Nuclear Power is green -garbage bag green.
Nuclear Power is green -garbage bag green.
Voice of Russia 26 March 2014
Japanese gov’t conceals high radiation data in Fukushima region from public
The Japanese government has postponed releasing the results of its latest measurement of radiation in three municipalities of the Fukushima region. The reason is the results are higher than expected, an unnamed source said in an interview with the Mainichi newspaper.
The matter is that the three municipalities in question currently have an active evacuation order, which might be lifted soon, and the government supports the lifting. That is why the Cabinet Office team decided to withhold the data as it might discourage residents from going back.
The recent measurements were significantly higher than expected: the levels were at 2.6 to 6.6 millisieverts a day, while expectations were at 1 to 2 millisieverts. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency and National Institute of Radiological Science decided to recalculate the results basing on an assumption that people would spend shorter periods outdoors than it is usually assumed in these cases (six hours instead of eight). The new results were submitted to the Cabinet Office team, and they plan to announce them later this month.
Atsuo Tamura from the Cabinet Office team has confirmed the recalculation and unreleased documents, but denied any attempts to conceal anything. But a professor of radiation and hygiene from the Dokkyo Medical University, Shinzo Kimura, has another opinion: “The assumption of eight hours a day outside and 16 hours inside is commonly used, and it is strange to change it. I can’t see it as anything but them fiddling with the numbers to make them come out as they wanted.”
Chernobyl Radiation-induced Thyroid Cancers in Belarus
Mikhail V. MALKO
Joint Institute of Power and Nuclear Research, National Academy of Sciences of Belarus
Krasin Str. 99, Minsk, Sosny, 220109, Republic
of Belarus: firstname.lastname@example.org QUOTE: ” absence of marked latency period is another feature of radiation-induced thyroid cancers caused in Belarus as a result of this accident. “
v.239(4); Apr 2004
Latency Period of Thyroid Neoplasia After Radiation Exposure
Shoichi Kikuchi, MD, PhD, Nancy D. Perrier, MD, Philip Ituarte, PhD, MPH, Allan E. Siperstein, MD, Quan-Yang Duh, MD, and Orlo H. Clark, MD
From the From Department of Surgery, UCSF Affiliated Hospitals, San Francisco, California.
“Latency Period of Benign and Malignant Thyroid Tumors
Although some sporadic tumors unrelated to radiation may be included among our patients, the shortest latency period for both benign and malignant tumors was 1 year as occurred in 3 patients, whereas the longest time was 69 and 58 years, respectively.”
Nat Clin Pract Endocrinol Metab. 2007 May;3(5):422-9.
Mechanisms of Disease: molecular genetics of childhood thyroid cancers.
Yamashita S, Saenko V.
Department of Molecular Medicine, Atomic Bomb Disease Institute, Nagasaki University, Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences, Japan. email@example.com
“The incidence of thyroid cancer in children increased dramatically in the territories affected by the Chernobyl nuclear accident; this increase is probably attributable to (131)I and other short-lived isotopes of iodine released into the environment. There was a broad range of latency periods in children who developed thyroid cancer; some periods were less than 5 years.”
Why did Yamashita change his tune after 3/11?
“Minimum Latency & Types or Categories of Cancer” John Howard, M.D., Administrator World Trade Center Health Program, 9.11 Monitoring and Treatment, Revision: May 1, 2013,
http://www.cdc.gov/wtc/pdfs/wtchpminlatcancer2013-05-01.pdf states that the latent period for Thyroid cancer is :
“2.5 years, based on low estimates used for lifetime risk modeling of low-level ionizing radiation studies”, pdf page 1.
Why aren’t journalists asking the right questions?
