51st District from 1934 to 1938. He was chair of the California State Central committee of the 12th congressional district from 1938 to 1940. He was also a delegate to each Democratic National Convention from 1940 to 1964.

Holifield was elected as a Democrat to the 78th and to the fifteen succeeding Congresses and served from January 3, 1943 until his resignation on December 31, 1974. He was not a candidate for reelection in 1974 to the 94th Congress.

Holifield resumed the manufacture and selling of men’s apparel after leaving Congress. He died on February 6, 1995.

While in Congress, he was chair of the U.S. House Committee on Government Operations (91st through 93rd Congresses) and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (87th, 89th, and 91st Congresses). He was member of the President’s Special Evaluation Commission on Atomic Bomb Tests at Bikini Atoll, 1946. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, as a member of the House Military Operations Subcommittee, he was a strong advocate of fallout shelters and said that the United States should “build a nationwide system of underground shelters”.[2] Holifield was also a congressional adviser to international conferences on uses of atomic energy, nuclear weapons testing, water desalinization, and disarmament.

Alvin M. Weinberg, who advocated inherent safety in reactor design, recounted an incident from 1972, where Holifield stated: “if you are concerned about the safety of reactors, then I think it may be time for you to leave nuclear energy.”[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chester_E._Holifield

The Japanese Diet would have us belive that the spirit of Holifield, as it stalks that land, is particularly Japanese. It aint.

Its Western.

You would have been better off importing rice and beef from 1950 Japan, than importing the technology and spirit of Mr Holifield.

Still I guess the heads of Nuke in Japan can’t even thread a needle.

I cannot be correct in all that I conclude on the basis of the evidence.

Which of course, gives nothing away to the nukers. After all, the salient fact is that 30 years after the assertions of the infalibility of the ECCS and the regs were asserted, the fact of ECCS failure was reported at 16.36 via the Fukushima Diiachi whiteboard.

That’s all one really needs to know. Because the problem has not been fixed in any nuclear reactor built anywhere in the world.

And like the man said, anyone concerned with reactor safety was kicked out of the industry 30 years ago.

“Oh Plutonium is quite safe to eat”: Dr Yamashita, head of the Japanese government childhood disease monitoring program, Fukushima, 2011.

If there is any truth to any of the source documents cited, quoted and reproduced here, the situation is a decades old scandal which should result in the dismemberment of nuclear industry and nuclear culture as it now exits.

You cannot keep this secret Mr Abe, its an American scandal foisted on the Japanese people in 1967. The more you keep it secret, the bigger the puppet you seem to me to be.


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