“Matsuda A, Matsuda T, Shibata A, Katanoda K, Sobue T, Nishimoto H and The Japan Cancer Surveillance Research Group. Cancer Incidence and Incidence Rates in Japan in 2007: A Study of 21 Population-based Cancer Registries for the Monitoring of Cancer Incidence in Japan (MCIJ) Project. Japanese Journal of Clinical Oncology, 43: 328-336, 2013 Download Source Data as Excel spreadsheets at http://ganjoho.jp/pro/statistics”
Dataset: “Incidence (National estimates), cancer_incidence(1975-2008)E.xls” Link: http://ganjoho.jp/pro/statistics/en/cancer_incidence(1975-2008)E.xls
A. THYROID CANCER INCIDENCE EACH YEAR, 0 – 19 YEARS OLD, WHOLE OF JAPAN, 1975-2008
1. BOTH GENDERS
B. THYROID CANCER NUMBER OF NEW CASES EACH YEAR 0 -19 YEARS OLD, WHOLE OF JAPAN
1. BOTH GENDERS
FUKUSHIMA – see previous post (FMU official thyroid survey findings. Press reports :
http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/542493/20140310/fukushimBy Esther Tanquintic-Misa | March 10, 2014 3:12 PM EST a-thyroid-cancer-children-trust-disaster-chernobyl.htm
International Business Times
Fukushima 3 Years After: Thyroid Cancer Cases Among Children Rising by By Esther Tanquintic-Misa | March 10, 2014 3:12 PM EST
Cases of thyroid cancer among children residing in Fukushima have grown steadily since the disastrous March 2011 incident. Citizens have all but lost hope and confidence in their government. And three years after, no one has been made accountable for the supposed worst nuclear disaster since the 1986 Chernobyl.
To say that Fukushima’s children have been robbed of their childhood and right to play and explore the outside world is an understatement….Doctors have seen a rising number in the cases thyroid cancer in children and young adults in Fukushima. In February, the cases of thyroid cancer in individuals aged between 18 and below jumped to 75, where 33 were confirmed to have cancer.
On Sunday, thousands joined anti-nuclear protests to signify their loss of trust against the government as the latter moves to reignite the country’s 50 idled nuclear reactors….So far, 254,000 out of 375,000 Fukushima children have been tested for possible cancer ailments and will continue to be screened in their entire lifetime…”
“A child walks past a geiger counter, measuring a radiation level of 0.162 microsievert per hour, at a square in front of Koriyama Station in Koriyama, west of the tsunami-crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, Fukushima prefecture March 1, 2014. March 11 marks the third anniversary of the earthquake and tsunami that devastated Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. In Koriyama, a short drive from the crippled Fukushima nuclear plant, the city recommended shortly after the disaster that children up to two years old not spend more than 15 minutes outside each day. Those aged 3 to 5 should limit their outdoor time to 30 minutes or less. The limits were lifted last year, but many kindergartens and nursery schools continue to obey them even now in line with the wishes of worried parents. An annual survey by the Fukushima prefecture Board of Education found that children in Fukushima weighed more than the national average in virtually every age group. The cause seems to be a lack of exercise and outdoor activity. Picture taken March 1, 2014. REUTERS/Toru Hanai”
SNAFU.Must have employed Barry Brooks, Pam Sykes and Andrew Bolt as dosimeter calibrators.
Probably true of the rest of the population.
Asahi Shimbun, 26 March 2014
y TOMOHIRO YAMAMOTO/ Staff Writer
Tokyo Electric Power Co. underestimated internal radiation doses of 142 individuals who worked at its Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant immediately after the triple meltdown three years ago, according to the health ministry.
Also on March 25, the ministry said it instructed TEPCO to strictly monitor the health of workers according to established procedure.
The ministry said it revised the workers’ radiation exposure records upward by an average of 5.86 millisieverts.
In one exceptional case, the radiation dose was amended by an additional 89.83 millisieverts, from 90.27 millisieverts to 180.10 millisieverts, exceeding the government-set limit of 100 millisieverts over five years.
The TEPCO employee continued to work at nuclear facilities because the utility believed the person’s radiation dose was well under the limit, according to ministry officials.
The health ministry also said an additional two individuals exceeded the legal annual limit of 50 millisieverts due to the new findings.
Twenty-four of the 142 individuals whose records were revised upward were TEPCO employees. The other 118 were contractors from 18 partner firms.
The government has examined the records of 1,536 of the 7,529 employees and contractors who worked at the plant between March and April in 2011. It did so after discovering in late January that TEPCO had used inadequate methods to estimate some workers’ radiation doses while rechecking TEPCO’s health management of workers.
The utility, for example, underestimated internal doses of those who had taken iodine tablets to protect their thyroid glands from radiation exposure. It remains unclear whether and how much the agent had reduced exposure levels.
Reader known as Captain D writes:
“I propose that the Chairman of the NRC would be well advised to fund an independently done History: After 3/11 and then once it is completed, use it to examine exactly what responses by the NRC were later found incorrect, in order to determine how they occurred, since it is obvious that the NRC chain of command failed in its duty to keep the public informed with factual up to date information. This effort would be similar to an NRC AIT review and would result in the NRC being far better prepared if/when the next nuclear incident/accident occurs so that it can fulfill its mandate by responding far more Professionally.
This History is very important because if/when the next “Fukushima” occurs, the NRC needs to respond in a more Professional manner that relies upon best practices, instead of just nuclear industry protectionism. Since the NRC already has existing funds for many programs and/or studies, funding this historical review should be given top priority. I believe that Paul Langley, myself and a few others that have been documenting this information since 3/11/11 would be most interested in this undertaking since we have already collected most of the publicly available documentation that we would need to complete this History.
Example: Paul Langley’s Nuclear History Blog
A multi-part series of “Flashbacks” of the News released immediately after Fukushima occurred.
Paul Langley’s series uses actual News accounts that were published and/or official reports that were considered factual at the time they were released. This series also illustrates just how MSM was really only reporting information that (no surprise to many of us) was later found to be completely inaccurate because it tried to protect the nuclear industry from the fallout of Fukushima’s triple meltdowns!
The effects of low‐dose radiation: Soviet science, the nuclear industry – and independence?
Author: Anders Pape Møller, Timothy A. Mousseau
Published: Feb 15, 2013 – From issue: Volume 10 Issue 1 (February 2013)
Anders Pape Møller and Timothy A. Mousseau (2013) Investigating the Effects of Low-Dose Radiation from Chernobyl to Fukushima: History Repeats Itself. Asian Perspective: October-December 2013, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 551-565.
Special Issue: After Fukushima: The Right to Know
Investigating the Effects of Low-Dose Radiation from Chernobyl to Fukushima: History Repeats Itself
Anders Pape Møller , Timothy A. Mousseau
The disasters at Chernobyl and Fukushima released large amounts of radioactive material, equivalent to many hundreds of nuclear bombs the size of those at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Currently, there is worldwide interest in the effects of so-called low-dose radiation on public health and on biological systems from molecules to ecosystems. Research efforts to quantify these effects constitute a curious mixture of Soviet science, research by independent scientists, and research supported by the nuclear industry. The article explains how navigating between these diverse efforts can be reconciled to synthesize available information to the benefit of the general public and the policymaking community.
Note to readers: Some days after my initial cut and paste of this article from the New York Times, I revisited the NYT site to find editorial changes and a correction had occurred. On 14 March 2014 the article headline had changed from “Squelching Efforts to Measure Fukushima Meltdown” to “Concerns Over Measurement of Fukushima Fallout”. So I have changed my headline to reflect this. The New York Times has added the following at the bottom of the text to the article: “Correction: March 17, 2014 An earlier version of the headline with this article misstated the actions of the Japanese government. There are deep differences over how to determine the health impact of the Fukushima disaster. The authorities are not ‘‘squelching” efforts to measure the effects of the accident.” To Australian readers who remember the story of Dr. Marston and the British nuclear tests I would suggest we are seeing a similar cultural event in Japan. When the power elite wish to push a particular barrow, that elite, be it political, military or whatever, are quite capable of the social engineering needed to make their dreams comes true at the expense of the needs and wishes of ordinary who occupy the living space affected. Apparently this aspect of Japanese nuclear culture is powerful enough to reach right into the editorial offices of the New York Times. Reference to Dr Marston: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedley_Marston “In the 1950s, Marston’s research into fallout from the British nuclear tests at Maralinga brought Marston into bitter conflict with the government appointed Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee. He was vindicated posthumously by the McClelland Royal Commission, which found that significant radiation hazards existed at many of the Maralinga test sites long after the tests.
His project also tracked fallout across the continent by examining the thyroids of sheep and cattle as well as devices that filtered radioactive elements from air. Later the results, which showed dramatic increases of certain radioactive elements after British Nuclear Tests, caused a further, controversial study where the bones of deceased people (especially children) were burnt to ash and then measured for Strontium-90. These tests showed that the tests had increased the concentration of Strontium-90 dramatically. As well as finding this after British tests a notable 50% increase was noticed one year when there were no tests and it was cited as evidence that the previous years hydrogen bomb tests had contaminated the majority of the world.” Marston was threatened by government agents, had his work censored and delayed, had his private mail opened by security services and was accused of being a communist. In the 1980s a Royal Commission in Australia found that his main opponent, the Chair of Atomic Weapons Test Safety Committee, Prof. Titterton was an agent of two foreign power, Britain and the United States. Tittle admitted that he was prevented by secrecy oaths he had taken to those two powers in his disclosures to government and the public of the fallout hazards present in Australia at the time.
There comes a time when media organizations need to determine whether or not they will record the truth, the whole truth and so as is possible, nothing but truth, barring declared advertising. Hopefully NYT does this. And does not bow to pressure to do the opposite.
The New York Times
Concerns Over Measurement of Fukushima Fallout
By DAVID MCNEILL | THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATIONMARCH 16, 2014
TOKYO — In the chaotic, fearful weeks after the Fukushima nuclear crisis began, in March 2011, researchers struggled to measure the radioactive fallout unleashed on the public. Michio Aoyama’s initial findings were more startling than most. As a senior scientist at the Japanese government’s Meteorological Research Institute, he said levels of radioactive cesium 137 in the surface water of the Pacific Ocean could be 10,000 times as high as contamination after Chernobyl, the world’s worst nuclear accident.
Two months later, as Mr. Aoyama prepared to publish his findings in a short, nonpeer-reviewed article for Nature, the director general of the institute called with an unusual demand — that Mr. Aoyama remove his own name from the paper.
“He said there were points he didn’t understand, or want to understand,” the researcher recalled. “I was later told that he did not want to say that Fukushima radioactivity was worse than Chernobyl.” The head of the institute, who has since retired, declined to comment for this article. Mr. Aoyama asked for his name to be removed, he said, and the article was not published.
The pressure he felt is not unusual — only his decision to speak about it. Off the record, university researchers in Japan say that even now, three years after the triple meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, they feel under pressure to play down the impact of the disaster. Some say they cannot get funds or university support for their work. In several cases, the professors say, they have been obstructed or told to steer clear of data that might cause public “concern.”
“Getting involved in this sort of research is dangerous politically,” said Joji Otaki, a biologist at Japan’s Ryukyu University who has written papers suggesting that radioactivity at Fukushima has triggered inherited deformities in a species of butterfly. His research is paid for through private donations, including crowdfunding, a sign, he said, that the public supports his work. “It’s an exceptional situation,” he said.
The precise health impact of the Fukushima disaster is disputed. The government has defined mandatory evacuation zones around the Daiichi plant as areas where cumulative dose levels might reach 20 millisieverts per year, the typical worldwide limit for nuclear-power-plant workers. The limit recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection is one millisievert per year for the public, though some scientists argue that below 100 millisieverts the threat of increased cancers is negligible.
In an effort to lower radiation and persuade about 155,000 people to return home, the government is trying to decontaminate a large area by scraping away millions of tons of radioactive dirt and storing it in temporary dumps. Experts at Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology put the cost of this project at $50 billion — widely considered an underestimate.
The chance to study in this real-life laboratory has drawn a small number of researchers from around the world. Timothy A. Mousseau, a professor of biological sciences at the University of South Carolina who has written widely on Chernobyl, studies the impact of radiation on bird and insect life. He has published papers suggesting abnormalities and defects in some Fukushima species. But he said his three research excursions to Japan had been difficult.
In one case, a Japanese professor and two postdoctoral students dropped out of a joint research paper, telling him they could not risk association with his findings. “They felt it was too provocative and controversial,” he said, “and the postdocs were worried it could hamper their future job prospects.”
Mr. Mousseau is careful to avoid comparisons with the Soviet Union, which arrested and even imprisoned scientists who studied Chernobyl. Nevertheless, he finds the lukewarm support for studies in Japan troubling: “It’s pretty clear that there is self-censorship or professors have been warned by their superiors that they must be very, very careful,” he said.
The “more insidious censorship” is the lack of funding at a national level for these kinds of studies, he added. “They’re putting trillions of yen into moving dirt around and almost nothing into environmental assessment.”
Long before an earthquake and tsunami triggered the Fukushima meltdown, critics questioned the influence of Japan’s powerful nuclear lobby over the country’s top universities. Some professors say their careers have been hobbled because they expressed doubts about the nation’s nuclear policy and the coalition of bureaucrats, industrialists, politicians and elite academics who created it.
Mr. Aoyama, who now works at Fukushima University, sees no evidence of an organized conspiracy in the lack of openness about radiation levels — just official timidity. Despite the problems with his Nature article, he has written or co-written eight published papers since 2011 on coastal water pollution and other radiation-linked themes.
But stories of problems with Fukushima-related research are common, he said, including accounts of several professors’ being told not to measure radiation in the surrounding prefectures. “There are so many issues in our community,” he said. “The key phrase is ‘don’t cause panic.”’
He is also critical of the flood of false rumors circulating about the reach of Fukushima’s radioactive payload.
Ken Buesseler, a senior scientist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution’s department of marine chemistry and geochemistry, in Massachusetts, who has worked with Mr. Aoyama, said he has spent much of his professional energy fighting the rumor mill. The cause is not helped, he added, by institutional attempts to gag Japanese professors.
“Researchers are told not to talk to the press, or they don’t feel comfortable about talking to the press without permission,” Mr. Buesseler said. A veteran of three post-earthquake research trips to Japan, he wants the authorities to put more money into investigating the impact on the food chain of Fukushima’s release of cesium and strontium. “Why isn’t the Japanese government paying for this, since they have most to gain?”
One reason, critics say, is that after a period of national soul searching, when it looked as if Japan might scrap its commercial reactors, the government is again supporting nuclear power. Since the conservative Liberal Democrats returned to power, in late 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has begun trying to sell Japan’s nuclear technology abroad.
Professors, meanwhile, say that rather than simply defend what is a piecemeal approach to studying the disaster, the government should take the lead in creating a large, publicly financed project.
“If we’ve ever going to make any headway into the environmental impact of these disasters, statistical power, scientific power, is what counts,” said Mr. Mousseau of the University of South Carolina. “We get at it with massive replication, by going to hundreds of locations. That costs money.” end quote
This suppression of research via the harassment of researchers in Japan has been occurring throughout Japan’s atomic age and came to a head immediately post Fukushima.
On 3 April 2013 I received an email from a US researcher who was working in Japan with Japanese researchers. His email read in part: “As for Japanese researchers, I m not sure about effects on careers. However, it is clear that there is self censorship going on, presumably motivated by fears of negative impacts on their careers. Several of our collaborators were reluctant to be co-authors on our papers. And I have heard similar stories from others (you could ask Ken Bueseller at Woods Hole for his experience). Best wishes,…..University of South Carolina”
Assessment of individual radionuclide distributions from the Fukushima nuclear accident covering central-east Japan
Norikazu Kinoshitaa,1,2, Keisuke Suekia, Kimikazu Sasaa, Jun-ichi Kitagawaa, Satoshi Ikarashia, Tomohiro Nishimuraa, Ying-Shee Wonga, Yukihiko Satoua, Koji Handaa,Tsutomu Takahashia, Masanori Satob, andTakeyasu Yamagatab
Edited by James E. Hansen, Goddard Institute for Space Studies, New York, NY, and approved September 29, 2011 (received for review July 24, 2011)
A tremendous amount of radioactivity was discharged because of the damage to cooling systems of nuclear reactors in the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant in March 2011. Fukushima and its adjacent prefectures were contaminated with fission products from the accident. Here, we show a geographical distribution of radioactive iodine, tellurium, and cesium in the surface soils of central-east Japan as determined by gamma-ray spectrometry. Especially in Fukushima prefecture, contaminated area spreads around Iitate and Naka-Dori for all the radionuclides we measured. Distributions of the radionuclides were affected by the physical state of each nuclide as well as geographical features. Considering meteorological conditions, it is concluded that the radioactive material transported on March 15 was the major contributor to contamination in Fukushima prefecture, whereas the radioactive material transported on March 21 was the major source in Ibaraki, Tochigi, Saitama, and Chiba prefectures and in Tokyo.
Fukushima-derived radionuclides in the ocean and biota off Japan
Ken O. Buesselera,1, Steven R. Jayneb, Nicholas S. Fisherc, Irina I. Rypinab Hannes Baumannc, Zofia Baumannc, Crystaline F. Breiera, Elizabeth M. Douglassb, Jennifer Georgec, Alison M. Macdonaldb, Hiroomi Miyamotod, Jun Nishikawad, Steven M. Pikea, and Sashiko Yoshidab
” The Fukushima accident was characterized by core overheating that led to the venting of radioactive gases, hydrogen explosions, and fires associated with spent fuel rods; this resulted in the preferential release of more volatile radionuclides, such as Cs, and gases to the atmosphere.”
On the basis of the evidence reported by qualified, peer reviewed papers, the Japan Atomic Industry Forum, IAEA reports, coupled with some media reports, and the order for people to stay indoors from 15 March 2011 issued by the Japanese government that fuel rods in spent fuel rods were “burning” (rapidly oxidizing) on 15 March 2011 in spent fuel pool number 4.
This is worst case scenario according to WASH-740. The “fires” for at least part of the time were hard to see and this indicate grave overheating of zirconium. Rapid oxidation of zirconium can occur without flame. The presence or absence of flame being irrelevant to the structural harm done to the rod cladding by extreme overheat. The indications are that the explosion in spent fuel pool 4 of 15 March 2011 was due to Hydrogen release from overheating spent fuel rods. The “burning” continued for some time. The “fire” was “put out” twice. The fuel rods continued to overheat for some time, Fukushima Diary publishing information which indicates overheating continued on and off for a number of weeks.
The main release of radionuclides from Fukushima Diiachi appears to have been on 15 March 2011.
The nuclear industry needs to tell the truth for once.
The fact is that the conventional explanations of “burning zirconium” and the alleged impossibility of “putting out” “burning zirconium” are inaccurate. The issue being one of reducing the temperature of overheating zirconium so as to prevent structural damage and release of radionuclides.
Obviously it is possible to cool overheating zirconium even when it is rapidly oxidizing.
The events of 15 March 2011 indicate that the current program to removed spent fuel rods from Spent Fuel Pool Number 4 will involve the disturbance and removal of fuel rods which were damaged and breached on 15 March 2011.
At the end of this, despite the grave damage suffered by Japan as a result of the events of 15 March 2011, the nuclear industry will turn around and claim reports of the consequences of a spent fuel pool fire are greatly exaggerated even though it was the nuclear authorities who many years ago gave the exaggerated consequences via WASH 740. On this basis, despite the grave harm done to Japan and its people on 15 March 2011, nuclear industry will attempt to use the Fukushima Diiachi disaster as a proof of nuclear safety. Whereas in fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The industry has always spoken in extremes. The world is in colour, not in black and white. The harms from the disaster are substantial and almost caused the death of a modern state. People are being placed at risk in order to prevent economic and social chaos in Japan today. The economic and social costs are actually substantial. The medical outcomes yet to be determined.
Nuclear power is not safe.